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 In the 1970s, a movement arose among white American evangelicals and 
fundamentalists that has been labeled variously as the “Christian Right,” or more broadly, 
“the Religious Right.” While they had not been entirely apolitical in the middle decades 
of the twentieth century, in the 1970s many theologically conservative Protestants began 
to organize specifically around their religious concerns, forming a number of groups—of 
which the Moral Majority was the best-known—in an effort to “bring the nation back to 
God.” They also moved to the political right, joining forces with “New Right” activists 
who were seeking to push the Republican Party in a more conservative direction. This 
dissertation examines the deep roots, long development and vigorous deployment of the 
ideology of the leaders of this movement. This ideology can be described as a “political 
theology,” since these evangelicals and fundamentalists thought and wrote in theological 
categories. Leaders like Jerry Falwell believed that the nation had been founded in a 
special relationship with God; that it was now being corrupted by an anti-God 
philosophy; that things as varied as abortion, the push for gay and lesbian rights, the lack 
of prayer in public schools, the Equal Rights Amendment, and attempts to reduce the 
nation’s nuclear weapons were evidence of this corruption; and that the time might be 
short before God judged America. In the words of II Chronicles 7:14, these leaders 
sought to “heal their land.”   
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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
 
 
 In the course of researching and writing this dissertation, I had a conversation 
with a family friend, a woman who has known me since I was a boy. When she heard that 
my topic was the political views of evangelicals, she expressed interest. She and I both 
would consider ourselves evangelicals, and she is from a rural community in central 
Nebraska that would be almost entirely “red,” to use the color-coded parlance for 
Republican that has become popular in recent years. Yet from the vantage point of her 
eight decades in that community, she looked with some bemusement on the political 
affiliations of her neighbors, recalling a time when many in that same community voted 
for Franklin Roosevelt, the New Deal, and Democrats. Why is it, she asked me, that so 
many evangelicals now vote Republican?  
 I attempted to answer her question, fumbling for a succinct response. This 
dissertation is an attempt to do better, although it is hardly succinct. In part, what I am 
doing here is attempting to explain evangelicals to themselves, to elucidate the origins of 
the political ideology that many of them take for granted. For many evangelicals, a 
Democratic affiliation—common a generation or two ago—would be unthinkable now; in 
many of their churches, theological conservatism is assumed to translate into political 
conservatism. As an historian and a pastor, perhaps I can in some small way bring clarity 
to the thinking of my fellow evangelicals. I have no desire to tell them how or whether to 
vote. But my friend’s question is an excellent one, and worth pondering. Why the alliance 
between Republicans and evangelicals? Why do many evangelicals accord politics the 
importance they do?  
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 I am also attempting to explain evangelical conservative political theology to 
outsiders, for to many non-evangelicals—even to some evangelicals who do not share 
it—that ideology is mystifying at best. To those who are less generous, it is willfully 
obtuse or incoherent in its commitments. These include a so-called “pro-life” stance on 
edge-of-life issues—abortion and euthanasia—while supporting capital punishment and 
calling for less aid to the poor; a prophetic scheme that details the end of this world while 
expressing little concern for earth-care in the present; ardent support for Israel regardless 
of that nation’s actions; suspicion of the broadly accepted theories of evolution and 
climate change; denigration of “big government” while simultaneously seeking 
government enforcement of “morality” and an expansion of military spending; and a 
fervent and unqualified belief in America’s “Christian” past despite evidence that might 
temper that claim. Many of these stances make little sense to those outside the ideology. 
That could be said, of course, of any political ideology; any such ideology seems strange 
to those do not share it. Yet thoughtful outsiders will seek to understand, and I hope to 
assist in that process. I may not share much of the political ideology of the Christian 
Right, but I do share most of the basic theological commitments of the evangelicals who 
are part of the movement, and I do not wish to see them misunderstood or caricatured.  
 I am grateful for that conversation and many others over the years that have 
helped me think through these issues. I am also deeply grateful for the kindness and 
flexibility of my fellow Christian disciples at St. Paul’s Evangelical Country Church, the 
church I pastor; I could not have completed this project without their willingness to let 
their pastor dabble in academic pursuits. Nor would I have started this particular project 
without the suggestion of Tim Borstelmann, a member of my committee and valued 
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professor, who encouraged me to tackle a project that is quite sweeping in scope. My 
adviser, Benjamin Rader, agreed to continue to serve as such even upon entering 
retirement. I thank him for his unfailing generosity of time, his insightful questions, and 
his suggestions that helped me deepen and clarify the story I attempt to tell. A number of 
others have provided help and encouragement along the way. I am grateful to Abigail 
Sattler, archivist at Liberty University, and Ben Brick, librarian at Grace University, for 
their assistance. Gary Nebeker alerted me to several useful sources. This history would be 
a much poorer one without them; its flaws, of course, belong to me alone.  
 This dissertation has truly been a family project. My parents have engaged in 
many hours of conversation about the Christian Right; my father, also a pastor, has 
always been a wise and trusted sounding board. My three young children have patiently 
put up with this project taking large amounts of my time. As one of my young daughters 
asked many months ago: “Daddy, why do you keep talking about Falwell?”   
 And regarding my wife, Lisa, I can only say that whatever knowledge I have 
gained in the course of my studies pales in comparison to a truly wise thing I did: 
marrying her.  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
REVIVAL AND REFORM 
 
 
 It is a war of ideology, it’s a war of ideas, it’s a war about our way of life. 
 
                 —Paul Weyrich, conservative activist 
 
 
 On September 23, 1949, the American public learned that the Soviet Union had 
atomic weapons. “We have evidence,” the Truman administration announced in a 
statement, “that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the U.S.S.R.” The 
news was not entirely unexpected; Americans had known that Soviet acquisition of bomb 
technology was probably inevitable. But the speed of the Soviet development came as a 
surprise. An article in Time magazine declared: “For the first time, U.S. citizens would 
know, as much of the world had known since 1945, how it feels to live under the threat of 
sudden destruction—coming like a clap of thunder and a rattle of hail.”1 
 Three days after the White House announcement, a thirty-year-old preacher from 
North Carolina began a three-week series of evangelistic meetings in Los Angeles, 
California. It was a campaign that would launch Billy Graham’s career as America’s 
most famous preacher of the twentieth century.
2
 Graham was quick to incorporate the 
sense of fear engendered by the new threat into his sermons. “Russia has the bomb now,” 
he preached in rolling cadences to the crowd assembled under a canvas tent, “the nation’s 
in an armament race, and we’re at each other’s throats, with hate between us, and 
                                                 
 1. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1997), 99-100; Nancy Gibbs and Michael Duffy, The Preacher and the Presidents (New 
York: Hachette Book Group USA, Inc., 2007), 1. 
 
 2. George M. Marsden, Religion and American Culture (Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace College 
Publishers, 1990), 217.  
2 
 
judgment is just around the corner unless we have a revival.” The Soviet Union had 
declared war on God as Satan someday would, Graham said, hinting at a link between the 
Soviets and the Antichrist. Israel—founded the year before in 1948—was its own nation 
“for the first time since the days of ancient Babylon.” Both were signs that the world’s 
final battle, Armageddon, might be quickly approaching.   
 His audience should have no illusions that the United States deserved special 
treatment from God. “We’re no better than Sodom and Gomorrah,” Graham said. “We 
don’t deserve to be spared any more than they were. The same sins that were 
characteristic of Sodom and Gomorrah and Pompeii, the same sins that were 
characteristic of a decadent Rome, the same sins that were characteristic of France in 
1940, when France fell to the German Nazi Panzer divisions, those same sins are right 
here in Los Angeles today.”  
 Nor were politics the answer to the problems of the nation. “I’m not taking up for 
the Republicans or the Democrats. The only party I’m for is the party of Jesus Christ,” 
Graham preached, eliciting applause from the crowd. What was needed was personal 
repentance. “Today, you’ve got your choice: to go Satan’s way, or God’s way. And you 
have to make the choice.”3 The remedy for any nation that is “sin-sick,” he wrote in a 
sermon published two years later, was spelled out in 2 Chronicles 7:14, which reads: “If 
my people which are called by my name shall humble themselves and pray and seek my 
face and turn from their wicked ways, then will I hear from heaven and will forgive their 
sin and will heal their land.” America, wrote Graham, “I challenge you at this hour to a 
                                                 
 3. Billy Graham, “What’s Wrong With the World,” recorded sermon, Oct. 2, 1949, Los Angeles. 
Billy Graham Center Archives, accessed February 17, 2014, http://www2.wheaton.edu/bgc/archives/ 
exhibits/LA49/05sermons01.html#audio. 
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spiritual revival.”4 For Graham, at mid-century, that revival was one to which politics 
would be largely irrelevant.  
 Thirty years after Graham’s Los Angeles revival meetings, another preacher 
would also diagnose America. “America—our beloved country—is sick,” wrote Jerry 
Falwell in 1979. “And when a country becomes sick morally, it becomes sick in every 
other way.” Abortion, pornography, homosexuality, “godless humanism,” “ultra-liberals” 
and feminists were corrupting America’s families, schools and communities. “Creeping 
socialism, which is a first cousin to communism, is taking over the Republic,” Falwell 
wrote. The Soviet Union was still a threat, and the administration of President Jimmy 
Carter was considering signing the results of the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT 
II), a nuclear arms limitation pact, with “the godless, not-to-be trusted Russian 
communists—who are committed to world conquest.” All were signs of America’s 
sickness, Falwell asserted. “It doesn’t take much to see the moral decay invading 
America everywhere.” 
 Like Graham, Falwell believed that America was sick. Like Graham, Falwell 
believed that the nation could recover, and both men saw 2 Chronicles 7:14—referring, in 
the biblical text, to ancient Israel—as having direct application to the United States. The 
“healing” it promised was possible. Yet for Falwell, America’s recovery from its illness 
would require more than revivalist preaching. Political action was called for, and Falwell 
founded the lobbying group Moral Majority in 1979 for that purpose. Those Americans 
who were still standing “on the side of Bible Morality” needed to oppose “the bleeding 
heart liberals” who were attempting to “pass their socialistic and godless legislation at 
                                                 
 4. Graham, “Whither Bound?” in America’s Hour of Decision (Wheaton: Van Kampen Press, 
1951), 146.  
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will…As the ranks of our Moral Majority swell into an army we will be able to look at 
the politicians and the men in high government positions, eye ball to eye ball, and set 
them straight about the direction this great nation must take.”5 Like Graham, Falwell 
called repeatedly for “revival.” But for Falwell, the intended revival was a politicized 
one, a revival in which personal commitment to Christ went hand-in-hand with political 
action. 
 This is not to suggest that Graham was apolitical. Indeed, throughout his career, 
he was closer to the center of American politics than Falwell ever was, as friend, 
confidant and sometime confessor of various American presidents from Harry Truman 
on. Early in his career, there were times when he sounded as if he might use his national 
status for political purposes, as when he boasted in 1952 that he could mobilize sixteen 
million evangelical votes with a word.
6
 In the post-Second World War era, he could be as 
virulently anti-Communist and conspiracy-minded as Senator Joseph McCarthy, as when 
he alleged that there were over a thousand “social sounding organizations that are 
communist and communist operated in this country.”7 Nevertheless, there was a 
difference in how Graham and Falwell perceived the relationship between religion and 
politics. Graham may have had political influence, but he used it primarily as a means of 
gaining respectability and publicity for his revivalist crusades. Falwell, on the other hand, 
sought to use his prominence as a television preacher to gain political influence. Both 
                                                 
 5. Jerry Falwell, “Why the Moral Majority?” in Moral Majority Capitol Report (Washington, 
D.C.: Moral Majority, Inc., August, 1979), The General Materials of the Moral Majority, MOR 1-2, series 
2, folder 2, Liberty University Archive, Lynchburg, VA.  
 
 6. Gibbs and Duffy, The Preacher and the Presidents, x.  
 
 7. Graham, “Whither Bound?”, 144. Later in life, Graham said that he regretted the fervor with 
which he preached anti-Communism, saying that anti-Communism came dangerously close to being his 
“gospel” for a time. Gibbs and Duffy, The Preacher and the Presidents, 24.  
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men saw America as sick and in need of healing. But the cure they recommended was 
radically different.  
 The contrast between these two men illustrates a development that occurred 
within American evangelicalism during the second half of the twentieth century. This 
development is sometimes referred to as the “rise of the Religious Right” or, more 
narrowly, the “Christian Right.” While that movement included other religious groups, 
the change with the greatest impact happened among evangelicals. Simply put, white 
American evangelicals became more politically active and more politically conservative. 
In the 1950s, less than a third of American white evangelicals were identified as 
Republicans; by the end of the twentieth century, nearly two-thirds of them were, as 
illustrated in figure 1.
8
 Not all evangelicals politically mobilized, nor did all of them 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 8. Lyman Kellstedt, John Green, Corwin Smidt and James Guth, “Faith Transformed: Religion 
and Politics From FDR to George W. Bush,” in Religion and American Politics: From the Colonial Period 
to the Present, ed. Mark A. Noll and Luke E. Harlow (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 285.  
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move rightward in their politics. Nevertheless, millions of them came to agree with 
Falwell’s diagnosis and proposed cure of politicized revival: America was indeed sick, 
and political engagement was called for.  
 What changed between 1949 and 1979?  
 Broadly speaking, the answer is that by the late 1970s, many white evangelicals—
and fundamentalists, evangelicalism’s more militant sub-group—had become convinced 
that America had forsaken its “godly roots” and the religious principles that had shaped 
the nation’s founding. Motivated by a deep sense of historical grievance, they believed 
that their beloved country was being stolen from them by a group they described 
variously as liberals, “secular humanists,” or elites intent on foisting godlessness on the 
“moral majority” of America. A philosophy alien to America’s history, they believed, 
was corrupting nearly every sphere of American life: family and gender roles, the public 
role of religion, education, attitudes toward sexuality and the unborn, the nation’s 
military preparedness, media and entertainment, and the nation’s work ethic. The country 
was headed for disaster unless “moral” people stood up to the secular onslaught, and for 
these evangelicals, the battle would have to be fought politically.  
 
A Political Theology 
 In this dissertation, I seek to describe the roots of this way of thinking by tracing 
its development through several centuries of American Christianity, focusing on the 
political theology of American evangelicals. Their political mobilization in the late 1970s 
was not without precedent, for they were heirs of a long tradition within American 
Christianity that saw the nation’s strength and status as divine blessings that were 
contingent on obedience to God. From the 1920s through the 1960s, this tradition had 
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largely gone underground, for various reasons I describe. But it was both revived and 
revised by a number of theologically conservative Protestants who began to see political 
action as essential to their divine calling as Christians and who saw the Republican Party 
as the most promising means of “healing their land” from what they saw as its moral 
corruption.  
 In simple terms, then, I trace the ideology of the Christian Right, by focusing on 
some of its evangelical leaders. Ideology, according to Daniel Bell many years ago, is “a 
way of translating ideas into action…Ideology is the conversion of ideas into social 
levers.”9 Bell’s definition is useful, for Falwell and other activists did indeed attempt to 
take a number of ideas present in the evangelical tradition and translate them into 
action—specifically, political action. By using the term “ideology,” however, I am not 
suggesting that their thought was consistent or always coherent; Falwell, for example, 
was intelligent, but not a theoretician or a political philosopher. As Ed Dobson, one of his 
early lieutenants in the Moral Majority, said later of the organization’s founding: “It was 
kind of a ‘ready, fire, aim’ approach. No one sat around for a lengthy period of time to 
discuss it, to analyze it, to come up with an ideology.”10 The same could probably be said 
of almost any political movement; any movement that grips the imaginations of a wide 
swath of the American public—as the Christian Right has done in the last few decades—
is probably less a tightly organized belief system and more a loose collection of themes, 
symbolic gestures, and catchphrases.  
                                                 
 9. Daniel Bell, “The End of Ideology in the West: An Epilogue,” in The End of Ideology: On the 
Exhaustion of Political Ideas in the Fifties (Glencoe: The Free Press, 1960), 370. 
 
 10. William Martin, With God On Our Side: The Rise of the Religious Right in America (New 
York: Broadway Books, 1996), 200.  
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 Nevertheless, the ideology of the Christian Right was not entirely amorphous, and 
a number of its components can be identified. First and perhaps most important was the 
belief that America had a special relationship with God. Different Christian Right 
activists phrased this in different ways—that America had a “covenant” with God, that it 
was founded by “godly men” upon “godly principles,” that it was a “Christian nation”—
but all shared this sort of religious exceptionalism. It is difficult to overstate the power of 
this version of American history for the Christian Right, for it provided both inspiration 
of and justification for political activism. Asserting America’s “Christian roots” was 
more than simply an observation about America’s past; it was also a mandate for the 
nation to “return to God.”  
 Second, they believed that America had fallen from this state of grace, and many 
of them found the culprit in “secular humanism.” Secular humanism, according to one 
prominent Christian Right leader, is “a man-centered philosophy that attempts to solve 
the problems of man and the world independently of God.”11 They saw this philosophy as 
insidiously effecting a host of social changes, not least the belief that growing 
government power was replacing a trust in God. For many of these politically mobilized 
evangelicals, their understanding of biblical prophecy, which included belief in a future 
world government headed by the Antichrist, gave this encroaching secularism an 
especially ominous cast.  
 Third, Christian Right activists believed that politics was the crucial arena in 
which the battle against secular humanism would be fought. They may have voiced a 
libertarian-sounding suspicion of “big government”—at least with regard to social 
                                                 
 11. Tim LaHaye, The Battle for the Mind (Old Tappan: Fleming H. Revell Company, 1980),  27.  
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programs. But they nevertheless maintained a remarkable faith in the power of politics to 
change the culture of the nation. While this return to politics surprised many observers at 
the time, it was really the reactivation of an earlier vision of their role in public life. 
Evangelicals had always seen themselves as commanded to make a difference in their 
world—Jesus Christ, after all, told his disciples that they were to be “salt” and “light”12—
and from the colonial period through the nineteenth century, many evangelicals had been 
politically engaged. That early ideology was a reformist one—an attempt to change 
society through politics and legislative action. From the 1930s to the 1970s, however, for 
a variety of reasons evangelicals understood their role primarily as an evangelistic one. 
They were to call people to accept the forgiveness of sin and relationship with God that 
Jesus Christ made possible through his death and resurrection; political action, for most 
evangelicals, was not crucial to this task. Thus, during this period, they were largely 
content to seek remedy for the nation’s ills through revival—an initiation or renewal of 
spiritual commitment on the personal and individual level. The activism of the Christian 
Right in the late 1970s was a renewal of the older, reformist type of engagement. 
 Fourth, they saw their political goal as a “moral” one rather than a “religious” or 
theological one. To some outsiders, this distinction appeared somewhat specious, since 
the agenda espoused by the Christian Right appeared, prima facie, to be founded on a 
certain type of Protestant reading of the Bible. But many Christian Right activists and 
thinkers believed their agenda was one that could be endorsed by all concerned citizens, 
regardless of their religious affiliations and theological beliefs. This is not to say that they 
gave up their more narrowly defined “religious” goal of converting others to Christianity. 
                                                 
 12. Matt. 5:13-14.  
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As evangelicals, they still stressed evangelism. But they saw morality as a set of broadly 
held and obvious ethical standards that should be heeded regardless of one’s religious 
beliefs; these standards were ones that a society ignored at its peril. This assertion that 
morality could be separated from religion meant that they could seek allies among 
Roman Catholics, Mormons, Jews and others in a way surprising to anyone who knew 
the antipathy American evangelicals had historically displayed toward these groups. The 
problem was that morality and religion were not so easily separated, and what appeared 
to them to be an inclusivist vision based on a broad moral consensus often appeared to 
others as exclusivist and based on a narrow reading on one religion’s scriptures.  
 Fifth, the “moral” vision that they sought to uphold had four primary areas of 
concern. They wanted a return to “traditional” values regarding sexuality and family life, 
decrying legalized abortion, the feminist movement, the increased acceptance of 
premarital sex and homosexuality, rising divorce rates, and sexualized media. They 
wanted a public deference to religion, especially lamenting the Supreme Court decisions 
that had removed prayer and Bible reading from public schools. They were strongly 
nationalist and were vigorous “cold warriors,” calling for increased military spending and 
a more assertive foreign policy against Communism. And, lastly, they believed that 
government was engaged in far too much social spending and that rather than creating a 
legitimate safety net, such spending was instead eroding the nation’s work ethic. What 
held these disparate concerns together, in part, was a certain conception of “liberty.” For 
the Christian Right, liberty was not the freedom to do whatever one wanted. Rather, 
liberty was the freedom to do what was right in God’s eyes, and in their view, changing 
11 
 
attitudes, “immoral” legislation and court decisions, and Communism were all threats to 
that liberty.  
 To what extent these concerns were “conservative”—which is how evangelical 
political activists began to think of themselves—is a matter of some debate, and depends 
on how one defines the term. At root, “conservative” simply means a certain resistance to 
change; to conserve something means to protect it from a threat.
13
 In this sense, the moral 
vision of the Christian Right was conservative; its members were seeking to turn back the 
clock to certain earlier attitudes, especially with regard to family life and sexuality. Yet in 
other important ways, the Christian Right agenda was at odds with political conservatism.  
 By the 1970s, conservatism consisted of several strands.
14
 Traditionalists like 
Russell Kirk (especially in his 1953 book, The Conservative Mind) argued that civilized 
society needed traditions, customs, and classes as restraints on humanity’s tendency 
toward anarchy; change was not automatically beneficial.
15
 Second, although anti-
Communism was a part of most American’s mental furniture across the political 
spectrum, anti-Communists like Whittaker Chambers saw the ideology not just as a 
political threat but as a metaphysical one; the contest between the United States and the 
                                                 
 13. David T. Koyzis observes that “conservatism is itself not a single unified ideology capable of 
being evaluated as an identifiable doctrinal position.” Rather, a “conservative has a heightened sense that 
with change of any sort comes inevitable loss—often the loss of something good which cannot be 
replaced.” Political Visions and Illusions: A Survey and Christian Critique of Contemporary Ideologies 
(Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 2003),  72-73.  
 
 14. George H. Nash, The Conservative Intellectual Movement in America Since 1945 (New York: 
Basic Books, Inc., 1976), xiii-xix. While it is possible that Nash overestimated the strength of the 
“traditionalist” wing of his fusionist synthesis, his work nevertheless remains an influential account of the 
intellectual history of conservatism. Kim Phillips-Fein, “Conservatism: A State of the Field,” The Journal 
of American History 98, no. 3 (December 2011), 729-730.  
 
 15. Donald T. Critchlow, The Conservative Ascendancy: How the GOP Right Made Political 
History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2007), 19. 
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Soviet Union was a battle between good and evil. Libertarians contributed a third set of 
concerns to conservatism, viewing an expanding government as a threat to individual 
liberty and valuing an unfettered free market as a way of maintaining that freedom. These 
strands were in some ways contradictory, the most obvious tension being the one between 
the radical liberty espoused by libertarians and the customs and mores extolled by 
traditionalists.
16
  
 They also were in partial tension with the agenda of the Christian Right. Christian 
Right activists shared a hatred of “godless Communism”—Falwell bemoaned the “sad 
fact” that the United States only had the capability of killing “3 to 5 per cent of the 
Soviets because of their antiballistic missiles and their civil defense”17—but their vision 
differed from the other two strands. Evangelicalism has historically been a populist 
movement, one that has been skilled in appealing to ordinary citizens; traditionalists, on 
the other hand, were more likely to engage in intellectual debates and to value the role of 
cultural elites in guiding society.
18
 Libertarians, with their stress on individual freedom, 
did not look kindly upon the Christian Right’s desire to use government power to enforce 
a moral code.
19
 Nevertheless, what the Christian Right shared with political conservatism 
                                                 
 16. Jerome L. Himmelstein affirms these same basic strands as making up the “New Right” that 
arose in the second half of the twentieth century: economic libertarianism, social traditionalism and militant 
anti-Communism. He, too, notes the tensions inherent in this mixture. Himmelstein, “The New Right,” in 
The New Christian Right: Mobilization and Legitimation, ed. Robert C. Liebman and Robert Wuthnow 
(New York: Aldine Publishing Company, 1983), 15-18.  
 
 17. Jerry Falwell, Listen, America! (Garden City: Doubleday, 1980), 98. 
 
 18. D.G. Hart, From Billy Graham to Sarah Palin: Evangelicals and the Betrayal of American 
Conservatism (Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company, 2011), 14.  
 
 19. For an analysis of this tension in recent years, see Ryan Sager, The Elephant in the Room: 
Evangelicals, Libertarians, and the Battle to Control the Republican Party (Hoboken: John Wiley & Sons, 
Inc., 2006).  
 
13 
 
was a belief that the federal government was too big—at least in terms of its domestic 
programs, since almost all conservatives defended an expanded military as part of the 
legitimate function of government. The Christian Right also believed that it was too 
secular, but other conservatives were willing to overlook that difference with their own 
agendas for the sake of an alliance.  
 
The Development and Deployment of a Reformist Ideology 
 As Kim Phillips-Fein has recently written, “religion still receives more lip service 
than sustained engagement from political historians.”20 If the Christian Right has become 
one of the most important voting blocs of the GOP, as is frequently noted, then 
understanding the thinking of its members is crucial in grasping the contours of the 
conservative movement. While the Christian Right has been the subject of several 
excellent histories, its ideology—especially the relationship of that ideology to its 
theology—has not been thoroughly elaborated.  
 Daniel K. Williams’ book God’s Own Party: The Making of the Christian Right, 
for example, chronicles the political development of the Christian Right and its marriage 
with the Republican Party, arguing that the story began not in the 1970s but in the 1920s 
when fundamentalists fought against both theological and cultural “liberalism.”21 Darren 
Dochuk has described how the rise of the Christian Right has been in large measure a 
southern story, highlighting the importance of southern California with its religious 
culture of “entrepreneurialism, experimentation, and engagement.”22 Lisa McGirr’s 
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Suburban Warriors: The Origins of the New American Right is also a story of the 
California southland; she examines the growth of political conservatism in Orange 
County during the 1960s and 1970s, and includes in her account the area’s burgeoning 
evangelical churches.
23
 William Martin’s With God on Our Side: The Rise of the 
Religious Right in America, companion book to the film of the same title, contains a 
wealth of interview material and is a broad survey of the development of religious 
conservatism.
24
 Michael Lienesch, a political scientist, provides a useful—although 
somewhat ahistorical—summary of the ideology of the Christian Right.25 Other observers 
seeking to tell the story of the “conservative ascendancy” in the last third of the twentieth 
century have accorded the Christian Right an important place in that history, describing it 
as a rear-guard action to preserve the “traditional” family26 or as part of a general 
backlash against moral permissiveness and the cultural upheaval of the 1960s.
27
 Still 
others have sought to situate the Christian Right against a global backdrop that included a 
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number of political movements from a variety of conservative religious traditions, 
including political Islam, Judaism and Hinduism. In this literature, the Christian Right is 
just one among several movements that have risen in reaction to a perceived erosion of 
values and a fragmentation of community that has accompanied modernization, 
globalization and secularization.
28
  
 What is lacking in this literature is a sustained treatment of the ideology of the 
Christian Right. It is certainly true that the activism of the Christian Right was in part a 
“backlash,” for example, against certain cultural and social changes. But why it was a 
backlash needs to be explained. How did politically active evangelicals come to think 
about politics as they did? In attempting to answer this broad question, I am not asserting 
that all politically active evangelicals—far less all evangelicals!—think in the same way. 
They are and have been a diverse group. Nevertheless, there are common themes in the 
rhetoric of the movement. Examining these ideological themes of the Christian Right is 
by necessity a theological discussion, for its members think and write in theological 
categories; thus, the questions I seek to answer are in part theological ones. How is it that 
evangelical theology, which in the middle of the twentieth century seemed to militate 
against political activism, could for many evangelicals support it by the 1980s? Why did 
evangelicals, whose theology has denigrated “good works” as having little value apart 
from the heart-change of a “born again” experience, seek to use the power of politics to 
coerce “moral” behavior? How did dispensationalism, an influential method of biblical 
interpretation among evangelicals that includes a highly pessimistic view of the future, 
                                                 
 28. See, for example: Gilles Kepel, The Revenge of God: The Resurgence of Islam, Christianity 
and Judaism in the Modern World (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1994); Torkel 
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affect their understanding of politics? How is it that a movement that in the nineteenth 
and early twentieth centuries had cared deeply for a broad range of social issues—such as 
slavery, women’s rights, temperance, child labor, improved housing—could by the 1980s 
be predominately focused on issues relating to sex and the family—such as abortion, 
pornography, homosexuality, feminism and divorce? Finally, why was this political 
theology deployed in the late 1970s? These are questions that are not tangential but 
central to understanding the development of modern American conservatism—or at least 
they should be.  
 Elucidating the theological underpinnings of the Christian Right’s ideology also 
helps shed light on one of the most vexing problems facing historians of modern 
American conservatism: the role of race. Race is one of the primary fault lines in the 
historiography of the movement, with some historians seeing a backlash against the 
changes of the civil rights era as a crucial part of its formation
29
 and others emphasizing 
the importance of economic issues and political principles.
30
 Clearly, in the 1960s and 
1970s the nation made great strides in remedying centuries of racial injustice. These 
changes were both legal—the most obvious examples being the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
and the Voting Rights Act of 1965—and cultural, as overt racism became less acceptable 
in society. No longer could politicians engage in naked race-baiting in an effort to win 
votes. But racial prejudice did not disappear with the passage of these landmark pieces of 
legislation, and a basic question is the extent to which, for example, conservatives’ calls 
                                                 
 29. See, for example, Joseph Crespino, In Search of Another Country: Mississippi and the 
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for “law and order,” a reduction in welfare spending, an expansion of states’ rights versus 
federal power, and an end to school busing were “code” for racial concerns.  
 I am sympathetic to those who see race as central to the conservative resurgence. 
After all, when the Democratic Party became decisively supportive of civil rights for 
African Americans in the 1960s, those within that party who opposed civil rights had to 
go somewhere, and they became open to the Republican invitation to join a party that, 
while not openly racist, did appear to be more in keeping with their concerns. However, 
understanding something of evangelical theology adds another dimension to this 
discussion of race and political conservatism. While I develop this especially in chapter 
3, here I will simply note that because evangelicals have largely understood sin and 
salvation in a personal, individualistic way, many white evangelicals were prone to view 
the civil rights movement with suspicion because it was an attempt to right a social 
wrong without accompanying “regeneration” of the heart.  
 
Evangelicalism and Fundamentalism 
 Thus far, I have used the the term “evangelical” to describe a certain type of 
Protestant Christian. But this obscures an important distinction, because many of those 
who mobilized as part of the Christian Right in the 1970s—including Falwell—identified 
themselves not as evangelicals but as “fundamentalists.”31 Some definitions are 
necessary.  
 Who is an “evangelical”? And how do evangelicals differ from 
“fundamentalists”?  The term “evangelical” is derived from the Greek word euangelion, 
                                                 
 31. See, for example, Falwell, “Why I Am a Fundamentalist,” in Fundamentalist Journal 1, no. 1.  
(September 1982), 6. 
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which means “gospel” or “good news.” That good news, as Christians have understood it, 
is that Jesus Christ makes forgiveness of sin and eternal life with God possible. But, 
given that all Christians share that belief, what makes evangelicals distinct?    
 During much of the twentieth century, a common definition was that an 
evangelical was “anyone who liked Billy Graham.” Falwell liked to say that a 
fundamentalist is “an evangelical who is angry about something.”32 While these 
definitions are somewhat tongue-in-cheek, they are reminders of how loosely both terms 
have been used. After all, evangelicalism and fundamentalism are not clearly defined 
denominations with creeds and membership standards; there are no “card-carrying 
evangelicals.” As a result, some observers have simply labeled as “evangelical” anyone 
who has had a “born again” experience, or claims a “personal relationship with Jesus 
Christ.”  
 Among scholars attempting more precision, there has been considerable debate 
about what constitutes evangelicalism. Clearly, it is a diverse movement. The National 
Association of Evangelicals, for instance, claims as members about 45,000 churches 
representing over forty different denominations from a range of theological traditions, 
including Calvinist, Arminian, Anabaptist, and charismatic.
33
 The Evangelical 
Theological Society, a group of scholars whose doctrinal basis affirms simply the Trinity 
and  the inerrancy of Scripture,
34
 includes members who hold different beliefs about 
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eschatology, the proper subjects of baptism, the nature of God’s work in creation, and 
whether “charismatic gifts”—such as tongues-speaking—exist today.35 The label 
“evangelical” has been given to Christians who hail from a wide variety of churches, 
including some from mainline Presbyterian, Methodist, and Episcopalian churches, 
African-American churches and historic peace churches like the Mennonites.  
 Metaphors abound in attempts to capture this evangelical diversity. Timothy 
Smith has referred to the “evangelical mosaic” and the “evangelical kaleidoscope.” 
Randall Balmer has used the imagery of a “patchwork quilt,” a metaphor intended to 
evoke the folksy populism he sees in American evangelicalism.
36
 Robert K. Johnston 
speaks of evangelicalism as an extended family.
37
 Some have suggested that the groups 
lumped together as “evangelicals” are too diverse to be included in the same camp. 
Donald W. Dayton, for example, has argued that the term evangelical “has lost whatever 
usefulness it once might have had” and “that we can very well do without it.”38 In part, 
his objection is that there have been three separate meanings of “evangelical”—
Reformational in the sixteenth century, pietistic and conversionist in the eighteenth, and 
fundamentalist in the twentieth—and that asserting commonality among all three is going 
too far.  
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 Yet, despite such protests, it seems unlikely that the term “evangelical” is going to 
disappear. Moreover, there are numerous scholars who, while acknowledging the 
diversity, see a basic unity among the various branches. Douglas A. Sweeney, for 
example, asserts that evangelicals “comprise a movement that is rooted in classical 
Christian orthodoxy, shaped by a largely Protestant understanding of the gospel, and 
distinguished from other such movements by an eighteenth-century twist.”39 That “twist” 
was the revivalism of the Great Awakening, with its emphasis on conversion and 
emotional fervency. David Bebbington, in a definition often cited by historians, also 
includes conversion in his four-fold definition of evangelicalism: “conversionism, the 
belief that lives need to be changed; activism, the expression of the gospel in effort; 
biblicism, a particular regard for the Bible; and what may be called crucicentrism, a stress 
on the sacrifice of Christ on the cross.”40 While evangelicals have differed in various 
particulars, they have shared these characteristics.  
 Who, then, are “fundamentalists”? In short, fundamentalism is a sub-type of 
evangelicalism that developed an emphasis in the early twentieth century on defending 
what its adherents saw as orthodox Christianity against those who were attempting to 
“modernize” the faith. Fundamentalism, according to George Marsden, was “militantly 
anti-modernist Protestant evangelicalism…a loose, diverse, and changing federation of 
co-belligerents united by their fierce opposition to modernist attempts to bring 
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Christianity into line with modern thought.”41 The efforts of these fundamentalists to 
control their denominations and institutions largely failed. But fundamentalists did not 
disappear. Instead, in the 1930s and 1940s they were remarkably successful in developing 
their own subculture.
42
 In the 1970s, fundamentalists would provide much of the 
leadership for the nascent evangelical right.  
 Among such evangelicals, few ideas were as compelling as the belief that 
America was founded as a “Christian nation,” and thus it is where I begin my narrative. 
Chapter 1 describes the deep roots of this belief, which date back to the earliest days of 
Puritan settlement, and sketch its subsequent development. While most evangelicals have 
stopped short of describing the United States as a “new Israel,” many have had the belief 
that their nation has a special relationship—for some, a covenant—with God. 
Understanding this belief helps explain the passion the Christian Right has had for 
“bringing the nation back to God”; it also helps explain how many evangelicals can both 
hold to dispensationalism, which often has discouraged social reform, and also lobby for 
political change.  
 Chapter 1 takes the story through the American Civil War, as both northern and 
southern evangelicals saw themselves as the rightful heirs of the nation’s “godly” 
heritage. Chapter 2 addresses the theological “civil war” within American evangelicalism 
that erupted in the decades after the bloody conflict, as fundamentalists and modernists 
squared off in a battle over the proper way to interpret the Bible. This dispute had 
important political ramifications: by the 1930s, many fundamentalists had largely given 
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up on political and large-scale reform, although still praying for widespread revival. Yet 
great care should be taken in describing the 1930s and 1940s as decades of 
fundamentalist “retreat,” as some have. These were rather decades of regrouping; 
fundamentalists—and fundamentalism’s “neo-evangelical” reformers—never gave up on 
their vision of America’s mythic religious past. In chapter 3, I examine some of the social 
and cultural changes of the 1960s and early 1970s. These changes—among them civil 
rights legislation, “second wave feminism,” the Roe v. Wade decision, and shifting mores 
regarding sexuality—did not immediately cause the political mobilization of conservative 
Protestants. But they were sources of increasing concern, and helped lay the groundwork 
for the Christian Right of the late 1970s. What evangelicals and fundamentalists still 
needed was a new way to think about politics; chapter 4 describes how Francis 
Schaeffer—who diagnosed much of American society as suffering from the ill effects of 
“secular humanism”—and other writers helped them begin to see political action as a 
primary way of effecting social change. Chapter 5 explores how history and eschatology 
shaped the ideology of the Christian Right. Various writers in the 1960s and 1970s 
propagated the “Christian nation” version of American history, updating and modifying it 
and in the process creating a “usable” past that was put into service by political activists 
as the Christian Right movement coalesced. Others saw in current events, both domestic 
and foreign, signs that the end of the world was near. Their version of premillennial 
dispensationalism was not overtly political, but it did have political implications that 
would become increasingly clear. Chapter 6 describes the organization of a number of the 
Christian Right groups in the late 1970s, and attempts to locate their formation against 
the backdrop of the national politics of the period. Finally, in chapter 7 I show how a 
23 
 
number of conservative Protestant political leaders in the late 1970s and early 1980s 
helped forge an ideology that joined their religious convictions with the political agenda 
of the Republican Party in the era of Ronald Reagan. 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
THE ROOTS OF EVANGELICAL PATRIOTISM 
 
 
 …for we must consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill, the eyes of all people 
 are upon us; so that if we shall deal falsely with our God in this work we have 
 undertaken and so cause him to withdraw his present help from us, we shall be  
 made a story and a by-word through the world…     
         
         —John Winthrop, “A Model of Christian Charity,” 1630 
 
 The first English settlers in North America portrayed their colonial effort in 
religious terms—hardly surprising, given the religious nature of English society in the 
seventeenth century. Indeed, European society as a whole largely took for granted that 
religion and government were inextricably linked. Europeans saw themselves as part of 
“Christendom,” a Christian civilization whose roots extended all the way back to the 
establishment of Christianity as the official religion of the Roman Empire following the 
conversion of the emperor Constantine.
1
 It was simply assumed that Christianity was a 
part of Europe’s identity. The state and the church were mutually supportive. Rulers 
enforced proper worship and punished those deemed heretical. During the Middle Ages, 
one’s baptism as an infant symbolized membership in both spiritual and political 
kingdoms.  
 This apparent religious unity was never complete, for there were always 
dissenters of various sorts. In 1054, a growing split within Christendom was finalized 
with the division between the Eastern Orthodox church and the western church led by 
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Rome.
2
 The Protestant Reformation that began in the sixteenth century destroyed the 
unity of western Christendom, as Christianity fragmented into Lutheran, Catholic, and 
Calvinist branches, with a number of smaller groups seeking to interpret the Bible by 
their own lights. “Anabaptists”—an initially pejorative term meaning “rebaptizers,” since 
they argued that their baptism as infants was meaningless—challenged the union of 
church and state.
3
 But for the most part, this union remained intact, and the ruler of a 
country determined its religion.  
 These new religious differences added fuel to the fires of political tension, as 
Protestant and Catholic nations throughout Europe fought for territory and converts. 
England did not escape this religious conflict. The English Reformation, which began in 
1534 when King Henry VIII separated the English church from Rome, began a long 
period of intermittent religious strife. For well over a century and a half, Protestants and 
Catholics sought to shape the theology and worship of the national church. Especially 
fervent in their desire for Protestant reform were a growing number of “Puritans,” labeled 
as such for their belief that the English church needed “purifying” from what they viewed 
as the corrupting influence of Roman Catholicism.
4
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Colonial Covenantalism 
 The zeal of many Protestants was strengthened by their belief that their country 
had a covenant with God, a divine calling with certain obligations. For example, William 
Tyndale, whose writings and English translations of the Bible would have an enormous 
effect on the English Reformation, viewed the covenant of the Pentateuch—the first five 
books of the Old Testament—as having application to all nations. In the biblical 
covenant, God made an agreement with the nascent Israel: whether he blessed or cursed 
Israel depended on its obedience to his commands.
5
 Tyndale wrote: “For according unto 
these curses hath God dealt with all nations, after they were fallen into the abominations 
of blindness.”6 Tyndale stopped short of claiming that England was God’s chosen nation, 
but he did propagate the idea that a nation’s welfare was dependent on its keeping the 
covenant with God. In a work published in 1531, he expressed fear that England would 
soon incur God’s curses. England had rejected the message of those God had sent, such 
as John Wycliffe (c. 1320-1384): “And as I doubt not of the examples that are past, so am 
I sure that great wrath will follow, except repentance turn it back again, and cease it.”7  
 Thus, the first English settlements in North America were birthed in a culture that 
took the blending of religion and politics for granted. Those who migrated to North 
America in the early decades of the seventeenth century transferred these ideas to their 
new homes, believing that English Christianity was at the center of God’s redemptive 
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plan for the world.
8
 Especially for Puritan settlers, the concept of covenant loomed large 
in their thinking. For some—like the “pilgrims” who sailed on the Mayflower and landed 
at Plymouth in 1620—England’s covenant was irreparably broken and the only solution 
was to separate themselves and live elsewhere. Others, like John Winthrop, were more 
optimistic about England’s future and sought to build a “city on a hill” that would be a 
model that England would emulate.
9
 Despite these differences, they shared a sense of 
their high calling; as Sydney Ahlstrom writes, they maintained the conviction “that the 
reformation being carried out in these commonwealths was actually a decisive phase in 
the final chapter of God’s plan for his Church in this world.”10  
 This is not to suggest that the motives of the English settlers were entirely 
spiritual or that all English settlers had a uniform devotion to these spiritual ideals. Many 
came for material gain, to escape unwelcome circumstances at home, or to fulfill a sense 
of adventure; African slaves, who first arrived in 1619, and some indentured servants 
came unwillingly. The communities English settlers created were hardly godly utopias, 
even in their own eyes. Nevertheless, as they described their endeavors they frequently 
resorted to religious language, which took several forms. First, most English colonists 
saw their new societies in North America as Christian communities, with the Bible as a 
guide not only for how they lived their private lives, but as a blueprint for their systems 
of governance. Second, they saw their colonies as providentially ordained: it was God 
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who who had made their settlements possible and God who would use them for his 
purposes. Third, they at least gave lip-service to the idea that their colonies would serve 
as evangelistic beachheads for reaching Native Americans with the Christian faith.  
 These themes were not mutually exclusive, and were often combined. In 1606, for 
example, King James I issued a charter to the London Company, giving it permission to 
found what would become known as Jamestown, the first successful English colony. The 
charter described the London Company’s “Desires for the Furtherance of so noble a 
Work, which may, by the Providence of Almighty God, hereafter tend to the Glory of his 
Divine Majesty, in propagating of Christian Religion to such People, [who] as yet live in 
Darkness and miserable Ignorance of the true Knowledge and Worship of God…”11 John 
Rolfe, Virginia colonist and husband of Pocahontas, described the English in Virginia as 
“a peculiar people, marked and chosen by the finger of God, to possess it, for 
undoubtedly he is with us.”12 The Mayflower Compact of 1620 described the voyage of 
the English Puritan separatists to Cape Cod as having been undertaken “for the Glory of 
God, and Advancement of the Christian Faith, and the Honour of our King and 
Country.”13  
 It was John Winthrop’s famous sermon, “A Model of Christian Charity,” 
however, that gave clearest voice to the idea that God had made a covenant with English 
immigrants. Preached to Puritan immigrants to Massachusetts at the beginning of their 
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colonial endeavor in 1629, it illustrates their sense of divine mission. Winthrop, the 
newly chosen governor of Massachusetts Bay Colony, asserted that he and his fellow 
migrants were called to exercise justice and mercy toward one another and to “work out 
our salvation under the power and purity of his holy ordinances.” They were to live in 
obedience to God, for they had entered into a “covenant” with God. If he brought them 
safely to their intended destination, “then has he ratified this covenant and sealed our 
commission, [and] will expect a strict performance of the articles contained in it.” The 
consequences of failing to live up to the terms of their covenant would be severe. If the 
colonists would “fall to embrace this present world and prosecute our carnal intentions, 
seeking great things for our selves and our posterity, the Lord will surely break out in 
wrath against us.” Keeping the covenant, however, would make them a blessing to the 
world. The Lord would “be our God and delight to dwell among us, as his own people 
and will command a blessing upon us in all our ways…men shall say of succeeding 
plantations: the Lord make it like that of New England.”14 Winthrop saw a parallel 
between Massachusetts and ancient Israel, and ended his sermon by quoting from 
Deuteronomy 30, in which God promised blessings if Israel would obey him and curses if 
it did not.  
 Clearly, these English colonists intended to create societies that were Christian in 
orientation. By some measures, they were successful, if one simply means that a majority 
of the colony’s inhabitants were professing Christians, or that the colony’s leaders sought 
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to enforce certain Christian behaviors like church attendance, or that the accepted 
authority in the colony was the Bible.
15
  
 English colonists were also, for the most part, sharply antagonistic toward those 
who did not share their religious beliefs or their vision of how society should be 
constructed. Many English settlers may have traveled to North America for the freedom 
to worship as they chose, but they were not interested in extending that right to others. 
The 1641 Massachusetts “Body of Liberties” stated that “if any man after legall 
conviction shall have or worship any other god, but the lord god, he shall be put to 
death.” Capital punishment was also mandated not just for murder but for witchcraft, 
blasphemy, sodomy, homosexuality, adultery and kidnapping.
16
 Early Baptists in the 
American colonies were sometimes whipped, fined or imprisoned. Roger Williams and 
Anne Hutchinson were banished from the Massachusetts colony for their dissenting 
views. Four members of the Society of Friends, also known as “Quakers,” were executed 
in Massachusetts between 1659 and 1661 for their beliefs and rejection of Puritan 
authority. Most famously, nineteen people were executed in the witchcraft hysteria that 
gripped Salem, Massachusetts, in 1692.
17
  
 Protestant settlers were also sharply anti-Catholic and anti-Jewish. Settlers to 
Virginia were ordered to bring “no traitors, nor Papists that depend on the Great Whore;” 
in 1640, Virginia forbade Catholics from holding office unless they swore loyalty to the 
Church of England, and any Catholic priest who dared migrate to Virginia was to be 
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deported. Maryland’s 1649 “Act Concerning Religion” that made toleration of all 
Christian groups the official policy explicitly excluded “blasphemers and Jews”—hardly 
a promotion of the “Judeo-Christian ethic” that some twentieth-century evangelicals 
would laud.
18
 
 Attitudes toward Native Americans and slaves were even less friendly. The 
English did view the conversion of Native Americans to Christianity as one of their 
responsibilities, thus revealing their belief in the essential humanity of native 
inhabitants.
19
 Yet they could also refer to Native Americans as “wild men,” “hellish 
fiends and brutish men/That devils worshipped” and “miserable animals.”20 William 
Bradford, governor of Plymouth, described the burning of a Pequot village in 1637—
including the slaughter of several hundred women and children—as a “sweet sacrifice,” 
for which the English “gave the praise to God.”21 John Cotton argued that English settlers 
had the right to possess land that Indians had occupied for centuries: “Where there is a 
vacant place, there is liberty for the son of Adam or Noah to come and inhabit, though 
they neither buy it, nor ask their leaves.”22 Sporadic and brutal conflicts, like King 
Phillip’s War (1675-1676), were setbacks to what missionary efforts to Native Americans 
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there were. Almost no white settlers in North America questioned the practice of 
slavery;
23
 as Peter Kolchin notes, American slavery arose in a global context in which 
various forms of unfree status—slavery, serfdom, peonage—were widely practiced and 
accepted. Furthermore, there was little concerted effort by whites to introduce 
Christianity to slaves during the colonial period.
24
 One observer noted in 1682 that 
“Christians in America…take very little care to have their slaves instructed...There, 
provided that the slaves can multiply, and work hard for the benefit of their masters, most 
men are well satisfied without the least thought of using their authority and endeavors to 
promote the good of the souls of those poor wretches.”25 
 
“The Birthday of a New World” 
 Religious leaders themselves hardly saw their era as any sort of “golden age” of 
Christianity. Indeed, within a few years of the founding of the New England colonies, the 
“jeremiad” became a staple of Puritan preaching. This type of sermon was essentially a 
lament over the sins of the people, and a warning that the society would experience God’s 
judgment if its members did not repent and return to faithfulness.
26
 
 In the eighteenth century, it appeared to some in the American colonies that those 
pleas and prayers were being answered in the form of the First Great Awakening. This 
period of trans-Atlantic revivals, in which the American colonies participated, is usually 
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dated to the 1730s and 1740s, although some have questioned whether it should be 
thought of as a cohesive event or as disparate revivals not meriting a group descriptor.
27
 
To be sure, there were revivals throughout the eighteenth century, but those beginning in 
the mid-1730s were exceptional in their energy. Beginning with the preaching of 
Jonathan Edwards in Massachusetts, the revival spread throughout the colonies through 
the preaching of many others, preeminently George Whitefield, who toured the colonies 
in the early 1740s and preached to thousands. In the fall of 1740, for example, he spoke 
to crowds of nearly 8,000 every day for a month.
28
  
 The Great Awakening shaped American Protestantism in a variety of ways, giving 
rise to a new style of belief and practice known as “evangelicalism.” Above all, 
evangelicals emphasized the need for a personal relationship with God, an emphasis 
forcefully presented in the Great Awakening. Thousands reported a new intensity of 
religious experience. The revivals also fostered a new style of preaching, one more 
geared to emotional appeals to the heart, and one that would continue to be developed 
into the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. The First Great Awakening was largely 
Calvinist
29
 in theological orientation. Calvinism emphasized a human being’s inability to 
generate faith by himself or herself; traditionally, Calvinism taught that sin held a 
person’s will completely captive unless freed by the Holy Spirit. Nevertheless, revivalist 
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preachers could appeal to individuals to be saved, believing that God would move in 
those whom he had called, or “elected,” to salvation.30 The Awakening was also a 
sweeping event that united Americans, in that reports of revivals in various locales were 
published elsewhere; Harry Stout has suggested that Whitefield became America’s first 
celebrity.
31
 The Awakening also was a stimulus for a more individualistic understanding 
of religion: while Protestantism as a whole stressed the need for individuals to place their 
faith in Christ, itinerant evangelists like Whitefield urged them to do so even apart from 
settled ministers and established churches. As Mark Noll writes, “the Great Awakening 
by itself did not bring about the change from a Puritan style of religious life to an 
evangelical style, but it had much to do with facilitating that shift, and thus it contributed 
forcefully to the shape of later religious life.”32 Finally, the Awakening also prompted an 
increase in conversions to Christianity among African Americans, both slave and free.  
 For some, the Great Awakening confirmed their belief that God had a special plan 
for America. Christians have typically held one of three general views of the “end-
times”—what will happen at the end of earthly history—based on their understanding of 
a passage in Revelation that speaks of Satan being bound for a thousand years.
33
 Some 
have been postmillennialists—the “post” refers to their belief that Christ will return at the 
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end of that thousand-year period. In this view, society will develop in a positive direction 
and things will get better and better until the dawn of the millennium brightens into the 
full day of a golden age, culminating with Christ’s arrival. Others have been 
premillennialists, believing that Christ will return before the millennium begins, and that 
until that day, the world’s spiritual condition will get worse and worse. Still others have 
been amillennialists, who hold that the reference to a thousand years is not to be taken 
literally. In this view, the “millennium,” taken symbolically, has been happening ever 
since the earthly ministry of Christ. Most American Christians in the eighteenth century 
were postmillennialists, and some saw the revivals as a sign that the millennial kingdom 
was imminent—or even present. John Moorehead, a Boston minister, proclaimed: “The 
Millennium is begun. Christ dwells with Men on Earth.” Some seventy New England 
clergymen signed a manifesto in 1743 that declared the Awakening to be a sign of the 
millennium.
34
 Jonathan Edwards, a pastor and theologian in Northampton, 
Massachusetts, and defender of the revivals, saw God’s hand in them. “It is not unlikely 
that this work of God’s Spirit,” he wrote, “so extraordinary and wonderful, is the 
dawning, or at least a prelude of that glorious work of God, so often foretold in scripture, 
which, in the progress and issue of it, shall renew the world of mankind.” Surely the 
millennium was near. And, he added, “there are many things that make it probable that 
this work will begin in America.”35 Edwards was hardly the first Puritan to suggest that 
America would be the center of the millennial age. Cotton Mather’s 1702 Magnalia 
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Christi Americana asserted that New England would possibly be “the Spot of Earth, 
which the God of Heaven Spied out” as the capital of the millennial kingdom.”36  
 Theologically, Jonathan Edwards and Thomas Paine were worlds apart. Edwards 
was one of the foremost heirs of the American Puritan tradition, with its belief in the 
sovereignty of God and the divine inspiration of the Bible. Paine, author of the pamphlet 
Common Sense that did much to mobilize revolutionary sentiment in the American 
colonies against Great Britain, within two decades would write The Age of Reason that 
attacked the Bible and organized religion, earning him the opprobrium of many American 
clergymen.  
 Yet Edwards and Paine shared a belief that America would play a central role in 
the drama God was unfolding in the world. For Paine, the timing of Europe’s discovery 
of the Americas was no coincidence. “The Reformation was preceded by the discovery of 
America: As if the Almighty graciously meant to open a sanctuary to the persecuted in 
future years, when home should afford neither friendship nor safety, ” Paine wrote in 
Common Sense, published in 1776.
37
 The American revolution that Paine sought to 
inspire had sweeping possibilities: “We have it in our power to begin the world over 
again. A situation, similar to the present, hath not happened since the days of Noah until 
now. The birth-day of a new world is at hand, and a race of men perhaps as numerous as 
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all Europe contains, are to receive their portion of freedom in the event of a few 
months.”38 
 Paine’s assertion partook of Christian millennialism, although Paine himself did 
not hold the view of biblical authority on which it was founded. American colonials with 
a variety of religious beliefs shared the belief that the revolution was in some sense a new 
dawn for the world. For many, the American Revolution had divine sanction. Abraham 
Keteltas of Newburyport, Massachusetts, preached a sermon in 1777 titled “God Arising 
and Pleading His People’s Cause” in which he argued that “[o]ur cause is not only 
righteous but, most important, it is God’s own cause. It is the grand cause of the whole 
human race.” The cause of the American Revolution “is the cause of truth against error 
and falsehood, the cause of righteousness against iniquity, the cause…of benevolence 
against barbarity, of virtue against vice.” The Revolution, he preached, was a battle of 
heaven against hell. “It is the cause for which heroes have fought, patriots bled, prophets, 
apostles, martyrs, confessors, and righteous men have died. Nay, it is a cause for which 
the Son of God came down from his celestial throne and expired on a cross.”39 
 For some eighteenth-century evangelicals, the Great Awakening that shaped their 
movement made the American Revolution more possible. Historians have long debated 
the relationship between the Great Awakening and the American Revolution.
40
 Leaders 
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of the Awakening did not explicitly espouse any particular political ideology, and it is 
difficult to draw a bright line connecting the content of the revivalist sermons with the 
revolution.
41
 Yet various historians have suggested the Awakening helped create a 
cultural milieu in which revolutionary ideas could flourish. Gordon Wood, for example, 
writes that the religious revivals, which relied on an individualist logic, “became in one 
way or another a massive defiance of traditional authority” and could foster a willingness 
to challenge all forms of deference—including that needed to support a monarchical 
society.
42
 Patricia Bonomi also argues that denominational schisms caused by the 
Awakening foreshadowed a spirit of later political rebellion; the Awakening “pierced the 
façade of civility and deference that governed provincial life” and ushered in a “new age 
of contentiousness;” revivalists frequently characterized their opponents as tyrannical and 
illegitimate—rhetoric that would later be put to political use.43  
 If the earlier revivalists’ contribution to the revolution was limited to challenging 
deferential habits, many preachers during the revolutionary era went much further, 
baptizing the cause of independence with God’s approval. In 1777, Nicholas Street 
preached in New Haven, Connecticut, that the rebelling colonies were like Israel fleeing 
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from Egyptian slavery during the Old Testament exodus. “And now we are in the 
wilderness, i.e. in a state of trouble and difficulty, Egyptians pursuing us, to overtake and 
reduce us.” The colonies were fighting against “Egypt”—that is, Great Britain, which 
was in “unreasonable vileness and cruelty…endeavouring to oppress, enslave and destroy 
these American States.”44 Samuel Sherwood, a Congregational pastor in Fairfield, 
Connecticut, preached in 1776 that God had favored “this branch of his church” with 
“liberties and privileges…beyond what are enjoyed in any other part of the world.” 
Sherwood sought to encourage his hearers with the belief that God would ensure the 
success of the revolution: “It does not appear probable that a persecuting, oppressive and 
tyrannical power will ever be permitted to rear up its head and horns in it.…Liberty has 
been planted here; and the more it is attacked, the more it grows and flourishes.” 
Comparing Great Britain to “Babylon the great” in the biblical book of Revelation, 
Sherwood suggested that these “commotions and convulsions in the British empire” 
might be the tribulation before the millennium, ending his sermon with a peroration of 
biblical texts describing that blissful era. Clearly, in Sherwood’s view, God favored the 
American cause.
45
 Israel Evans, a Continental Army chaplain who served under George 
Washington, also linked America with Israel. Evans preached a sermon immediately 
following the 1781 American victory at Yorktown; his published version included a 
poem with the lines: “To him who led in ancient days/The Hebrew tribes, your anthems 
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raise;/The God who spoke from Sinai’s hill/Protects his chosen people still.”46 In these 
sermons and many others like them, preachers like Street, Sherwood and Evans borrowed 
indiscriminately from biblical examples of oppression, applying them to the wartime 
situation. They also freely combined Whig revolutionary ideology and Scripture. As John 
Fea writes, “[v]ery few patriot sermons noted the differences between civil liberty as 
taught by patriots and spiritual liberty as taught in the Bible.”47  
 
Republican Ideology, Revival and Reform 
 This assertion that God favored the patriot cause gave rise to the belief following 
the war that the newly independent nation was specially favored by God. For numerous 
Americans following the attainment of independence, the blessings of political liberty 
and the blessings of eternal salvation were granted by the same God, and had 
considerable overlap. This “deification of the national enterprise,” writes Marsden, was 
the beginning of “civil religion”: “the attributing of a sacred character to the nation 
itself.”48 If so, then the first saint of the civil religion was George Washington. Even 
while alive, Washington was the subject of remarkable encomiums. The chaplain Evans’ 
praise of Washington could be mistaken for references to Christ. In 1779, Evans told 
battle-weary troops that “once more see[ing] the illustrious CHIEF of the armies of the 
United States, and obtain[ing] his approbation, for he knows your worth, will make you 
forget all your past dangers and toils, and make you pant for an opportunity to distinguish 
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yourself in his presence.”49 This adulation would continue into the nineteenth century, 
with biographies like that of Mason Locke Weems, who invented stories of Washington’s 
piety and moral probity,
50
 and paintings like the 1865 The Apotheosis of Washington, 
which adorns the rotunda of the United States capitol and depicts Washington ascending 
to heaven surrounded by female figures representing Liberty, Victory and the original 
thirteen colonies.
51
  
 The United States Constitution, ratified in 1788, did not mention God,
52
 and the 
Bill of Rights (which took effect in 1791) prohibited the federal government from 
establishing a national religion or prohibiting its free exercise, although it said nothing 
about support of religion by the individual states.
53
 Such a hands-off policy—the creation 
of what Thomas Jefferson would later suggest was a “wall of separation” between church 
and state
54—did not, however, mean the separation of religion from American society. 
Within a half-century of America’s independence, evangelicalism in a multiplicity of 
sects and denominations was thriving. Indeed, writes Fea, if “the United States was ever a 
‘Christian nation,’ it was so during the period between the ratification of the Constitution 
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(1789) and the start of the Civil War (1861).”55 This would have been surprising to many 
of the nation’s “founding fathers,” many of whom were heavily influenced by Deism.56 
This departure from traditional Christianity was an outgrowth of the Enlightenment, the 
eighteenth-century movement that put great trust in the ability of reason and the scientific 
method. Deism was a view of God that stripped traditional theology of anything that 
could not be supported by unaided human reason; Deists believed in a creator God—
since reason demanded that a highly complex “machine” like the universe have a 
creator—but were highly suspicious of any claims of his supernatural intervention in the 
world.
57
 They also, for the most part, rejected the Trinity, the traditional Christian belief 
that God, while one being is also three persons, Father, Son and Spirit. Jefferson, 
famously, excised all miracles, the resurrection of Jesus Christ, and any claims of Christ’s 
divinity from his version of the gospels.
58
  
 Jefferson was prescient about many things, most notably the destructive power of 
slavery in the new nation. But regarding the religious future of America, he wildly missed 
the mark, asserting that Unitarianism—a theology that rejected the Trinity—would sweep 
the nation. “I rejoice that in this blessed country of free inquiry and belief,” he wrote to a 
Unitarian minister, “which has surrendered its creed and conscience to neither kings nor 
priests, the genuine doctrine of only one God is reviving, and I trust there is not a young 
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man now living who will not die an Unitarian.”59 Yet it was evangelicalism, with its 
thorough-going Trinitarian theology and its emotional fervency far removed from Deistic 
coolness, that carried the day in the nineteenth century.  
 By 1835, the Frenchman Alexis de Tocqueville could write after an extended tour 
of the United States that “America is still the place where the Christian religion has kept 
the greatest real power over men’s souls.”60 In large measure, this was due to the “Second 
Great Awakening” that was then revitalizing American Christianity. As is the case with 
the First Great Awakening, giving precise dates to the second is difficult, for the entire 
nineteenth century was punctuated by revivals in various regions. But the first four 
decades of the nineteenth century saw a surge of conversions to evangelical Christianity. 
While church membership is not the only way to assess the strength of the revival, the 
percentage of Americans who were members of churches seems to have doubled between 
1800 and 1860.
61
  
 If the First Great Awakening was largely Calvinist in theological orientation, the 
second was marked by a more Arminian bent. “Arminianism”—a theological framework 
named for the Dutch theologian James Arminius (1560-1609)—put far greater trust in 
human ability to come to Christ than did Calvinism. Charles G. Finney, the most famous 
and influential of the mid-nineteenth century evangelists, wrote that revival “is not a 
miracle, or dependent on a miracle, in any sense. It is a purely philosophical result of the 
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right use of the constituted means.” While the means themselves were created by God, 
the use of those means to bring about revival lay within human power.
62
 In part, this 
emphasis on human free will in salvation was due to the growing influence of Methodism 
in America. John Wesley (1703-1791), the founder of Methodism, and Francis Asbury 
(1745-1816), an Englishman who spent most of his adult life traveling America as a 
Methodist missionary, emphasized humanity’s liberty to accept or reject God’s free 
grace. Baptists, too, modified somewhat their traditional Calvinism, in practice if not in 
doctrine.
63
 Both Baptists and Methodists engaged in vigorous evangelism, and the 
numbers of both grew tremendously in the early nineteenth century.
64
 By the mid-
nineteenth century, asserts Richard J. Carwardine, evangelicalism was the “principal 
subculture in American society.”65 
 A theology that emphasized human free will dovetailed easily with the growing 
egalitarianism and democratic spirit in the new republic. Americans had thrown off the 
yoke of the British Empire, and were open to a theological message that said that their 
wills were also unshackled. For many, the rhetoric of revival and Revolution became 
inextricably linked, and many American evangelicals blended their faith with republican 
ideology. As Nathan Hatch writes, evangelists in the early republic “could rarely divorce 
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[their message of revival] from contagious new democratic vocabularies and impulses 
that swept through American popular cultures.”66 According to Tocqueville: “For the 
Americans the ideas of Christianity and liberty are so completely mingled that it is almost 
impossible to get them to conceive of the one without the other.”67 Thus Lorenzo Dow, 
an American Methodist revivalist preacher, could quote both the Bible and Thomas Paine 
in a sermon, and cite the Declaration of Independence as an authority: “But if all men are 
‘BORN EQUAL,’ and endowed with unalienable RIGHTS by their CREATOR, in the 
blessings of life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness—then there can be no just reason, 
as a cause, why he may or should not think, and judge, and act for himself in matters of 
religion, opinion, and private judgment.”68 
 For many American evangelicals, it was indeed “self-evident” that all (white men, 
at least) were created equal. Both reason and Scripture, with its affirmation of the 
“priesthood” of all believers,69 seemed to support the rectitude of the American political 
system. Theodore Frelinghuysen, whose political career included being a U.S. senator 
and a vice-presidential candidate, asserted that “Republic is a word of Christian 
meaning.”70 It was clear to many evangelicals that God’s hand was on the American 
nation, birthing it through the Revolution, preserving it during its tumultuous first 
decades and now was blessing it as it expanded. From there, it was a short step to 
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affirming that God had specially chosen the nation for his purposes. “[I]f this nation is, in 
the providence of God, destined to lead the way in the moral and political emancipation 
of the world,” said Lyman Beecher, Congregational and Presbyterian minister, in an 1835 
speech, “it is time she understood her high calling, and were harnessed for the work.”  
 This sense of “high calling” fed the belief that the nation had a “manifest destiny” 
to overspread the continent, bringing with it the purported blessings of liberty and 
Christianity. “It is…plain that the religious and political destiny of our nation is to be 
decided in the West,” Beecher continued. “There is the territory, and there soon will be 
the population, the wealth, and the political power.”71 The idea that the future lay in the 
west was an old one. Ernest Lee Tuveson notes that many Europeans had long had a 
sense that “civilization” was carried across the centuries by particular peoples, and that it 
had moved west, from the Near East to Greece to Rome and then to Western Europe. It 
seemed logical that the next step would be across the Atlantic. “Westward the course of 
empire takes its way,” wrote the British philosopher George Berkeley in a 1726 poem.72 
In the nineteenth century, the Lousiana Purchase (1803), the forcible removal of Native 
Americans from their lands east of the Mississippi River, and a burgeoning population 
pushing ever westward made real the possibility that America might eventually stretch all 
the way to Pacific Ocean. The imaginations of many Americans were fired by the 
possibility of expanding the nation’s borders. In 1845, the journalist John L. O’Sullivan 
summarized the attitudes of many, writing of “our manifest destiny to overspread the 
continent allotted by Providence for the free development of our yearly multiplying 
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millions.”73 By 1846, the United States had negotiated with Britain for Oregon and 
instigated a war with Mexico that resulted in the acquisition of California and much of 
what is now the American Southwest. While for some the concept of “manifest destiny” 
was a purely nationalist sentiment, it also for others had a religious component. Not only 
had “Providence” allotted the western lands to America, as O’Sullivan asserted, but 
pushing westward allowed Christianity to spread, too; missionaries, revivalists and 
denominations moved westward with the nation.  
 
Two Civil Wars 
 By the mid-nineteenth century, evangelicals across regional and denominational 
boundaries shared a common “creed”: “a Trinitarian God; the depravity, guilt and 
condemnation of all mankind; an atonement by the Son of God sufficient to procure 
man’s salvation; regeneration by the Holy Ghost producing repentance and faith; and the 
final judgment of all men, resulting in everlasting misery for the wicked and blessedness 
for the righteous.”74 Despite these unifying characteristics, evangelicalism was about to 
both experience and contribute to the Civil War. Evangelicals, North and South, would 
take different positions not only on the question of slavery, but on the proper relationship 
of Christians to their government and the type of reform that they should seek. 
Furthermore, within a few decades of the Civil War, evangelicalism would be further 
fractured by another “civil war,” one between fundamentalists and modernists.  
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 The Second Great Awakening took place as the “second party system,” consisting 
of the Whig and Democratic parties, was forming, and the two processes shaped each 
other. Both political rallies and evangelical revivals drew on the same populist theme of 
the equality of all white men. Both politicians and revivalists pragmatically used varied 
means to excite the masses. As Finney noted, the politicians “get up meetings, circulate 
handbills and pamphlets, blaze away in the newspapers, send their ships about the streets 
on wheels with flags and sailors, send coaches all over town, with handbills, to bring 
people up to the polls, all to gain attention to their cause and elect their candidate.” 
Revivalists were justified in adopting similar tactics, he suggested.
75
 
 There were evangelicals who saw political involvement as unfitting for the dutiful 
follower of Christ, for several different reasons. For some, their political abstention was 
rooted in a distaste for the “evils” of party spirit: the divisiveness fostered by party 
politics worked against the harmony desired in a Christian society, political rallies—often 
lubricated with plenty of alcohol—led to moral decay, and duplicitous politicians said 
whatever they thought the electorate wanted to hear. “[V]ital piety,’ wrote one Methodist 
churchman, “declines in the Churches very nearly in proportion to the increase of 
political excitement.”76 Other political abstainers had deeper theological reasons for their 
disengagement. Some adopted a “pietist” stance, arguing that the Christian’s primary 
duties were to cultivate personal holiness and to save souls; politics was an irrelevant 
concern. Others, like the Reformed Presbyterians, believed that the American system of 
government was essentially non-Christian—the Constitution did not acknowledge the 
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supremacy of Christ or the authority of Scripture—and thus they would not ally 
themselves with it. Premillennialists like the “Adventist” followers of William Miller 
believed that the return of Christ was so near that politics was pointless. Why vote when 
the universe itself would soon be destroyed?
77
  
 The political abstainers, however, were in the minority in the antebellum period. 
Most evangelicals were politically engaged, although they were not monolithic in their 
party affiliations. Those who viewed politics as a means of advancing their reform 
agendas tended to join the Whig Party, agreeing with its vision of an activist role for 
government, including the responsibility to uphold public morality. For evangelical 
Whigs, the old Puritan idea still loomed large: the state was a moral entity and Christians 
had a duty to influence it. Democratic evangelicals, on the other hand, tended to believe 
that government should be neutral, and that regenerate individuals should voluntarily 
regulate their own behavior.
78
 While they may have disagreed over the proper affiliation 
for evangelicals, both Democratic and Whig evangelicals would have affirmed Finney’s 
statement: “In a popular government, politics are an important part of religion. No one 
can possibly be benevolent or religious, to the full extent of his obligations, without 
concerning himself, to a greater or less extent, with the affairs of human government.”79  
 The nineteenth century was one of tremendous Christian activism generally, and 
especially on the part of evangelicals. Reformers were motivated by a variety of 
impulses, most prominently the biblical commands to ameliorate the needs of their fellow 
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humans. For some, there was a fair bit of anxiety over Roman Catholicism thrown in
80
; 
this was an era, after all, of strong nativism whose most prominent political manifestation 
was the Know-Nothing (or American Party) with its principle that “Americans must rule 
America.”81 For some evangelicals, improving education was a way to assimilate 
potentially dangerous immigrants into an “American” way of life. They also were driven 
by the postmillennialist hope common to the era. Writing in the 1830s, Finney gave voice 
to this optimistic eschatology: “If the church will do all her duty, the millennium may 
come in this country in three years.”82  
 Evangelicals increased their mission activities, forming groups like the American 
Sunday School Union (1824) for the purpose of evangelizing and educating young people 
within the nation’s borders, and the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign 
Missions (1810) to send missionaries overseas. They created magazines and publishing 
houses, like the American Bible Society and the American Tract Society, as tools for 
reaching a popular audience.
83
 They formed an abundance of voluntary societies, creating 
what Ronald G. Walters has termed a “benevolent empire” of overlapping causes, 
leadership boards and financial resources.
84
 These groups tackled a variety of social 
issues, seeking, for example, to improve education, end the practice of dueling, improve 
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the care of the disabled and mentally ill, and curb the nation’s use of alcohol.85 The latter 
was rooted in the fact that the nation’s per capita liquor consumption was higher in the 
early nineteenth century that at any other time in American history; the temperance 
movement gained enough steam in the mid-nineteenth century that Massachusetts and 
Maine restricted access to strong drink.
86
  
 As the abolitionist movement gained steam in the mid-nineteenth century, the 
divergent understanding of the role of government contributed to the sectional crisis. 
Southern evangelicals, concerned with maintaining their slave society, viewed a reformist 
vision of the federal government with alarm, for it could become a tool of abolition. 
Some northern evangelicals had precisely that hope. Not all abolitionists were 
evangelicals, nor were all northern evangelicals abolitionists, but the anti-slavery cause 
was, Carwardine writes, “profoundly influenced by that strain of millennialist, 
perfectionist revivalism associated with Finney,” especially in New England.87  
 The American Civil War was a fight over the question of slavery, the proper 
relationship of the federal government to the states, and the nature of the nation’s 
westward expansion. It was also a religious war.
88
 Differing ways of interpreting 
Scripture on the question of slavery motivated belligerents. The famous line from 
Abraham Lincoln’s second inaugural address—“Both read the same Bible, and pray to 
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the same God”—is accurate.89 But many northern and southern evangelicals came to 
strikingly different conclusions on the question of slavery. Those seeking to defend the 
practice pointed out that the Bible never condemned slavery; indeed, the New Testament 
commanded slaves to obey their owners, and the apostle Paul sent an escaped slave back 
to his master. Northern anti-slavery evangelicals had a somewhat more complex biblical 
case to make. One strategy they used was to argue that the type of slavery condoned in 
the Bible was different from the race-based, perpetual bondage practiced in nineteenth-
century America. A second was to argue that the spirit of the Bible was to be followed 
rather than the letter; in other words, that the general thrust of the Bible—in its principles 
of Christian love, the creation of all humans in God’s image, and the basic unity of 
believers—was toward equality.90 This second strategy was vulnerable to the pro-slavery 
charge that its proponents were playing fast and loose with the biblical text and were 
insufficiently literal in their interpretation.
91
 In the 1830s and ’40s, three major Christian 
denominations—Presbyterian, Baptist and Methodist—split into northern and southern 
wings. The reasons for these splits were complex, especially in in the case of the 
Presbyterians, who faced other differences than slavery. But the issue of slavery did play 
a major role in these divisions, and the fracturing of these church bodies foreshadowed 
the collapse of the second party system—and the subsequent creation of the Republican 
Party—and the Civil War itself.  
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 The war provided opportunities to once again reflect on the nature of God’s 
dealings with America. For some of those northern evangelicals who saw slavery as the 
“national sin,” the war was a harbinger of the millennium: this group had great hopes that 
a new day would dawn with slavery’s eradication. In the words of Julia Ward Howe in 
her “Battle Hymn of the Republic,” the nation was now undergoing God’s “righteous 
sentence.” He was “trampling out the vintage where the grapes of wrath are stored,” and 
using his “terrible swift sword.” But his “truth is marching on,” and she claimed to see 
the “glory of the coming of the Lord.” The same idea was present—without the 
optimistic millennial hope—in Lincoln’s remarkable second inaugural address, in which 
he suggested that God might be punishing both north and south with “this mighty scourge 
of war.”92  
 A more common response among both northern and southern evangelicals was to 
claim God’s approval for their side. For many Americans the idea that America was 
God’s chosen nation—in some sense, a “new Israel”—was standard. Lincoln, whose own 
faith remains something of a mystery,
93
 expressed the idea with a caveat, describing 
himself as a “humble instrument in the hands of the Almighty, and of this, his almost 
chosen people.”94 Others were not so cautious; Lincoln’s “almost” did not figure in their 
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thinking. Both northern and southern preachers sought to claim for their side the mantle 
of God’s chosen nation. Beecher, a strong defender of the Union who in 1861 was the 
pastor of a Congregational church in Brooklyn, rehearsed Israel’s difficult exodus from 
Egypt and argued that throughout history, standing for moral principle meant facing 
tribulation: “And now our turn has come. Right before us lies the Red Sea of war. It is red 
indeed. There is blood in it…and the Word of God to us to-day is, ‘Speak unto this 
people that they go forward!’”95 Using the same biblical story, Benjamin M. Palmer, 
pastor of First Presbyterian Church in New Orleans, drew the reverse conclusion: the 
southern states were only seceding from the Union to defend the principle of self-
government, “but the heart of our modern Pharaoh is hardened, that he will not let Israel 
go.”96  
 After the war, evangelicals sought to bridge the divide between north and south, 
although regional denominational splits remained into the twentieth century. But the Civil 
War was not the only disrupting event in the second half of the nineteenth century; 
American evangelicals faced various social challenges, including urbanization, 
immigration and industrialization. There was nothing intrinsically “rural” about 
American evangelical theology, and evangelicalism had long thrived in urban settings. 
But these changes did mean that evangelicals would have to adapt, no longer able to rely 
on small-town ethos and familial networks that had shaped the culture of the nation.
97
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The bigger question was how evangelicals would react to new intellectual challenges, 
namely, the theory of evolution and new, critical methods of understanding the Bible. 
Disputes over these issues would eventually split American Protestants into 
“fundamentalists” and “modernists.” As far as American evangelicals were concerned, 
this religious “civil war” was nearly as earth-shaking as the war between North and 
South. It was also a split with political implications, for the theological conservatism of 
fundamentalists would come to be matched by their political conservatism. 
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CHAPTER 2 
 
FUNDAMENTALISM, MODERNISM AND  
NEO-EVANGELICALISM 
 
 
 An evangelical message vitally related to world conditions is not precluded by 
 New Testament doctrine. Indeed, conservative Protestantism insists, only this 
 estimate of the sinfulness of man and his need of regeneration is sufficiently  
 realistic to make at all possible any securely-grounded optimism in world affairs. 
 Any other framework can offer only a “bubble and froth cure.”      
    
                —Carl F. H. Henry, The Uneasy Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism, 1947 
 
 In the early twentieth century, long before Billy Graham rose to prominence, the 
most famous American revivalist preacher was another “Billy”: William Sunday, “the 
baseball evangelist.” Born in Iowa in 1862, Billy Sunday (1862-1935) became a 
professional baseball player in the 1880s. After undergoing a conversion experience, 
Sunday left baseball and became a preacher. The basic message of the Bible, Sunday 
believed, was that individuals could be saved from the penalty of their sin and be spared 
an eternity in hell. Humanity’s real problem was not economic or working conditions, or 
lack of education. Rather, humans were sinners who needed to come to Christ and 
forsake their wicked ways. It was a message that Sunday preached with vigorous energy 
and flamboyant showmanship—he was known for sliding across the platform as if the 
podium were home plate, or for planting an American flag on the pulpit—and he drew 
heavily on homespun metaphors and colloquial speech. “I’d stand on my head in a mud 
puddle,” he once said, “if I thought it would help me win souls for Christ.”1 
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 Washington Gladden (1836-1918) was also a preacher, but one with a markedly 
different style, temperament and theology. Gladden, by 1882 the pastor of a 
Congregationalist church in Columbus, Ohio, sought to apply Christian theology to all 
aspects of life, including economic and social conditions. He advocated ethical business 
practices, profit-sharing between owners and employees, and unionization. The church, 
he believed, ought to ameliorate the conditions that led to poverty, unemployment and 
drunkenness. The views of Gladden—along with those of men like Walter 
Rauschenbusch, Josiah Strong, and Charles Sheldon—would eventually become known 
as the “Social Gospel.” Leaders of this movement believed that Christianity ought to be a 
powerful force for social reform.
2
  
 To Gladden, the revivalist Sunday’s message of individual salvation from eternal 
damnation was simplistic, a caricature of Scriptural teaching, and when Sunday came to 
Columbus in 1912 for a series of revival meetings Gladden sharply criticized him and his 
techniques. A debate erupted in the city’s religious press. Sunday—who defended 
Christian charity and generosity—nevertheless charged that leaders like Gladden were 
“trying to make a religion out of social service with Jesus Christ left out.” For Sunday, 
the Social Gospel had too much “social” and not enough “gospel.” “We’ve had enough of 
this godless social service nonsense,” he said.3 The road to the kingdom of God is not by 
the bathtub, or the gymnasium, or the university, but by the “blood red hand of the cross 
of Christ.”4  
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 The exchange between Gladden and Sunday was but one small skirmish in a 
much larger war that had broken out within American evangelicalism. By 1912, 
evangelicalism was dividing into two camps, split over how to respond to new social and 
intellectual challenges. A “conservative” wing, to which Sunday belonged, sought to 
defend the old orthodox theological formulations; a “liberal” wing was willing to adapt 
and modify evangelical theology to make it more amenable to new intellectual trends. 
Following the First World War, these wings would coalesce into “fundamentalists” and 
“modernists,” and would battle for control of Protestant denominations and colleges.  
 Fundamentalists largely lost these battles, and also lost the cultural influence that 
conservative Protestants had enjoyed in the nineteenth century. From the 1930s through 
the 1970s, fundamentalists—and the “neo-evangelicals” who would seek to reform 
fundamentalism—largely avoided overt political action, although they never were as 
apolitical as some observers thought. It was true that their theology—in large measure a 
reaction against the Social Gospel—pushed them away from political activity, as did their 
fascination with premillennial dispensationalism. Nevertheless, they still voted, and many 
were willing to politically mobilize over certain issues like prohibition and measures 
restricting the teaching of evolutionary theory. And they never lost their hopes for 
restoring “Christian America,” which for them meant a nation in which Christianity was 
again accorded a place of social and political prominence. During these decades, 
conservative Protestants would lay the groundwork for their political resurgence in the 
1970s.  
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“Be Ye Separate”: The Fundamentalist-Modernist Split 
 Despite the horrific devastation of the Civil War, when it was over, many 
evangelicals still retained great hopes for the nation’s future. Slavery had been ended, and 
since most white evangelicals failed to grapple with the depth of the nation’s racism, for 
many northern evangelicals it seemed the biggest barrier to the postmillennial golden age 
they anticipated had been removed. There were a variety of reasons why their optimism 
of the mid-nineteenth century continued apace. 
 Evangelicals still dominated the nation’s colleges, where their theology was 
supported by Scottish “common sense” realism; this optimistic epistemology was 
opposed to the skepticism of philosophers like David Hume and held that the human 
mind could apprehend truth directly.
5
 For evangelicals, both “common sense” and 
science supported the conclusions about God’s nature and work they drew from 
Scripture. Both the natural world and the Bible were witnesses of the same set of truths. 
Furthermore, revivals continued with regularity, and some major Protestant 
denominations saw their membership triple between 1860 and 1900.
6
 The most 
prominent revivalist of the postwar era was Dwight L. Moody (1837-1899), a Chicago 
businessman who turned to evangelism. A two-year preaching tour with his song-leading 
partner Ira Sankey (1840-1908) in Great Britain brought him acclaim back home, and 
Moody returned to the United States to embark on a career that made him the most 
widely heard preacher in America during the last quarter of the nineteenth century.  
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 The postwar years also saw a concerted effort to increase America’s missionary 
presence around the world. Here, too, Moody was influential. Missions conferences he 
initiated near his Northfield, Massachusetts, home led to the 1876 founding of the 
Student Volunteer Movement; its motto—“the evangelization of the world in this 
generation”—encapsulated the optimism and sense of possibility felt by many 
evangelicals.
7
 SVM was but one such missionary effort; denominations like the 
Presbyterians and Baptists also increased their international mission efforts. 
 At home, evangelicals engaged in vigorous reform efforts; perhaps as many as 85 
percent of the social reformers at the turn of twentieth century were connected in some 
way to evangelicalism.
8
 This is not to suggest that all evangelicals espoused the same 
agendas; evangelicalism was so widespread and pervasive in American society that one 
could find evangelicals on multiple sides of any given issue. Nevertheless, evangelicals 
provided much of the energy for reform efforts, including temperance, anti-poverty 
efforts,
9
  and legislation aimed at limiting commerce on Sundays. The broader 
Progressive movement—with its agenda that included fighting government corruption, 
increasing democratic participation, protecting consumers, lessening the gap between rich 
and poor, and introducing women’s suffrage—was fueled in large part by an evangelical 
sense of civic responsibility that had its roots in colonial Puritanism.
10
 The fact that 
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delegates to the 1912 Progressive Party convention could sing the hymn “Onward 
Christian Soldiers” illustrates this linkage.11  
 Nevertheless, even as those “Christian soldiers” marched, the ground under their 
feet was shaking. Numerous changes, both social and intellectual, were about to pose 
formidable challenges to the evangelical dominance of American culture. The related 
processes of urbanization, immigration, and industrialization were reshaping the ways 
Americans lived, worked and related to one another.
12
 None of these changes posed an 
existential threat to evangelicalism; indeed, evangelicals, with their decentralized—even 
fragmented—church organizations and pragmatic spirit were well-suited to adapt quickly 
to a less rural environment. But alongside these changes were intellectual challenges that 
posed a greater threat to evangelical theology. The differing ways that evangelicals would 
respond to these challenges would eventually split the movement.  
 
Challenges to Evangelical Faith 
 Evangelicals are, above all else, “people of the Book.” As noted in the 
introduction, “biblicism”—a high degree of reverence for the Bible—is one of the key 
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characteristics of the movement. Evangelical theology was—and is—built on a belief in 
the supernatural character of the Bible, asserting that it was “inspired” by God who 
supervised its creation.  
 Thus, when the authority of the Bible began to be challenged in the second half of 
the nineteenth century, evangelicals would begin to feel that the very foundations of their 
faith were under attack. As historian George Marsden writes, the “old order of American 
Protestantism was based on the interrelationship of faith, science, the Bible, morality, and 
civilization. It was about to crumble.”13 
 Even as evangelicals celebrated their visible successes in the later nineteenth 
century, there were forces of secularization at work. Intellectual inquiry increasingly 
began to look to naturalistic rather than supernatural sources of truth. In one sense, this 
was nothing new. The eighteenth-century Enlightenment had celebrated the power of 
human reason to unlock the secrets of the universe; for some Enlightenment thinkers, this 
meant reason needed little or no assistance from divine revelation. In the nineteenth 
century, some proponents of the new social sciences—like Auguste Comte (1798-
1857)—argued that social law no longer needed divine sanction, for society could be 
founded on science rather than religion. Some held the belief that science and religion 
were in conflict. For example, Andrew Dickson White, a founder and first president of 
Cornell University, made clear his allegiance in that supposed war. His university, he 
promised, would “afford an asylum for Science—where truth shall be sought for truth’s 
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sake, where it shall not be the main purpose of the Faculty to stretch or cut sciences 
exactly to fit ‘Revealed Religion.’”14 
 For others, empirical science was a less sure guide to truth than were feeling and 
intuition. Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834), a German theologian, argued that 
feeling was at the very core of religion. For Schleiermacher, theological truth was 
founded not on propositional statements about God but on a feeling of “absolute 
dependence” or “God-consciousness.” Creedal statements did not communicate objective 
truth; rather, they reflected the intuitive knowledge of God that their creators had 
experienced. Theological truth thus became for Schleiermacher radically subjective.
15
 
This stress on the importance of intuition and feeling was echoed in the Romantic 
movement of literature and art, although most of its leaders had even less interest than 
Schleiermacher in engaging with traditional orthodoxy. In America, Ralph Waldo 
Emerson, Henry David Thoreau and other “transcendentalists” sought a direct intuition of 
truth, often through the contemplation of nature. For both Thoreau and Emerson, this 
direct apprehension of truth, unmediated through sacred texts or historic dogma, led to a 
vigorous individualism. “No law can be sacred to me but that of my nature,” wrote 
Emerson. “Good and bad are but names very readily transferable to that or this; the only 
right is what is after my constitution, the only wrong what is against it.”16 
 Thus, traditional religious authority underwent substantial questioning by a 
variety of intellectuals in the latter nineteenth century. The “higher criticism” of the Bible 
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fueled this suspicion. Scholars of the Bible had long used so-called “lower” or textual 
criticism as part of their methodology; this was the practice of comparing small variants 
in the copies of the ancient texts in an effort to determine which was most likely the 
original. Higher criticism, however, was the application of techniques of literary criticism 
to the Bible. This new methodology—developed especially in German theological 
schools like the one in Tübingen—went far beyond the attempt to determine the content 
of the original text; practitioners of this methodology began to treat the Bible as they 
would any other collection of literary documents, asking questions of authorship, the 
circumstances of the documents’ creation, how and when they were formed and 
transmitted, and what belief system and traditions may have informed their creation. 
While it was possible to address these questions while still holding to the inspiration of 
the Bible,
17
 most practitioners of this method did not feel constrained by any belief in its 
supernatural origin. Believing that theirs was a properly scientific method, these biblical 
interpreters were willing to question, for example, whether the stated author of a biblical 
book actually was. One of the earliest arguments from higher critics was that the 
Pentateuch (the first five books of the Old Testament) was not written by Moses, as 
traditionally assumed, but rather had a number of authors and had evolved over a long 
period.
18
 In time, these methods were also applied to the New Testament. In the 1830s, 
David Friedrich Strauss, a German theologian, produced his Life of Jesus, Critically 
Examined, arguing that while the New Testament accounts of Jesus may have contained 
spiritual truth, they were nevertheless embellished stories and were historically 
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inaccurate. Joseph Renan, a French scholar, published a similarly named Life of Jesus 
(1863), and also argued that the New Testament was not literally true.  
 Coupled with—and at times reinforcing—these new approaches to understanding 
the Bible was a new way of understanding the origins of life. This, too, challenged the 
familiar way of understanding Scripture. In 1859, Charles Darwin, an English biologist, 
published The Origin of Species, which argued that random mutations coupled with the 
competition for scarce resources over eons explained the development of complex 
organisms from simple ones. In The Descent of Man (1871), he applied this evolutionary 
theory directly to human beings. “We thus learn,” he wrote, “that man is descended from 
a hairy, tailed quadruped, probably arboreal in its habits, and an inhabitant of the Old 
World.”19 
 Perhaps surprisingly, given the vehemence with which later fundamentalists 
attacked evolutionary theory, the initial reaction by theologically conservative Protestants 
to Darwinian evolution was somewhat mixed. There were those who saw in Darwinian 
theory a dangerous attack on Christian faith. Charles Hodge (1797-1878), Presbyterian 
theologian and professor at Princeton Seminary, published a book in 1874 under the title 
What is Darwinism? The answer, he argued, was that “[i]t is atheism. This does not 
mean…that Mr. Darwin himself and all who adopt his views are atheists; but it means 
that his theory is atheistic; that the exclusion of design from nature is…tantamount to 
atheism.”20 Yet there were others who adopted a more favorable view. Benjamin 
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Breckinridge Warfield (1851-1921), also a Princeton theologian, was a staunch defender 
of the doctrine of “inerrancy,” which holds that the Bible, in its original manuscripts, is 
without error. For Warfield, the theory of evolution did not require one to become an 
atheist or surrender belief in an error-free Bible. Throughout his career, Warfield was 
open to non-naturalistic versions of evolution, and held that God could have used and 
guided evolution as a means of creation.
21
 So was James Orr, a Scottish theologian whose 
essay on the question was included in The Fundamentals, the series of booklets published 
between 1910 and 1915 that helped give the fundamentalist movement its name. While 
suspicious of any version of evolution that relied on random chance, Orr suggested that 
the theory of evolution could be reconciled with an inerrantist view of Scripture. 
“‘Evolution’…is coming to be recognized as but a new name for ‘creation,’ only that the 
creative power now works from within, instead of, as in the old conception, in an 
external, plastic fashion. It is, however, creation none the less.”22 By the 1920s, however, 
it would be Hodge’s critical view that would be far more influential among 
fundamentalists.  
 
The Growth of Liberal Theology 
 Thus, the nation in the late nineteenth century was fast becoming a more 
urbanized, more industrialized, and more secular place, and some American Protestants 
increasingly believed that their theology would have to be adapted for the times if their 
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faith was to remain relevant. This was the option taken by those who would eventually 
become known as “modernists” (because they sought to adapt their faith to the modern 
world) or or “liberals” (because they emphasized freedom from tradition). Marsden has 
suggested that three strategies typified their efforts.  
 First, they deified historical processes. That is, rather than believe that Scripture 
was the supreme source of truth for all time, they believed that God was continuing to 
reveal truth through history and through the development of human culture. Truth was 
not static but constantly developing, and Scripture should be interpreted as the record of 
the religious experience of one ancient people, rather than God’s final word to all 
humanity. For the liberal, the benefit of this understanding meant that such a theology 
was immune to higher criticism and Darwinian challenges to Scripture, for it did not 
depend on defending Scripture as containing scientific and historical truth.    
 Second, liberals or modernists stressed the ethical. Traditional theology, they 
believed, had put too much emphasis on doctrine. This had led to theological disputes and 
to a fractured church; liberals also believed that such an approach was susceptible to the 
critical approaches to Scripture. The true test of a Christian was not doctrine, but a life 
lived in accordance with the ethics of Jesus. One of the primary ways this was manifested 
was the development of the Social Gospel. This movement, which was influential from 
about 1880 through the start of the Great Depression, emphasized the social implications 
of Jesus’ teaching. Gladden, for instance, in 1876 published Working People and Their 
Employers, in which he called for fair treatment of labor. His congregation in Ohio 
included mine owners;  Gladden believed in the justice of their workers’ demands for 
higher wages and improved working conditions, and called for the application of the 
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Golden Rule to labor relations. Charles Sheldon, a minister in Topeka, Kansas, published 
the novel In His Steps (1897), in which a congregation learned to ask itself “What would 
Jesus do?” and to live according to the answers. Walter Rauschenbusch (1861-1918), 
perhaps the best-known advocate of the Social Gospel, was influenced by New York City 
socialists, and saw progressive political reform as a way of bringing about the kingdom 
of God. Rauschenbusch believed that the Christian message affected not just personal 
moral issues like adultery and drunkenness, but should address the root causes of such 
social ills as poverty and inequality. Rauschenbusch advocated the value of labor unions 
and the socialization of industry, and attacked greed and laissez-faire capitalism. The 
kingdom of God, he argued, “is not a matter of getting individuals to heaven, but of 
transforming the life on earth into a harmony of heaven.”23  
 Third, Marsden suggests, liberal theology stressed the centrality of religious 
feelings. Schleiermacher had led the way here, arguing that the essence of religion was a 
feeling of dependence. Other liberal theologians followed his path, again de-emphasizing 
the importance of reason and dogma and elevating matters of the “heart.” Horace 
Bushnell (1802-1876), for example, came to believe that “truth” was something that had 
to be experienced rather than gleaned from the Bible; its writings should be taken as 
symbolic and figurative rather than as real and historic. Christ’s death, Bushnell believed, 
was not a substitute for guilty sinners, as evangelicals had believed. Rather, it was a 
symbol of God’s love, and “not a sacrifice in any literal sense.”24 As with the other two 
strategies, this one, too, had the advantage of being immune to scientific challenges and 
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historical criticism. Religion and science dealt with two different spheres, according to 
this way of thinking. Let the intellectuals say what they would about the origins of 
Scripture and the universe; religion still dealt with an area of truth untouched by 
science.
25
 
 
Conservative Responses to Theological Challenges  
 Other Protestants in America and Europe viewed both the secularizing intellectual 
trends and the liberal responses to them with alarm. For them, the challenges to the 
traditional understanding of Scripture were things to combat, not cause for theological 
invention. Nothing less than orthodoxy and the eternal fate of human souls hung in the 
balance, in their view, for liberal theologians were leading people away from basic 
message of the Christian faith. That message was that individuals could be spared 
condemnation in hell and gain eternal life by faith in the real, historical Christ as revealed 
in the Bible. Conservatives believed that by not defending the historicity of Scripture, by 
de-emphasizing doctrine, and by suggesting that religious feelings were at the heart of the 
Christian message, liberals were a threat to Christian orthodoxy.  
 Since these Protestants felt that the Bible was under attack, they rallied to its 
defense. Theologians at Princeton Seminary—Warfield, Charles Hodge, his son 
Archibald Alexander Hodge, and J. Gresham Machen—led the way in formulating the 
doctrine of inerrancy. The idea was not new; many Christians for centuries had believed 
that the Bible was without error, when interpreted according to the intention of its 
original authors. But now that critics were attacking its historical trustworthiness, these 
theologians believed that its defense required an explicit statement. Charles Hodge’s 
                                                 
 25. Marsden, Understanding Fundamentalism and Evangelicalism, 33-36. 
70 
 
 
Systematic Theology (1871), asserted that the Bible is “free from all error, whether of 
doctrine, fact, or precept.” For Hodge, the Bible was a “store-house of facts,” and the 
theologian ought to approach it as a scientist approached nature. The task was “to 
ascertain, collect, and combine all the facts which God has revealed concerning himself 
and our relation to him.”26 Those who followed Hodge at Princeton—his son A.A. Hodge 
and Warfield—carried the same banner, asserting that the Bible not only contained the 
Word of God, but actually was divine instruction, errorless and binding.
27
  
 The doctrine of inerrancy became something of a litmus test of orthodoxy, and 
during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries most Protestant denominations 
underwent at least one heresy trial, often of a seminary professor whose teachings 
challenged the idea of an error-free Bible. The case of Charles Briggs (1841-1913), a 
Presbyterian, was perhaps the most famous. Briggs, a professor at Union Theological 
Seminary in New York, believed that the Bible was authoritative and defended the 
supernatural elements of Christianity. Nevertheless, he argued in the 1890s that the Bible 
did contain errors that were secondary to its primary teachings, and for this, he was put 
on trial by the Presbyterian church, which suspended him from ministry. Both he and his 
seminary left the Presbyterian church.
28
 The case of Union is illustrative of the fact that 
heresy trials were not sufficient to stem the tide of liberalism, and by the early twentieth 
century, many of the nation’s seminaries had come under liberal control.  
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 For many ordinary evangelicals who filled the pews on Sunday mornings, these 
battles for control of the seminaries and denominations might have been only distant 
rumblings, but they were disconcerting nonetheless. The threats of secularism and 
liberalism seemed to be growing, and what they saw as orthodox Christianity was on the 
defensive. Dispensational premillennialism offered an explanation for these unsettling 
times: the Bible had predicted that things would get far worse before the return of Christ. 
Christians should expect a general “falling away” from the truth. Thus, for some—and 
perhaps paradoxically—the challenges to traditional evangelical faith confirmed rather 
than falsified the prophetic power of Scripture.  
 Dispensationalism directly countered the optimistic postmillennialism espoused 
by most nineteenth-century evangelicals. Postmillennialism held that things would 
improve until Christ returned; the “millennium”—a golden age—would culminate in the 
return of Christ. Dispensationalism, on the other hand, was “premillennial”; its 
proponents believed that Christ would return before the millennium, in close association 
with various horrific events on the earth.  
 As eschatological frameworks go, dispensational premillennialism was relatively 
young, originating in the nineteenth century with the British leader of the Plymouth 
Brethren movement, John Nelson Darby (1800-1882). Darby was born in London, and 
began his career as a lawyer in Ireland. Following his conversion, he entered the ministry 
in the Church of Ireland. Disconcerted by what he saw as a lack of spiritual vitality in the 
established church, he joined the Brethren movement in Dublin, which rejected the idea 
of ordained ministers. This group itself split in the 1840s, with Darby as the leader of the 
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stricter faction, and Darby began to travel widely, including trips to the United States, 
teaching his interpretation of biblical prophecy.  
 Darby divided all of human history into “dispensations,” periods in which  God 
structured his relationship with humanity differently. While this type of reading of the 
Bible was not entirely new, Darby’s interpretive scheme was unique in two ways. First, 
he taught a definite distinction between Israel and the Church—that is, between God’s 
Old Testament people and those who profess faith in Jesus Christ. God had made 
promises to Israel that had not yet been fulfilled, not even by the formation of the Church 
in the New Testament; the Church did not replace Israel in God’s plan for the world. This 
meant that Darby’s system was opposed to two common interpretations: he taught that 
the Church was not the fulfillment of Old Testament prophecy, nor was America, or any 
other nation, a “New Israel.” In Darby’s framework, both were impossible. The “Church 
age”—that is, the period from the time of Christ until the present—was merely a 
“parenthesis” in God’s plan for Israel, and God’s program for Israel awaited literal 
fulfillment. Soon, Darby taught, Jews would create a nation in their “Promised Land” and 
rebuild the Temple.  
 A second distinctive of Darby’s teaching was that Christ’s return would happen in 
two phases. The first would be the “Rapture,” when true believers would taken up in the 
air to meet Christ; this event, in dispensationalist terminology, was “imminent,” in the 
sense that it could happen at any time. With the Rapture, the Church age would conclude 
and the prophetic program for Israel would restart with the “tribulation” period spelled 
out in the book of Revelation. During these seven years, God would pour out great wrath 
upon the earth, and the Antichrist would rise to power. His reign would be ended with the 
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second return of Christ and the battle of Armageddon. Christ would then establish a 
thousand-year kingdom on earth. At the conclusion of that millennium, Satan would lead 
a doomed rebellion against Christ’s rule and be finally defeated, the dead would be 
resurrected, all humanity would face the Last Judgment.
29
 
 Darby’s teaching soon gained adherents on both sides of the Atlantic. There were 
various reasons for this popularity. Darby himself traveled widely, making extensive 
preaching tours between 1859 and 1872. His interpretive framework also seemed to be 
rigorously biblical, and dispensationalists supported their arguments with abundant 
biblical evidence. Fundamentalists defending the Bible from the liberal “assault” 
welcomed this emphasis on the literal truth of the Bible, even of the most difficult 
prophetic passages. Dispensationalists were some of the strongest defenders of the 
inerrancy of Scripture. Beyond the biblical arguments, however, the shifting cultural 
milieu in the late nineteenth century made dispensationalism seem plausible. Increasing 
secularism, an influx of Catholic immigrants, theological liberalism that eroded trust in a 
literal Bible, and the Civil War itself all made postmillennialism more difficult to believe 
for some. In the same way, the twentieth century with its world wars, nuclear threat, and 
liberalized mores would seem to confirm the validity of premillennialism. Furthermore, 
postmillennial thinking was “guilty by association” in that the Social Gospel was built on 
its premise; for fundamentalists, this itself made it suspect.  
 Dispensationalism would soon carry the day among the growing fundamentalist 
movement. Moody himself, whose own influence was widespread, began to preach the 
premillennial return of Christ, although Moody was never as fervent a dispensationalist 
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as some. Numerous other evangelists in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
taught dispensationalism, including Billy Sunday, and by the 1930s, this way of 
interpreting Scripture was taught in the vast majority of fundamentalist churches.
30
 Bible 
conferences, which were extended meetings at which attendees would worship together 
and hear various preachers, sprang up to teach dispensationalism and other conservative 
concerns. A number of Bible schools—including Moody Bible Institute (Chicago), the 
Bible Institute of Los Angeles, and Northwestern Bible Training School (Minneapolis)—
were founded with dispensationalism as one of their doctrinal emphases. These schools 
graduated numerous pastors who spread dispensationalism to their churches. 
Furthermore, the publication of the Scofield Reference Bible in 1909 by Cyrus Ingerson 
Scofield (1843-1921) helped make dispensationalism the most common eschatology 
among fundamentalists. This study Bible included Scofield’s notes teaching Darby’s 
system alongside the biblical text; for many readers unfamiliar with any other way of 
interpreting Scripture, dispensationalism became the only possible way to read the 
Bible.
31
  
 
The First World War and Fundamentalist Separatism 
 By the time of the First World War, the rift between liberals and conservatives 
was deepening, and by the end of the 1920s, the separation was nearly complete, with 
modernists largely in control of the major denominations and fundamentalists 
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proclaiming the imperative to separate from these bodies. Yet in the first few years of the 
twentieth century, there were attempts at ecumenical cooperation.  
 The Federal Council of Churches of Christ, formed in 1908, sought cooperation 
on social issues among its eighteen million members representing thirty-three 
denominations. While conservatives would eventually criticize the FCC for what they 
saw as insufficient focus on individual redemption, others initially praised its efforts.
32
 
The 1910 World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh, Scotland, marshalled support for 
global evangelistic efforts and was supported across the theological spectrum.
33
 The war 
itself united conservatives and liberals in an outpouring of patriotism. “Christianity and 
Patriotism are synonymous terms,” said Billy Sunday, “and hell and traitors are 
synonymous.” Shailer Matthews, dean of the University of Chicago Divinity School and 
a champion of modernist thinking, echoed the sentiment: “For an American to refuse to 
share in the present war…is not Christian.”34 Prohibition, a cause dear to the hearts of 
many social reformers both conservative and liberal, was finally victorious in 1919 with 
the passage of the Eighteenth Amendment.  
 But following the war, the split between conservatives and liberals would become 
final. The theological groundwork for the split had already been laid with earlier 
inerrancy battles, and further theological lines were drawn with the publication of The 
Fundamentals: A Testimony to the Truth, a series of twelve booklets that were published 
between 1910 and 1915. These volumes consisted of nearly one hundred articles that 
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defended a variety of beliefs conservatives believed crucial, including the virgin 
conception of Christ, the inerrancy and authority of the Bible, the salvific efficacy of the 
death of Jesus Christ and the reality of his resurrection, and importance of evangelism.  
 The war produced, as Joel A. Carpenter notes, a “sense of cultural peril,” and 
liberals and conservatives alike accused each other of endangering American civilization. 
Some liberals charged premillennialists with being insufficiently patriotic or even 
disloyal for failing to affirm that the war would “make the world safe for democracy”; in 
premillennial theology, no war—or any other development—would lead to real and 
lasting “progress.” Conservatives, on the other, attempted to link liberal theology with 
German militarism, asserting that that nation’s cultural decay resulted from its denial of 
biblical authority and acceptance of evolutionary philosophy. Liberals in America who 
espoused the same things were threats.
35
 In 1919, a group of conservative Protestants 
formed the World’s Christian Fundamentals Association to combat these ideologies in 
churches and schools. Increasingly, conservatives also reacted against the changing 
mores in American society. Sex—the discussion of which had been largely taboo in 
polite society—was now addressed more frankly in the movies and tabloid newspapers. 
Some women—the “flappers” of the era—began to wear their hair and their dresses short 
and smoked in public. New dance styles brought “the bodies of men and women in 
unusual relations to each other,” according to one Southern Methodist leader.36 
 This emerging movement—a reaction against both cultural and theological 
trends—was finally given the name that stuck by Curtis Lee Laws, editor of the Baptist 
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paper the Watchman-Examiner: a “fundamentalist,” he wrote in 1920, was someone 
willing to do “battle royal” for the fundamentals of the faith.37 The battle commenced in 
earnest in the 1920s, especially in the Northern Baptist Convention and the Presbyterian 
Church. To a lesser extent, the Protestant Episcopal church and the Northern Methodists 
experienced conflict. Southern denominations—like the Southern Baptist Convention and 
southern Presbyterians—did not; in the South, conservatives were already dominant and 
remained largely unchallenged. For many southerners, modernism was a Yankee 
innovation and thus was never seriously considered.
38
 Furthermore, many southern 
evangelicals were already accustomed to the idea of the “spiritualization of the church.” 
This concept—especially useful for those seeking to defend slavery in the antebellum 
years and Jim Crow laws after the Civil War—held that the church should concern itself 
only with “spiritual” matters and not meddle in politics. Northern liberals who sought to 
bring in the kingdom of God through politics were thus suspect on several grounds.
39
  
 The contest between fundamentalists and modernists played out in pulpits, the 
religious press and in denominational gatherings. In 1922, Harry Emerson Fosdick, a 
Baptist ministering for a time in a New York City Presbyterian church, preached a 
sermon opposing fundamentalism titled “Shall the Fundamentalists Win?” 
Fundamentalists, he argued, were “essentially illiberal and intolerant” when what was 
needed were those who could blend the “new knowledge and the old faith.” Fosdick took 
issue with those who insisted on belief in the virgin birth of Jesus, an inerrantist view of 
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the Bible, a substitutionary view of the atonement—the belief that Jesus’ death was a 
punishment in the place of sinners—and premillennialism. Fundamentalists, he argued, 
were attempting to “deny the Christian name” to those who did not agree with them.40 
Clarence E. Macartney, a Presbyterian pastor in Philadelphia, responded with “Shall 
Unbelief Win?” While taking the label “conservative” rather than “fundamentalist”—
unlike many fundamentalists, he did not believe that one’s eschatology was of crucial 
importance—Macartney argued that Fosdick’s version of Christianity was irreconcilable 
with traditional belief.
41
 Such a view was echoed by Machen in his book Christianity and 
Liberalism (1923), probably the most famous response to liberalism. Machen argued that 
liberalism was not a variant of Christianity, but a new religion altogether, since it denied 
that salvation was dependent on Jesus’ death. The “many varieties of modern liberal 
religion,” he wrote, “are rooted in naturalism—that is, in the denial of any entrance of the 
creative power of God (as distinguished from the ordinary course of nature) in connection 
with the origin of Christianity.” In his view, liberals should admit that they were no 
longer part of churches that had been founded on the basis of biblical Christianity.
42
 
 In the 1920s, it would be Machen and his fundamentalist allies who would lose 
control of their institutions. Their attempt to force their denominations, schools, and 
mission groups to subscribe to traditional evangelical doctrine largely failed, and 
increasingly, fundamentalists believed that separatism was the best course of action. 
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After all, the Bible said that “he that believeth” had no part with “an infidel,” and the 
“temple of God” none with idols. “Wherefore come out from among them, and be ye 
separate.”43 When Princeton Seminary, where Machen taught, revised its theological 
stance to be more inclusivist in 1929, Machen and others withdrew to form Westminster 
Theological Seminary in Philadelphia. Eventually, Machen would be instrumental in 
founding a new denomination entirely, the Presbyterian Church of America, later 
renamed the Orthodox Presbyterian Church.
44
 The General Association of Regular 
Baptist Churches was formed in 1932 by conservatives who had left the Northern Baptist 
Convention. Thousands of independent Baptist churches would be founded during the 
1930s and ’40s. J. Frank Norris, a southern Baptist preacher, started the World Baptist 
Fellowship in the 1930s, out of which was later formed the Bible Baptist Fellowship. 
Both were dedicated to fundamentalist principles.
45
 
 If control of religious institutions was one front on which fundamentalists and 
modernists battled, the cultural front was another, centering on the theory of evolution. 
For fundamentalists, Darwinian evolution was a symbol of much that was going wrong 
with America, similar to how later fundamentalists would view both Communism and 
“secular humanism.” Evolution represented a weakening of biblical authority, an attack 
on supernaturalist Christianity, and led—they believed—to a reduction of human worth 
to that of animals. The First World War intensified these convictions, as many 
fundamentalists linked Germany with evolution. Thus, the fundamentalist attack on 
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evolution was more than merely a theological dispute; they saw it as a defense of 
American civilization, and in the 1920s succeeded in getting statutes passed in a number 
of southern states forbidding the teaching of evolution in the public schools. Famously, 
this led to the Scopes trial in 1925, when John Scopes was charged and tried for teaching 
evolution in Dayton, Tennessee. The case would have received a great deal of attention 
anyway, but it was elevated into a major national event by the personalities on both sides. 
Clarence Darrow, a well-known lawyer and an agnostic, joined Scopes’ defense team, 
and William Jennings Bryan—three-time presidential candidate, orator and 
fundamentalist spokesman—joined the prosecution. Scopes was found guilty, although 
the verdict was later overturned on a technicality. But the case from the outset was about 
far more than Scopes’ guilt or innocence. Fundamentalism itself seemed to be on trial, 
with its belief in the historicity of miracles, the inerrancy of Scripture including a literal 
six-day creation, and a dogged insistence that these be taught in public schools. In the 
eyes of many in the national press, fundamentalism was intellectually backwards and 
culturally unsophisticated. For a writer like H.L. Mencken, Bryan’s inability to offer an 
satisfactory response to Darrow’s challenges to his beliefs meant that fundamentalism 
was suitable only for the “gaping primates of the upland valleys.”46 In the minds of many, 
the press coverage of the Scopes trial helped cement fundamentalism’s reputation as 
obscurantist and rural, even though it had long been largely a northern, eastern, and urban 
movement.   
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The Hope for Revival and Neo-Evangelicalism 
 By the mid-1920s, then, fundamentalism was on the defensive. It had lost control 
of major denominations, it had a negative reputation among intellectual elites, and it no 
longer occupied a place of cultural power. To some observers, it seemed that 
fundamentalism was a dying movement, “an event now passed,” in the words of a writer 
in the magazine Christian Century.
47
 Fundamentalists renewed their call to live a 
“separated life,” one characterized by a turning away from “worldly” amusements and 
adherence to a strict moral code.  
 This loss of cultural influence had implications for how fundamentalists viewed 
political action, for now not only their eschatology but their experience seemed to 
confirm their pessimism regarding the future. Yet it was not as if fundamentalists 
retreated entirely, and suggesting as one observer has that the decades between the 1930s 
and the 1970s were ones of “self-imposed isolation” goes a bit too far.48 While they did 
retreat from much overt political action, they still harbored a deep-seated belief that theirs 
was a “Christian nation,” and held out hope that it could return to its previous exalted 
position. For many, their political retreat was short-lived; by the 1940s, some 
fundamentalists were eager to leave their movement’s militant separatism behind and re-
engage with the broader intellectual culture, including in the political sphere. 
Furthermore, the concept of “revival” was not merely an individualistic one. While it was 
true that evangelicals had always believed that an individual needed to personally profess 
faith in Jesus Christ to be saved, fundamentalists believed that this had sweeping social 
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effects: revival was the only sure and effective means of cultural transformation. Thus, in 
the 1930s and ’40s, fundamentalists were, as Joel Carpenter writes, “not content to 
remain in sectarian isolation and quietude. Prompted by their revivalist heritage to dream 
of another great religious awakening in America, they set about to make it happen.”49  
 
The “Great Reversal”: From Reform to Revival 
 After the Scopes trial, it may have appeared to some that fundamentalism was in 
decline. In reality, the 1930s and 1940s were a period in which the movement was 
regrouping. Having lost control of the institutions and denominations that had been so 
dominant in the nineteenth century, fundamentalists set about creating an alternative 
network to nourish their faith. Fundamentalism may have been a largely ignored 
subculture in America during the interwar years, but it was a resilient and even thriving 
one.  
 As noted above, the grandiosely named World’s Christian Fundamentals 
Association, was founded in 1919. It grew out of a series of prophecy conferences, and its 
members, including men like William B. Riley, Lewis S. Chafer, and Reuben Torrey, 
sought to combat liberalism and evolution. The method they advocated was the creation 
of “Bible institutes”—ministry training schools—and Bible conferences. Over the next 
several decades, fundamentalists would develop these and other institutions.
50
  
 Concerned that theological graduate schools were rife with modernist thinking, 
fundamentalists sought to develop alternative training facilities. Some of the many Bible 
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institutes founded in these years were small and loosely organized; others had older roots, 
like Moody Bible Institute in Chicago, and were important hubs of fundamentalist 
activity. Westminster Theological Seminary, as noted above, was founded in 1929 by 
Machen and others. The Evangelical Theological College, later Dallas Theological 
Seminary, began in 1926 by associates of C. I. Scofield, and maintained his 
dispensationalist emphasis. 
 Other fundamentalist enterprises were more geared for the masses. Bible 
conferences were often week-long events that combined the appeal of resort-style 
activities at an appealing location with biblical teaching on personal holiness or 
dispensationalist prophecy. Thousands each year would attend these conferences at 
locations ranging from Rumney Bible Conference in New Hampshire to Winona Lake in 
Indiana. Radio reached many more in an era in which broadcasting was a rapidly growing 
industry. Hundreds of programs dedicated to fundamentalist teaching were scattered 
across the nations’ airwaves, some of them with large audiences. In 1939, Charles E. 
Fuller’s Old Fashioned Revival Hour, for example, had an estimated audience of fifteen 
to twenty million. Fundamentalists also developed a thriving publishing industry of 
books, materials to be used in Sunday schools, and magazines.
51
  
 Fundamentalists also looked abroad, believing that their divine mandate was to 
take the “gospel” to all lands. The older missions agencies had suffered as a result of the 
fundamentalist-modernist controversy; the doctrinal battles in the denominations had 
spread to the boards of those groups. Liberalism had caused some to question the 
necessity of the evangelization of other cultures. Fundamentalists, however, were 
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successful in increasing their missionary presence; by one estimate, between the 1930s 
and the 1950s, the fundamentalist percentage of the North American missionary 
population had doubled to about 30 percent.
52
  
 Thus, while it may have been off the radar of many observers of American 
culture, fundamentalism was a vigorous movement. The question was, to what end would 
that vigor be directed? The answer: revival. Harry Ironside, dispensationalist pastor of 
Moody Memorial Church, declared that “if there is world-wide brokenness of 
spirit…God will delight to do some mighty work before the coming again of His blessed 
Son.”53 Fundamentalists formed a variety of groups with the aim of stirring revival to a 
flame, and sought to find signs that something like another “Great Awakening” was 
beginning. Donald Grey Barnhouse, fundamentalist pastor and journalist, announced in 
1934 that despite the economic depression, new missionaries were being sent out, 
students were enrolling in Bible institutes, and numerous “witnesses to the truth” were 
broadcasting on the airwaves.
54
  
 While it is something of a caricature, the 1930s marked a shift in fundamentalists’ 
political attitudes from reform to revival. From the inception of the evangelical 
movement in the eighteenth century through the early twentieth century, most 
evangelicals had been willing to seek social change through political action; this 
willingness provided much of the energy, for example, for the reforms of the Progressive 
era and Prohibition. But in the 1930s, in what some have referred to as “the Great 
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Reversal,”55 fundamentalists shifted to a much more inward and individualized strategy, 
that of calling non-believers into a saving relationship with Jesus Christ.  
 There were at least two reasons for this. First, their recent setbacks had soured 
them on political action; their successes in passing anti-evolution legislation and 
Prohibition had proven to be only temporary. Second, their eschatology taught them that 
wickedness, crime, natural disasters, persecution of faithful Christians and political 
oppression would all increase before the return of Christ.
56
 Fundamentalists directed their 
energy toward revival because it seemed to them that real, lasting political reform was 
impossible. “Expect as little as possible from churches, or governments, under the present 
dispensation,” declared a British evangelical in 1878. Moody echoed the assessment: 
“Each dispensation…end[s] in failure…I don’t find anyplace where God says the world 
is grow better and better…I find that the earth is to grow worse and worse.”57 This 
pessimism continued into the twentieth century, and could foster, as Paul Boyer notes, an 
antigovernment, antireform ideology.
58
 Barnhouse argued that the Bible gave Christians 
no mandate “to go out and crusade for political righteousness.”59  
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 Despite such proclamations, fundamentalists during the 1930s and ’40s were not 
entirely apolitical. They continued to vote, although they were not united behind a single 
party, at least outside of the South—in that region, white fundamentalists, like other 
white southerners, were solidly Democratic. Nationwide, a majority of conservative 
Protestants do seem to have been Democrats during this period.
60
 Yet others like Billy 
Sunday, were probusiness Republicans,
61
 and some fundamentalists rallied against the 
Democratic presidential candidate Al Smith, a Roman Catholic, in the 1928 election. 
Anti-Catholic prejudice still loomed large in some fundamentalist thinking.  
 Some fundamentalists were sympathetic to right-wing campaigns like that of 
Gerald Winrod (1900-1957), a Kansas religious publisher and one-time U.S. Senate 
candidate. Many of Winrod’s concerns were ones common among fundamentalists: he 
opposed biblical higher criticism, alcohol, and the Social Gospel. But he was also 
strongly opposed to the New Deal, and urged that President Franklin D. Roosevelt be 
impeached. Winrod’s antagonism to the expansion of the federal government was fueled 
in part by anti-Semitism; Winrod believed the New Deal was part of a Jewish conspiracy 
to implement socialism. He was charged in a 1942 sedition case—eventually dropped—
that alleged he was a Nazi sympathizer.
62
 The Ku Klux Klan also revived after the First 
World War. The Klan presented itself as a Protestant organization with the aim of 
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protecting white privilege and a “Christian” moral order, through violence against 
African Americans if necessary. Some fundamentalists, especially in the South, 
supported the Klan, although many other leaders denounced it. Nevertheless, the racism it 
embodied was widespread, as was its theme that American civilization was under attack 
from secularism, Catholicism, immigration and immorality.
63
 Other demagogues also 
found an audience during the economic turmoil of the Great Depression. Gerald L. K. 
Smith was a Disciples of Christ preacher who allied first with Louisiana’s Huey Long, 
whose Share Our Wealth plan called for the confiscation of wealth from the rich and a 
redistribution of income to the poor. When Long was assassinated in 1935, Smith joined 
forces with Father Charles E. Coughlin, a Catholic priest from Detroit who blended anti-
Communism and anti-Semitism. Their new Union Party ran a candidate for president in 
1936, and attracted a fervent following with Smith’s proto-fascist and racist message, 
although the candidate won less than 2 percent of the popular vote.
64
 There were 
fundamentalists who were sympathetic to such views, and prominent fundamentalist 
publications gave some credence to theories about an international, socialist Jewish 
conspiracy.
65
 Such theories played on the anti-Semitism and the fears of socialism 
common to the period, not only among fundamentalists.   
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 Nevertheless, most fundamentalists rejected the radicalism of demagogues like 
Winrod and Smith. Their hopes lay elsewhere. While they may have believed that 
permanent spiritual progress was an illusion, fundamentalists had hardly given up on real 
social and cultural change. In what Marsden refers to as the “paradox of fundamentalist 
revivalism,”66 fundamentalists could believe that the world was sliding into moral 
degeneracy and that Armageddon was quickly approaching while at the same time 
working for a revival that they hoped would bring a wave of godliness to the nation. 
Revival was a method of social change all fundamentalists could espouse. And many 
believed that it would effect the only sort of social change that was meaningful and 
lasting. Fundamentalist theology tended to be individualistic, with an understanding of 
sin that saw it as almost entirely a product of individual persons rather than something 
embedded in societal structures and institutions. Thus, reforming society through laws 
and the legal system would do little good as long as that society was made up of 
unregenerate individuals. What was needed was revival on the personal level. While they 
may have pulled back from overt political action, fundamentalists had not given up on 
social change; they hoped that the transformation of individuals through the “gospel” 
would bring about the transformation of the culture.  
 Indeed, fundamentalists still retained a powerful belief in the nation’s Christian 
heritage and in the possibility of the resurrection of that heritage. Moreover, they had a 
deep sense of responsibility for the nation’s spiritual well-being, seeing themselves as a 
“godly remnant” that could someday redeem it.67 This was somewhat at odds with their 
                                                 
 66. Marsden, Fundamentalism  and American Culture, 43.  
 
89 
 
 
eschatology, perhaps the result of what Marsden calls a “residual postmillennialism,”68 a 
carry-over from the nineteenth century when most evangelicals believed that they could 
help usher in a golden age through their own actions. They may have been 
dispensationalists, but fundamentalists still harbored hopes for the nation’s future. If 
nothing else, they hoped for a temporary reprieve from the long-term moral decay that 
presaged the end of days.  
 
Neo-Evangelical Optimism 
 By the end of the 1930s, a growing number of younger fundamentalists were 
becoming discontented with their movement’s separatist tendencies and anti-intellectual 
reputation. Believing that conservative Protestants needed to engage with rather than 
simply react against the broader culture, they constituted a reform movement within 
fundamentalism that became known as “neo-evangelicalism.” Neo-evangelicals—or 
simply evangelicals—retained some of the emphases of fundamentalism, such as 
inerrancy and the revivalist goal of “saving souls.” But they also attempted to soften 
some of fundamentalism’s militant tone, and they created a number of institutions that 
would lead conservative Protestants out of their subculture.  
 Among the most prominent of these evangelicals were Harold John Ockenga, Carl 
F. H. Henry, and Billy Graham. Ockenga (1905-1985) was a Congregational pastor who 
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had attended Princeton Theological Seminary during the upheaval caused by Machen’s 
departure, and Ockenga was among those students who followed Machen to the new 
Westminster Theological Seminary, from which he graduated. Ockenga became the 
pastor of the influential Park Street Congregational Church in Boston in 1936, a position 
he held until 1969. During those years, Ockenga helped found several important 
evangelical institutions, including the National Association of Evangelicals in 1943.
69
    
 The NAE was founded as an alternative to two other organizations. The Federal 
Council of Churches—after 1950, the National Council of Churches—was created in 
1908 with the aim of promoting a Christian influence in society, and its doctrinal 
statement was left intentionally vague so as to garner support from as wide a variety of 
Christian groups as possible. By the 1920s, fundamentalists like Carl McIntire were 
criticizing the FCC as being too focused on the social gospel to the exclusion of personal 
salvation, and being soft on communism.
70
 McIntire and others founded the American 
Council of Christian Churches (1941) expressly as a counterweight to the FCC; McIntire 
insisted, for example, that only those denominations willing to reject modernism and 
separate themselves from the FCC would be welcome to join the ACCC.
71
 The founders 
of the National Association of Evangelicals saw it as taking something of middle road 
between the FCC and the ACCC; in their view, the former was too compromised with 
modernism, while McIntire’s group was too militantly fundamentalist. The NAE, said J. 
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Elwin Wright, ought to express the “essential solidarity as evangelicals,” while 
cultivating “a spirit of love and consideration toward those with whom we differ on less 
essential matters.”72 By 1947, thirty denominations—with membership totaling over one 
million—had joined the NAE.73  
 While disavowing militancy, the founders of the NAE had high hopes for its 
influence. In a statement evoking the long tradition of American religious 
exceptionalism, Ockenga stated at the opening conference that the United States “has 
been assigned a destiny comparable to that of ancient Israel.” The nation was beset with 
“rampant secularism” and “indifference to God.” The choice was clear: “One is the road 
of the rescue of western civilization by a re-emphasis on and revival of evangelical 
Christianity. The other is a return to the Dark Ages of heathendom which powerful force 
is emerging in every phase of world life today.” Ockenga called for an evangelical 
witness in all segments of society. No longer should evangelicals be content to build their 
own institutions and contemplate the end times. Evangelical leaders were needed in the 
academy, in politics and in the business.
74
  
 This same sort of call was echoed by Carl F. H. Henry in his book The Uneasy 
Conscience of Modern Fundamentalism (1947). Henry, a journalist and eventual 
professor who at the time of publication was completing a doctorate in theology at 
Boston University, inveighed against fundamentalism’s tendency to focus on individual 
salvation to the exclusion of social ills. “An evangelical message vitally related to world 
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conditions is not precluded by New Testament doctrine,” he wrote.75 Evangelicals needed 
to move beyond narrow questions of private morality and engage in the kind of social 
activism that had been prevalent in the nineteenth century. Evangelism and social reform 
should be linked. A message of personal regeneration was the church’s primary task, but 
it should be not be forgotten that Christianity is a “world-and-life view.” He envisioned 
Christians competent in all fields of study, including Christian statesmen standing for 
“the great evangelical affirmations throughout world politics.”76  
 There was a ready audience for this message, and a number of fundamentalism’s 
reformers, including Ockenga and Henry, believed that a new graduate school was 
needed. Fuller Theological Seminary was founded in 1947 with the help of radio 
evangelist Charles Fuller, with Ockenga as its first president and Henry on its faculty. 
Fuller would come to be known as the flagship institution of the new evangelicalism. The 
magazine Christianity Today, founded 1956, would be its primary mouthpiece, and 
Henry would serve as its first editor, until 1968.  
 A major force behind the creation of Christianity Today was the evangelist Billy 
Graham. Born in North Carolina, Graham had attended Bob Jones College, Florida Bible 
Institute and Wheaton College before briefly serving as a pastor. In 1944, he joined 
Youth for Christ, a newly formed organization that had the goal of evangelizing 
America’s young people. Formed during the tumultuous years of the Second World War, 
Youth for Christ sought to avoid compromising with modernism while using a variety of 
“modern” methods to reach its target audience. Its rallies, attracting thousands, featured a 
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variety of musical and theatrical entertainment, capped off with a sermon. Graham was a 
traveling evangelist with the organization, and gained a great deal of attention after 
William Randolph Hearst’s newspapers featured the movement. Graham soon traveled to 
England for evangelistic tours, and in 1949 came into national fame for his series of 
revival meetings in Los Angeles.
77
 
 Youth for Christ organizers, like many of evangelicalism’s leaders, sought to 
avoid overt politicization, and explicitly distanced themselves from right-wing groups 
like that of Gerald Winrod. Torrey Johnson, a Youth for Christ leader, told Time 
magazine that his organizers had no “political axes to grind,” and that its only goals were 
“the spiritual revitalization of America” and “the complete evangelization of the world in 
our generation.”78 Nevertheless, Youth for Christ leaders and other evangelicals freely 
blended their faith with patriotism and anti-Communism. A 1945 Youth for Christ rally 
in Chicago, for example, drew seventy thousand participants to a flag-bedecked Soldier 
Field, where they sang the national anthem, cheered returning soldiers, and listened to an 
appeal to buy war bonds.
79
 Graham’s sermons in the 1940s began increasingly to play on 
the fear of Communism’s spread as he sought to create a sense of urgency in his 
audiences, holding out national repentance as America’s only sure hope. In this theme, 
Graham was hardly alone. President Truman, speaking to the Federal Council of 
Churches in March 1946, only one day after hearing Winston Churchill’s “Iron Curtain” 
speech in Fulton, Missouri, warned that without a “moral and spiritual awakening” 
America was doomed. General Dwight Eisenhower, speaking the following month, told a 
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group of Army chaplains that humanity’s only hope lay in “moral regeneration.”80 As 
tensions with the Soviet Union increased and Cold War fears spread, evangelicals found 
that their goals were in sync with much of the national mood. It was a convergence that 
Graham utilized to gain publicity for his evangelistic efforts, and he cultivated 
relationships with every American president beginning with Eisenhower’s election in 
1952.
81
  
 Evangelicals were the beneficiaries, along with other religious groups, of 
something of a post-war “religious boom” in the United States. The economy, fully 
recovered from the Great Depression as a result of wartime investment, brought a new 
prosperity to families, and returning soldiers seemed ready along with the rest of the 
country to settle into a domestic pattern. New families were created as the the “baby 
boom” generation, usually defined as those born between 1946 and 1964, added millions 
to the nation’s population, and many of those families joined churches. By a variety of 
measures, the postwar period was a remarkably religious one. Church membership, the 
construction of houses of worship, and enrollment in clergy-training institutions all 
increased rapidly in the decade following the war.
82
 Americans reported that they trusted 
in churches far more than other institutions, be they schools, the government and the 
media. In 1954, nine of ten Americans surveyed said that they believed in the divinity of 
Christ; roughly two-thirds believed in the existence of Satan.
83
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 The fear of Communism strengthened the link between Christianity and 
patriotism. Communism as a system was atheistic, and for some Americans, opposing 
Communism meant embracing Christianity—or at least religion of some sort. “Our form 
of government,” said president-elect Dwight Eisenhower in 1952, “has no sense unless it 
is founded in a deeply felt religious faith, and I don’t care what it is. With us of course it 
is the Judeo-Christian concept but it must be a religion that all men are created equal.”84 
During Eisenhower’s presidency, the phrase “In God We Trust” would be adopted as the 
nation’s motto and printed on its currency (1955), and “Under God” added to the Pledge 
of Allegiance (1954). Historian Stephen J. Whitfield has suggested that what revived in 
the 1950s was “not so much religious belief as belief in the value of religion.”85 For 
some, this is surely true: religion was seen as providing a spiritual foundation for “the 
American Way” in contrast to Communism. The contrast with the Soviet Union during 
the Cold War heightened for some the sense that America was founded with religious 
roots. Americans were “a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme 
Being,” wrote Supreme Court justice William O. Douglas.86 
 Conservative Protestants, then, found a ready audience for their belief that the 
Cold War was not just a global struggle for political dominance, but a cosmic battle 
between spiritual forces of good and evil. “Either Communism must die, or Christianity 
must die,” wrote Graham, “because it is actually a battle between Christ and anti-
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Christ.”87 Charles Lowry, writing in 1956 in the pages of the new Christianity Today, 
argued that Communism was directly opposed to Christianity: “It is rather an opposed 
and a competing system, controlled by diametrically antagonistic premises; and it is in a 
very nearly exact sense the expression in twentieth-century terms of the spirit of 
Antichrist. It seeks deliberately, strategically, uncompromisingly and with fierce, 
inhuman hostility to extirpate the influence, teaching and name of Jesus Christ.”88  
 
Political Engagement 
 Thus, in the decades following the Second World War, a variety of forces began 
to push conservative Protestants toward political action. Their belief about the nature of 
America’s founding—that theirs was a “Christian nation” in some sense—always 
underlay their thinking about political engagement. During the Cold War, this belief was 
heightened by its contrast with “godless Communism,” and even mainstream political 
leaders played up the nation’s purported religious roots; for some, international politics 
took on the character of a moral crusade. Among evangelicals, some of their leaders were 
advocating a greater involvement in all aspects of society, including politics. Billy 
Graham’s popularity and his acceptance among the nation’s political elite encouraged 
many evangelicals to believe that political influence was both possible and desirable. 
That slowing growing belief would increasingly benefit the Republican rather than the 
Democratic Party, a shift described more fully in the chapters that follow.   
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CHAPTER 3 
 
CONSERVATIVE PROTESTANTS, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND 
CULTURAL CHANGE 
 
 
 If as much effort could be put into winning people to Jesus Christ across the land 
 as is being exerted in the present civil rights movement, America would be turned 
 upside down for God. 
 
                     —Jerry Falwell, “Ministers and Marches” sermon, 1965 
 
 
 March 21, 1965, was a Sunday. In Selma, Alabama, some three thousand 
marchers began the trek from Selma to Montgomery, the state capital, fifty-four miles 
away. The first attempt at such a march had been two weeks earlier on March 7, when 
some six hundred marchers had set out for Montgomery as a way of calling for a federal 
voting rights bill to protect the constitutional rights of African Americans. On that day 
the marchers had been met at Selma’s Edmund Pettus Bridge by deputies and Alabama 
state troopers, some on horseback, who fired tear gas and charged into the crowd, beating 
and clubbing marchers with nightsticks. Two days later, three white out-of-town 
ministers who had come to Selma in support of the demonstrations were attacked by 
locals armed with a club; one of them, James Reeb, a Unitarian Universalist minister, 
later died of his injuries.
1
  
 The brutality at the bridge was broadcast on national television, and Reeb’s death, 
too, received widespread publicity. Martin Luther King, Jr., delivered a eulogy for him in 
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Selma on March 15, in which he praised Reeb as a “witness to the truth that men of 
different races and classes might live, eat, and work together as brothers.”2  
 Now, on March 21 as the march from Selma began for a second time, another 
southern preacher offered his assessment of ministers like Reeb. Jerry Falwell, preaching 
a sermon titled “Ministers and Marches” to a crowded sanctuary in Lynchburg, Virginia, 
was sharply critical of pastors who participated in civil rights activism, although he did 
not mention Reeb by name. Such pastors needed to be off the streets and behind their 
pulpits, proclaiming the saving gospel of Jesus Christ. “Preachers are not called to be 
politicians but to be soul-winners,” he said. “We have a message of redeeming grace 
through a crucified and risen Lord. This message is designed to go right to the heart of 
man and there meet his deep spiritual need.” Christians were not called to “reform the 
externals,” he said, or wage war against sin, whether that sin be gambling, alcohol 
consumption, prostitution, “prejudiced person or institutions,” or anything else. “Our 
ministry is not reformation but transformation. The gospel does not clean up the outside 
but rather regenerates the inside.”3 
 Falwell’s speech is notable for several reasons. First, there is the obvious irony of 
it, given that within fifteen years Falwell’s own actions would be contradicting this 
statement as he himself would be heavily involved in political action and in making an 
effort to “reform the externals” through his lobbying group, Moral Majority.4 Nor was he 
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separated from politics even before 1965. As noted below, Falwell was involved in the 
political fight against integration that arose in Virginia following the Brown v. Board of 
Education Supreme Court decision in 1954. Second, his sermon is illustrative of the deep 
ambivalence that many white conservative Protestants felt toward political action. Not all 
of them shared Falwell’s segregationist beliefs, even in the South. But many of them 
would have echoed his statement that Christians were called to “save souls,” not to 
change society. Partly because of their individualist conception of sin and salvation, 
partly because of the dispensationalist theology held by many, and partly because most of 
them were comfortable with the status quo and saw little reason to challenge it, most 
white evangelicals and fundamentalists had no desire to be politically engaged beyond 
casting a ballot. Third, Falwell’s speech hints at the complex connections between the 
civil rights movement and the rise of the Christian Right, connections I sketch in this 
chapter. 
 Race was not the only issue to confront white evangelicals and fundamentalists in 
the 1950s through the 1970s. These decades saw the growth of the federal government, as 
the Depression-era “New Deal” was expanded in President Lyndon Johnson’s “Great 
Society.” The Supreme Court put new limits on Bible reading and prayer in public 
schools. Following the trail blazed by African-American civil rights activists, other 
groups—racial minorities, women and homosexuals—began to call for a redressing of 
their unequal treatment. Abortion was legalized in the Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade 
decision in 1973. Drug use, divorce and sex outside of marriage were on the rise and 
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treated with greater openness. The Vietnam War deeply divided Americans, the events of 
Watergate shook their faith in elected officials, and a stagnant economy and oil embargo 
threatened their prosperity.  
 Such a simplistic listing hardly suffices as a summary of the events of three 
decades. But it is a reminder that these were turbulent times, and white theologically 
conservative Protestants varied in their responses to them. Some—a definite minority—
saw in the Bible justification for an evangelical progressive politics. In 1971, for 
example, a few students at Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, an evangelical institution 
near Chicago, formed The People’s Christian Coalition, which would eventually become 
the Sojourners Community; its magazine would become a mouthpiece for the evangelical 
left. Oregon Senator Mark Hatfield would also be a spokesman for evangelicals who 
were uncomfortable with what they saw as the nation’s militarism, racism and lack of 
social justice.
5
  
 Yet by the end of the 1970s, it would not be an evangelical left that had politically 
mobilized America’s white evangelicals, but the Christian Right. Increasingly during 
these decades, many evangelicals and fundamentalists began to believe that the federal 
government was not an ally in their fight to bring revival to the nation. Because of their 
antipathy toward some of its actions, they were willing to be led into the ranks of political 
conservatism. The 1960s and early 1970s saw a number of changes that eventually 
became fodder for the Christian Right’s claims that the nation had abandoned its religious 
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roots. Slowly, they began to overcome their antipathy to political activism and to see 
mobilization as a key strategy in returning to those roots.  
 
Evangelicals, Fundamentalists, and Civil Rights 
 The struggle by and for African Americans to be treated as full citizens was, of 
course, a long one, with many important milestones. But events of the mid-1950s 
quickened the pace of change. The 1954 Supreme Court decision of Brown v. Board of 
Education declared racially segregated schools unconstitutional; the court ruled the 
following year that schools should be integrated “with all deliberate speed.” Also in 
1955, African Americans boycotted the Montgomery, Alabama, bus system after Rosa 
Parks declined to give up her seat to a white man; the year-long boycott saw the rise to 
national fame of a young minister named Martin Luther King, Jr. The Civil Rights Act of 
1957 strengthened the ability of the federal government to enforce voting rights for 
African Americans. The same year, the Little Rock, Arkansas, public schools were 
integrated, but only after President Dwight Eisenhower used federal troops to do so.
6
  
 The subsequent events of the civil rights movement—with its sit-ins, boycotts, 
protest marches, voter registration efforts, sermons, arrests, violence and bloodshed—
divided theologically conservative Protestants, as they divided America as a whole. 
Committed segregationists defended the system of white supremacy that had been created 
in the American South, and at times used Christian rhetoric to justify their racist 
ideology. The Ku Klux Klan used violence and intimidation to defend white privilege in 
what its members saw as a “Christian” society, a label they limited to Protestants. White 
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Citizens’ Councils, which arose in the South as a more “respectable” alternative to the 
Klan, also saw biblical support for segregation. For some, integration was but one more 
manifestation of liberal theology, more concerned with the “social gospel” than with 
saving souls. Historian Joseph Crespino, focusing on Mississippi, notes that liberal 
theologians were often satirized in the Council newsletter.
7
 Some segregationists sought 
to defend segregation as God’s plan for races to co-exist peacefully, pointing to the 
divine command that Jews in the Old Testament were not to intermarry with other 
peoples, and to Acts 17:26, which noted that God had determined the “bounds of [all 
nations’] habitation.”8 Some also argued that the “curse of Ham,” the punishment 
inflicted on one of Noah’s sons, had fallen on Africans and thus their American 
descendants.
9
 Others did not believe that Scripture mandated segregation, but that God 
allowed segregation as a legitimate form of social organization.
10
 This view could be 
found among northern evangelicals, too. Writing in the pages of the evangelical magazine 
Christianity Today in 1957, E. Earle Ellis—at the time a professor of Bible at Aurora 
College in Illinois—defended segregation. While dismissing the “curse of Ham” and the 
Acts 17:26 arguments as poor interpretations of the Bible, he nevertheless argued that 
segregation per se did not violate biblical ethics. “Segregation does not necessitate bad 
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race relations, nor does integration guarantee good ones,” he wrote. “On the contrary, the 
very opposite often appears to be true.”11  
 One of the southern preachers who supported segregation during the 1950s and 
1960s was Jerry Falwell. Born in Lynchburg, Virginia, in 1933, Falwell was converted to 
fundamentalist Christianity in 1952, partly through the radio ministry of Charles Fuller.
12
 
After graduating from Baptist Bible College in Springfield, Missouri, in 1956, he 
returned to Lynchburg and founded the Thomas Road Baptist Church with thirty-five 
initial members. The church grew quickly, in large part because of Falwell’s tireless 
efforts of door-to-door evangelism and his radio ministry, which he launched soon after 
his church’s inception.13  
 Although few of his early sermons survive, Falwell’s own racial beliefs during 
this period are clear. In 1958, a few weeks after the governor of Virginia ordered some of 
the state’s public schools to close rather than admit African-American students,14 Falwell 
preached a sermon titled  “Segregation or Integration: Which?” God had ordained each 
race a certain place to live, he said, referring to Acts 17:26, and that commandment had 
been violated when Africans were forcibly brought to America as slaves. “In spite of this 
unchangeable condition, we can and should maintain God’s plan for the races, as well as 
possible, here in this nation.” After disavowing any hatred toward other races, Falwell 
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argued that “[w]hen God has drawn a line of distinction, we should not attempt to cross 
that line.” African Americans were under the curse of Ham, which meant that they were 
to be perpetual “servants.” Furthermore, he said, “we see the hand of Moscow in the 
background” and the Devil himself behind integrationists’ efforts, and integration “will 
destroy our race eventually” as it will lead to interracial marriage.15 The next year, in 
1959, Falwell was the first chaplain of Lynchburg’s chapter of the Defenders of State 
Sovereignty and Individual Liberties, a state-wide organization birthed as part of the 
“Massive Resistance” movement against integration, and  dedicated to preserving 
segregated schools and a “society based on racial separatedness.”16  
 Other theologically conservative Protestants were more moderate. The 
Presbyterian Church in the United States—a southern denomination—passed a resolution 
shortly before the Brown decision of 1954 supporting desegregation and calling for 
peaceful compliance with that effort. The Southern Baptist Convention passed a similar 
resolution immediately after the decision.
17
 These resolutions do not indicate active 
support for the civil rights movement, nor do they mean that all members of those 
denominations agreed with the resolutions of their delegates, but the fact remains that 
these bodies were on record as opposing segregation. Indeed, David L. Chappell has 
argued that one of the reasons for the success of the civil rights movement was the 
weakness of the theological arguments marshalled against it. Compared with the 
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overwhelming support white clergy gave slavery before the Civil War, the opposition to 
civil rights during the 1950s and 1960s by white clergy appears limited and indecisive.
18
  
 A small minority of evangelicals—like Frank Gaebelein, who among other things 
was an associate editor of Christianity Today—actively supported the civil rights 
movement.
19
 Dozens of white evangelicals joined the march from Selma to Montgomery. 
Members of InterVarsity Christian Fellowship, a college campus group, overwhelmingly 
supported federal intervention in southern states.
20
 Billy Graham, although generally of 
conservative political convictions, was cautiously supportive of civil rights, desegregated 
his evangelistic meetings in the early 1950s and invited Martin Luther King, Jr. to give 
the opening prayer one night during Graham’s 1957 crusade in New York City.21 Mark 
Hatfield, evangelical Republican governor of Oregon from 1959-1967, was a member of 
the NAACP, helped end discrimination in Oregon hotels in 1953, and consistently 
supported civil rights throughout his long U.S. Senate career.
22
  
 Most northern evangelicals and fundamentalists, though, were of mixed mind on 
the question of civil rights for African Americans. On the one hand, their theology told 
them that all races were created by the same God, and they knew that African-American 
evangelicals shared their core theological convictions. Their basic sense of justice was 
offended by the mistreatment of demonstrators in places like Birmingham, where the 
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police turned fire hoses and dogs loose on peaceful marchers, and a bomb planted in a 
church killed four young girls.  
 On the other hand, for several different reasons they were often skeptical of civil 
rights activism. Pervasive racism, shared by Americans across the nation, was one reason. 
In 1958, for example, just under two-thirds of all Americans said that they would not be 
willing to vote for a well-qualified African American for president.
23
 By 1963, 49 percent 
of white Americans thought they might move if an African-American family moved in 
next door; 80 percent thought they might if a great number moved in.
24
 George Wallace’s 
success in gaining northern support during his presidential campaigns is another 
illustration of white attitudes. Wallace, in his first inaugural address as governor of 
Alabama in 1963, famously pledged to uphold “segregation forever” and later that same 
year attempted to block the admission of African-American students to the University of 
Alabama.
25
 Wallace’s rhetoric was an amalgamation of race-baiting, bombastic anti-
Communism, and assertions that a federal government led by liberal elites was assaulting 
local and states’ rights. Yet he clearly had appeal among whites outside the South, 
winning more than third of the votes in the Wisconsin Democratic primary during the 
1964 presidential campaign and 30 percent in Indiana.
26
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 A second reason many theologically conservative Protestants hesitated to embrace 
the civil rights movement was the fear of Communism. In the mid-twentieth century, 
suspicion that Communists were behind any form of cultural change bordered on 
paranoia. In his “Ministers and Marches” sermon, for example, Falwell asserted that 
Martin Luther King, James Farmer, and other civil rights leaders were “known to have 
left-wing associations” and that Communists were exploiting American dissension for 
their own benefit.
27
 Falwell was hardly alone in making these allegations. During the 
mid-1960s, following urban riots in several African-American neighborhoods, half of all 
Americans believed that Communists were at least partially responsible for both the civil-
rights demonstrations and the riots.
28
 J. Edgar Hoover, at the time director of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigations, warned President John F. Kennedy that King was under 
Communist influence, and the White House authorized the FBI to wiretap King and other 
members of the Southern Christian Leadership Conference.
29
 The civil rights-Communist 
link was false, but during the 1950s and 1960s, the fear of Communism made it easy for 
segregationists to brand the civil rights movement as not only disruptive, but subversive.  
 A third reason for the ambivalence of white theologically conservative Protestants 
toward the civil rights movement was certain aspects of their theology. As noted in 
chapter 2, the premillennialist dispensationalist theology held by many worked against 
their support for social reform. The belief that the world would get worse until the return 
of Christ could easily feed a kind of passivity about working for change—especially 
among white evangelicals who did not suffer the deprivations African Americans did 
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during the Jim Crow era. Even Billy Graham, who was largely supportive of civil rights 
for African Americans, expressed his doubt about such change. Following the 1963 
March on Washington, in which King spoke of his dream that white and black children in 
Alabama would someday be able to walk hand in hand, Graham found it hard to believe 
that such fellowship would happen this side of the Rapture. “Only when Christ comes 
again will little white children of Alabama walk hand in hand with black children.”30 
Graham was not alleging that King’s dream was undesirable; rather, he viewed it as 
unrealistic.  
 Their view of sin and salvation, too, caused many white evangelicals and 
fundamentalists to be suspicious of social reform as a legitimate activity for Christians. 
The old arguments of the fundamentalist-modernist split still loomed large. Evangelicals 
and fundamentalists tended to see social reform as liberal “Social Gospel,” and therefore 
suspect. Their revivalist heritage caused them to see their primary—if not their only—
goal as “getting people saved.” That is, in their view, humans’ basic problem was their 
estrangement from God because of their sin; it was a problem that only individual 
repentance and confession of faith in Jesus Christ could overcome. This diagnosis could 
lead some to see little merit in social reforms that did not entail “heart change,” a 
theological motif that Michael O. Emerson and J. Russell Hawkins have labeled 
“antistructuralism.” Rather than see social problems as rooted in society’s structures—
laws, cultural practices, or institutions—white evangelicals tended to see all social 
                                                 
 30. Michael O. Emerson and Christian Smith, Divided by Faith: Evangelical Religion and the 
Problem of Race in America (New York: Oxford University Press, 2000), 47. 
109 
 
 
problems as a result of individual sin, with regeneration the only remedy.
31
 “Jesus’ stress 
on the universal need of regeneration speaks to our own turbulent times: ‘Ye must be 
born again,’” wrote the editors of Christianity Today in 1957. “The possibilities of fallen 
human nature are fancifully romanticized by those who expect a full solution of the race 
problem while they neglect this dimension of life.” Segregation is a moral wrong, this 
editorial went on to declare, and the sufferings of African Americans “suggest the deep 
need for soul-searching and repentance in the churches,” as well as action. “The early 
Church unleashed a flood of kindness in a world of racial strife; the modern Church has 
too often unleashed a flood of resolutions.” However, “[f]orced integration is as contrary 
to Christian principles as is forced segregation. The reliance on pressure rather than on 
persuasion has resulted in a marked increase of racial tensions in some areas. Christianity 
ideally moves upon the life of the community by spiritual means; the secular agencies, on 
the other hand, tend to resort to force, with the result that their achievements are 
continually endangered.”32  
 Thus, white theologically conservative Protestants were usually bystanders to or 
critics of the civil rights movement. Many of them viewed segregation unfavorably. But 
many also, for a variety of reasons, had an equally unfavorable view of activists.
33
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Nevertheless, in at least two important ways, the civil rights movement helped lay the 
groundwork for later political engagement among white evangelicals.  
 First, the civil rights movement explicitly linked morality and politics. In their call 
for the nation to give equal treatment to all citizens, regardless of race, both leaders and 
ordinary activists claimed that their movement reflected something higher than merely 
political pragmatism: it was the right thing to do. As historian Mark Noll writes, “[the 
civil rights movement] reinvigorated the possibility that some moral principles deserved 
higher loyalty than the established law of the land.”34 In this, African-American 
Protestant civil rights activists were heirs of the evangelical reform tradition of the 
nineteenth century; it was white evangelicals’ ambivalence about the civil rights 
movement that was out of step with that tradition. In making claims about the morality of 
their movement, civil rights activists were paving the way for some later white 
evangelicals to make similar claims, albeit in the support of conservative rather than 
progressive politics. Thus, the civil rights movement bequeathed to evangelical 
conservatives the possibility that government power could be used for moral ends. In one 
sense, this was nothing new; a long tradition, going back to the Puritans in the colonial 
period, saw a positive role for the state as moral enforcer.
35
 Yet it was a strand that had 
largely disappeared from fundamentalist and evangelical thinking following the failures 
of Prohibition and anti-evolution legislation. As Chappell argues, many African-
American civil rights activists, including King, had a pessimistic view of human nature 
and the intractability of evil. Because of this belief, they “were conspicuous for their 
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unwillingness to let social processes work themselves out and for their lack of faith in the 
power of education and economic development to cure society of oppressive evils.” It 
would take “coercion”—for King and others in the SCLC, this meant nonviolent 
resistance—for the oppressors to relinquish their power. 36  
 Interestingly, white evangelicals shared this pessimism regarding human nature; 
they, too, rejected the liberal hope in the innate goodness of humanity. This shared belief 
also shared a source: the Bible’s teaching on the sinfulness of humanity. For King at 
least, this view was mediated by Reinhold Niebuhr, whose writings King absorbed during 
his academic career, especially during his graduate study at Boston University. For 
evangelicals, who tended to see Niebuhr as a “liberal” because of his emphasis on ethics 
rather than on salvation offered by Christ, this pessimism regarding human nature was 
rooted more directly in the doctrine of original sin and in a Calvinistic stress on “total 
depravity.” Yet in the mid-twentieth century, this gloomy anthropology led to different 
conclusions regarding the efficacy of political action. For King and other African-
American civil rights activists, it meant political action was necessary. For many white 
evangelicals, it meant that even those who sympathized with the plight of African 
Americans were suspicious of political efforts, for they believed that such efforts were 
unable to touch the center of the problem, which was the corrupt human heart. It would 
not be until the 1970s, when many white evangelicals came to believe that the federal 
government was leading the nation away from its “godly roots,” that they, too, would 
mobilize politically.  
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 Second, the civil rights movement did far more than present a model of political 
engagement for white evangelical conservatives. It also helped create the conditions for 
that engagement. The expansion of the federal government that occurred in an effort to 
enforce equal treatment of African Americans led some evangelicals, especially in the 
South, to view it with antipathy. The Brown Supreme Court decision (1954) and its 
subsequent enforcement with federal troops, the Civil Rights Act (1964), the Voting 
Rights Act (1965), and the 1968 Civil Rights Act (the “Fair Housing Act”) all involved 
the federal government overruling state and local authorities. While leaders of the 
Christian Right like Falwell would later denounce the segregation and racism some of 
them espoused in the 1960s,
37
 the battle over integration predisposed them to believe that 
the federal government had grown too large and too prone to intervention in local affairs. 
This concern meshed with a revitalized conservative movement that was coalescing in the 
1960s, as conservative activists sought to stop the growth of government that had begun 
in the “New Deal” era.38 As described in chapter 5, one of the precipitating events of the 
Christian Right was the Internal Revenue Service’s increased scrutiny in the 1970s of 
private religious-based schools on the grounds that they might be discriminatory and 
therefore undeserving of tax-exempt status. 
 Conservatives appealed to these fears of an expansive federal government in 
language that sometimes played on old racial ones. Wallace was hardly a conservative; 
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small-government conservatives tended to see him as another New Deal southerner who 
welcomed federal money for his state and region.
39
 But Wallace pioneered a new way of 
talking about race as the language of blatant bigotry became less acceptable. As his 
biographer Dan Carter notes, Wallace could recalibrate his rhetoric based on his 
audience. In the South during the mid-1960s, he used racist language much more freely. 
To national audiences, however, he was “careful to couch his message in the more 
congenial terrain of economic conservatism, states’ rights, anticommunism, and the 
public’s fear of social disorder.”40 To what extent the appeal of such rhetoric was because 
of the racism of his audiences is difficult to determine. But the fact remains that it was the 
federal government that was enforcing civil rights legislation, and any complaint about 
that power could be readily interpreted as expressing dislike of civil rights efforts. Barry 
Goldwater supported voting rights for African Americans, but as a senator voted against 
the 1964 Civil Rights Act on constitutional grounds; he argued that portions of the bill 
were unconstitutional because they allowed for federal intervention into private 
enterprise.
41
 Regardless of Goldwater’s own personal beliefs regarding race, this message 
of resisting federal interference played well in South where “states’ rights” had long been 
a battle-cry for maintaining segregation, and Goldwater’s only electoral college victories 
outside of his home state of Arizona were in the South. Richard Nixon’s so-called 
“southern strategy” during his 1968 presidential campaign, too, included soliciting the 
support of Strom Thurmond, the South Carolina senator who had opposed civil rights 
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legislation for years. Nixon had supported the civil rights legislation of the 1960s, but he 
also assured southerners during the campaign that he would not vigorously pursue federal 
enforcement of desegregation mandates.
42
 
 
“The Times They Are a-Changin’” 
 Race was not the only or even the primary factor in the increasing political 
conservatism of evangelicals. The civil rights era was one in which the federal 
government was expanding its reach in a variety of areas. Thus, as Noll notes, while 
complaints of “big government” were a smokescreen for segregationists whose true goal 
was a rollback of civil rights efforts, the role of the federal government did become a 
more honestly debatable topic.
43
 Escalating American involvement in the Vietnam 
conflict and the military draft meant that millions of young men felt federal power in a 
most direct and immediate way.  
 Federal spending overall as a percentage of GNP continued to grow in the 
decades following the Second World War.
44
 Federal aid for education expanded during 
the 1960s, and President Johnson’s “Great Society” programs included the creation of 
Medicare and Medicaid, health insurance programs for the elderly and poor, respectively. 
Federal regulation of matters affecting the public health increased, including higher 
standards for automotive safety, the Clean Air Act (1963) and the Clean Waters Act 
(1966). The surgeon general’s office issued its first warnings about the links between 
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cigarette smoke and cancer. The National Endowment for the Arts was created in the 
mid-1960s, as was the National Endowment for the Humanities.  
 
School Prayer and Bible Reading 
 The Supreme Court, too, extended its reach with several rulings that Christian 
Right leaders would later identify as evidence of America’s purported jettisoning of its 
godly heritage. In the early 1960s, the court moved against Bible reading and teacher-led 
prayer in public schools. The first decision, Engel v. Vitale, dealt with a prayer adopted 
by the New York Regents in the 1950s: “Almighty God, we acknowledge our 
dependence upon Thee, and we beg Thy blessings upon us, our parents, and our 
teachers.” A group of parents, including Steven Engel, sued William Vitale, a New York 
school board president, arguing that the prayer violated their religious beliefs and the first 
amendment’s clause prohibiting the establishment of religion. The Supreme Court agreed 
in 1962. Justice Hugo Black, writing for the 6-1 majority, cited Jefferson’s “wall of 
separation” phrase in support of the ruling; the Establishment Clause, he wrote, “must at 
least mean that in this country it is no part of the official business of government to 
compose official prayers for any group of American people to recite as part of a religious 
program carried out by government.”45  
 The ruling was immediately criticized by politicians from both parties.
46
 Billy 
Graham reported that he was “shocked and disappointed.” 47 Yet perhaps surprisingly, 
given how this decision would later be denounced by the Christian Right, evangelicals 
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and fundamentalists on the whole did not see the Engel decision as a threat. The bland 
nature of the prayer, and the fact that it was composed and recited rather than 
spontaneous, led many of them to accord it little meaning anyway. Christianity Today 
noted that such a “corporate prayer” encouraged a “least-common-denominator type of 
religion.” Eternity and Moody Monthly, evangelical magazines, also noted their support 
for Engel and suggested that the matter of teaching prayer to young people was best left 
to churches and parents.  
 A second Supreme Court ruling the following year, however, prompted greater 
antipathy from conservative Protestants. This one, Abington Township v. Schempp, barred 
the Lord’s Prayer and Bible readings from classrooms. A Pennsylvania law had mandated 
the classroom reading of ten verses from the Bible each morning and the recitation of the 
Lord’s Prayer; children could be excused from this ritual if their parents objected. The 
Schempp family did, and also argued in its suit that requiring the two Schempp children 
to stand in the hallway while their classmates prayed amounted to punishment. The suit 
was supported by the American Civil Liberties Union, and the case made it to the highest 
court in 1963. The court ruled in favor of the Schempps. The state must be neutral on 
matters of religion, wrote justice Tom Clark for the majority. “The breach of neutrality 
that is today a trickling stream may all too soon become a raging torrent.”48  
 Evangelicals were quick to express their dislike of Abington, perhaps because a 
ruling against the classroom reading of the King James Bible seemed to strike more 
closely to the foundation of their faith than the prohibition of a generic composed prayer. 
The National Association of Evangelicals began to advocate a constitutional amendment 
                                                 
 48. Irons, A People’s History of the Supreme Court, 411-412.  
117 
 
 
restoring prayer and Bible reading in public schools. Harold Ockenga, a leader in the 
post-war resurgence of neo-evangelicalism, argued that “a neutral or secular state, while 
preserving the nation from dominion by a denomination, leaves America in the same 
position as Communist Russia.” Fundamentalists weighed in, too. Carl McIntire wrote 
that a “greater issue is at stake than simply Bible reading in the schools. At stake is 
whether or not America may continue to honor and recognize God in the life of the 
nation.” Conservative Protestants were not alone in their affirmation of classroom 
religious practices; over 70 percent of Americans favored school prayer, and during the 
two years following the Engel decision, 111 congressmen introduced 147 proposals for a 
school-prayer constitutional amendment.
49
 George Wallace, in the midst of his fight 
against school integration and always ready to inveigh against Earl Warren’s Supreme 
Court, found another reason to do so. The “chief, if not the only, beneficiaries of the 
present court’s Constitutional rulings have been duly and lawfully convicted criminals, 
communists, atheists and clients of the NAACP,” he said after the Abington decision. 
And now, “we find the court ruling against God.”50  
 
Youth Protest 
 The 1960s and early 1970s were also years of other cultural and social changes, 
ones that many conservative Protestants found deeply unsettling. The era was one of 
protests, and for many Americans accustomed to the comparative consensus of the 1950s, 
the dissent was disruptive and disturbing.  The protests of the civil rights movement were 
the earliest, but as American involvement in the Vietnam conflict increased, so did 
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opposition to the war. For young American men of draft-age, the possibility of being sent 
to Vietnam was a cause for protest. Initially supportive of that involvement, the American 
public soured on the war as casualties increased with no clear path to victory—and 
uncertainty regarding what that victory would look like.  
 Other issues, often overlapping with the anti-war and civil rights causes, served as 
catalysts for dissent. The Port Huron Statement, a 1962 manifesto from the Students for a 
Democratic Society, criticized the nation’s militarism, buildup of nuclear weapons, anti-
Communist paranoia, racial bigotry, influence of big corporations, and unequal 
distribution of wealth. The influence of the statement was probably limited, but it did 
suggest that a growing number of people, especially young people, were willing to 
“question authority,” as a bumper sticker from later in the decade would phrase it.51 
College students protested in loco parentis rules—“in the place of the parents”—on 
campuses because they felt that rules addressing curfews and male-female contact were 
paternalistic and restrictive.
52
 Hippies in the Haight-Ashbury district in San Francisco and 
elsewhere shocked those of more conventional sensibilities by wearing granny dresses, 
leather vests, beads, and anything colorful; young men let their hair and beards grow. “I 
feel like letting my freak flag fly,” sang David Crosby. Musicians provided the anthems 
for Baby Boomers coming of age in an America they believed was racist, imperialistic, 
and unthinkingly conforming. “The times they are a-changin’,” sang Bob Dylan, and 
indeed they were. By the mid-1960s, a counterculture was emerging with liberation from 
cultural norms and self-expression as its primary themes.  
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Social Permissiveness 
 Charges that the era was one of “sex, drugs, and rock and roll,” could be 
overwrought, of course. But the 1960s and 1970s did see many people loosen their 
understanding of what sorts of behavior were appropriate. Between 1959 and 1973, the 
percentage of Americans who said that premarital sex was wrong dropped from 80 
percent to less than 50 percent.
53
 The practice of premarital sex increased as well, and the 
age of first sexual intercourse decreased.
54
 This shift took place in the context of other 
changes that gave women greater control over their own reproductivity. Oral 
contraception—“the Pill”—came on the market in 1960. The case of Griswold v. 
Connecticut (1965) established the right of married couples to obtain and use 
contraceptives, overturning a Connecticut law forbidding their use. In Eisenstadt v. Baird 
(1972), the court ruled that unmarried women had the same right.
55
   
 Movies and television shows began to treat sexual matters with far greater 
frankness; the Supreme Court in effect loosened the restrictions on obscenity in Miller v. 
California (1973), which allowed local communities to set their own standards. As a 
result, in many places pornography became less regulated and more widely available.
56
 
Drug use increased, especially of marijuana,
57
 a drug that in the minds of many became 
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almost synonymous with the counterculture. Other drugs—like LSD and heroin—were 
available to those who sought them. 
 
Gay Rights 
 Gays and lesbians were also becoming more vocal about the prejudice they faced 
during the 1960s and 1970s. Long disdained and vilified in mainstream culture, 
homosexual activity was illegal in every state prior to 1961; the American Psychiatric 
Association considered homosexuality sociopathic, a designation that was not removed 
until 1973.
58
 In the mid-twentieth century, many gays and lesbians remained 
“closeted”—keeping their sexuality private—in the face of social pressure; a few 
organizations, like the Mattachine Society and the Daughters of Bilitis, offered support 
and quietly worked for anti-discrimination laws. In 1969, however, events in Greenwich 
Village, New York, gave notice to the American public that some gays and lesbians were 
not content to remain in the shadows. The Stonewall Inn, a gay bar, was raided by police, 
ostensibly on the charge that it was selling liquor without a license. Patrons viewed the 
raid as another instance of law enforcement harassment, and fought back; a police 
crackdown the next night resulted in further rioting by gay men.
59
 Social acceptance of 
gays and lesbians was slow, but there was evidence during the 1970s of a growing “live 
and let live” attitude toward homosexuality; a society loosening its standards on 
premarital sex, divorce and what was considered obscene found it difficult to justify 
condemnations of homosexuality. Some states repealed their anti-sodomy laws, the U.S. 
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Civil Service Commission began in 1975 to allow the hiring of homosexuals, and the 
Democratic Party in 1980 for the first time included a gay rights plank.
60
  
 
Marriage and Gender 
 The 1960s and 1970s were also years that saw several challenges to the traditional 
understandings of marriage and gender roles. Divorce rates increased rapidly, as most 
states—beginning with California in 1969—adopted some version of “no-fault divorce” 
laws, allowing couples to divorce without alleging specific wrongdoing. Disapproval of 
divorce also dropped significantly.
61
 In part taking their cue from civil rights activists, 
women began to challenge societal limitations, such as inequalities in legal standing and 
pay and fewer job opportunities. An important milestone in this “second wave 
feminism”—the first wave resulted in women gaining the right to vote in the early 
twentieth century—was the 1963 publication of Betty Friedan’s The Feminine Mystique. 
Friedan wrote of educated woman who felt trapped in their roles as homemakers, wives 
and mothers, suggesting that the suburban home was in reality a “comfortable 
concentration camp.”62 For some women, involvement in the civil rights movement 
opened their eyes both to the power of mobilization around one’s identity and to the 
patronizing attitudes even among men seeking to end racial inequality.
63
 The National 
Organization for Women, with Friedan as one of its founders in 1966, provided a forum 
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for women to voice their discontent with discrimination they faced and also worked for 
legislative change. A success of that effort was the passage in 1972 of Title IX of the 
Educational Amendments Act, which mandated equal treatment of the sexes by any 
institution receiving federal money; one of the most obvious results of Title IX was the 
rush by high schools and colleges to create varsity sports programs for females.
64
  
 Perhaps the highest profile issue of the “women’s liberation movement” was the 
Equal Rights Amendment. Initially proposed in 1921, the ERA had languished in 
obscurity until 1970, when the Women’s Strike for Equality—a multi-city demonstration 
organized by NOW—helped raise the issue.65 The proposed constitutional amendment, 
which stated in its basic provision that “[e]quality of rights under the law shall not be 
denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex,” initially 
seemed to be headed for quick adoption. Sent to the states in 1972, it needed to be ratified 
by three-fourths of them by 1982 for adoption into the U.S. constitution. Twenty-two 
states approved it within the first year, but the pace of ratification soon slowed to a 
trickle, and by 1977—after five states had rescinded their previous approval—the 
amendment was still short three states. Some of the strongest opposition to the ERA came 
from women, including Phyllis Schlafly. Her Eagle Forum group argued that the 
amendment was unnecessary, given the “equal protection” clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, and that it could result in what anti-ERA forces saw as undesirable 
consequences: unisex toilets, legalized homosexual marriage, women in military combat, 
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and husbands freed of financial responsibility for their families.
66
 Schlafly also warned 
that the ERA would encourage lesbianism, an association strengthened in the minds of 
some when delegates at the 1977 National Women’s Conference approved a resolution 
calling for an end to discrimination against homosexuals.
67
 The ratification time limit 
expired in 1982, and the ERA died, a victim of the increasingly heated culture wars.  
 
Abortion 
 No issue would eventually come to exemplify the culture wars more than 
abortion, but in the 1960s, abortion was not a hotly debated issue, nor was it one 
particularly associated with women’s rights. All but one state had laws generally banning 
the practice; the majority allowed them if the woman’s life was in danger. Such laws did 
not eliminate all abortions; illegal ones could be had by women willing to have them 
performed by “back-alley” practitioners, often under dangerous conditions. But there was 
no organized movement seeking the expansion of abortion rights. The birth control 
movement, with Margaret Sanger (1879-1966) as a prominent spokesperson, focused 
almost entirely on contraception rather than abortion, and after women won the right to 
vote in 1920, women’s rights groups devoted most of their energy to the passage of the 
ERA. Abortion did become a matter of national debate for a brief period in 1962, when 
Sherri Finkbine was denied an abortion at an Arizona hospital. Finkbine had been taking 
thalidomide for headaches when she became pregnant; she and her doctor believed that 
she had a high risk of having a deformed child. Finkbine was the local host of a 
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children’s television show, and her situation received national media attention in the form 
of Life and Newsweek stories. She and her husband traveled to Sweden for an abortion, 
and a Gallup poll that year revealed that 52 percent of respondents believed that abortion 
was right in her case; 32 percent disagreed.
68
  
 By the early 1970s, a number of states had loosened their restrictions on abortion, 
including California, where in 1967 governor and future president Ronald Reagan signed 
into law a bill allowing abortions in the cases of rape and incest and when the pregnancy 
endangered the health of the mother.
69
 Four states had removed almost all such 
restrictions by 1971; an additional thirteen had broadened the legal reasons for abortion 
to include a woman’s mental and physical health as well as her life. Thirty states still 
allowed abortions only if the pregnant woman’s life was in danger, and three states made 
every abortion illegal.  
 During these years of slowly loosening restrictions, Romans Catholics were the 
most prominent religious voices against abortion. Catholics drew on a centuries-long 
history of opposition to the practice; church teaching, including that resulting from the 
Second Vatican Council in the early 1960s, condemned it. The Right to Life League, the 
nation’s first anti-abortion group, was formed in 1967 primarily by Catholics.70 Most 
Protestants, however, tended to be less vocal on the issue, partly because of historic 
suspicion of anything associated with Catholicism, and partly because the Bible—the 
final authority in their theology—did not address abortion specifically. Thus, 
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conservative Protestants took a variety of positions. Some fundamentalists, like John R. 
Rice, independent Baptist editor of The Sword of the Lord, sharply condemned abortion. 
The Southern Baptist Convention, on the other hand, passed a resolution in 1971 calling 
for states to loosen their restrictions on abortion. The resolution favored allowing “the 
possibility of abortion under such conditions as rape, incest, clear evidence of severe fetal 
deformity, and carefully ascertained evidence of the likelihood of damage to the 
emotional, mental, and physical health of the mother.” Other conservative Protestants 
were somewhere in the middle. Christianity Today, for example, printed an article 1968 
written by a Christian physician who suggested that Scripture was not explicit on the 
issue and that those who would forbid all abortions were guilty of a “hyperlegalistic 
distortion of true Christian ethics;” abortions performed before the point of fetal viability 
were probably permissible in some cases.
71
 In the midst of this lack of Protestant 
unanimity, abortion was not a topic that caused evangelicals and fundamentalists to 
politically mobilize.  
 The Supreme Court’s Roe v. Wade decision in 1973 did eventually change that 
political calculus, but not immediately. The Roe v. Wade case originated in Texas, where 
Norma McCorvey—publically known as “Jane Roe” until 1984, when she revealed her 
identity—initially sought an abortion in 1970. She was denied, and a suit was filed on her 
behalf by two lawyers seeking a plaintiff to challenge Texas’ law, which allowed 
abortions only if the woman’s life was threatened.72 McCorvey never had an abortion and 
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gave birth to a girl, who was adopted.
73
 Her case, however, continued its legal journey 
and found its way to the Supreme Court in 1970, with a decision finally issued in 1973. 
The 7-2 decision made abortion legal during the first two trimesters of pregnancy; states 
were allowed to restrict abortion after the fetus became “viable.” The court found, Harry 
Blackmun wrote in his majority opinion, that the Constitution includes the “right of 
privacy,” and the Fourteenth Amendment, with its guarantees of life, liberty and property, 
“is broad enough to encompass a woman’s decision whether or not to terminate her 
pregnancy.” 74 
 Roman Catholic clerics were predictably opposed to Roe v. Wade. Terence 
Cardinal Cooke of New York, for example, found the ruling “shocking” and 
“horrifying.”75 Conservative Protestants, as before the ruling, were of mixed minds on the 
decision. Southern Baptists, for example, in 1974 reaffirmed their earlier resolution, 
asserting that it was a middle ground between “the extreme of abortion on demand and 
the opposite extreme of all abortion as murder.” W.A. Criswell, a Texas pastor who had 
served as the SBC’s president from 1968 to 1970, approved the Roe decision, noting that 
he had always believed that a child became an individual person only after birth, and that 
decisions before birth should be made on the basis of what was best for the mother.
76
 
Other voices, however, were raised in protest against Roe. Billy James Hargis, founder of 
Christian Crusade, had long been preaching fundamentalism and anti-Communism; he 
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now added the anti-abortion cause to his efforts, creating the group Americans against 
Abortion. The National Association of Evangelicals issued a statement after Roe 
deploring the decision, “which has made it legal to terminate a pregnancy for no better 
reason than personal convenience or sociological considerations.”77 Christianity Today 
echoed the criticism, and there were other signs that evangelicals were rallying against 
abortion.
78
 
 
Signs of Evangelical Political Awakening 
 Nevertheless, the Roe decision did not cause immediate political mobilization. 
Falwell, for instance, did not begin to highlight abortion as prominent among America’s 
“national sins” until several years later, although he wrote later that the decision caused 
him immediate consternation.
79
 Paul Weyrich, a Catholic conservative activist and a key 
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player in the New Right movement of the 1970s, later said that he had tried to use the 
anti-abortion cause as a means of involving conservative Protestants in politics, but had 
“utterly failed.”80 
 There were, however, other signs that conservative Protestants were beginning to 
move further away from their relatively apolitical stance. Several incidents, scattered 
around the country, revealed that evangelicals and fundamentalists were willing to fight 
against trends that they believed were weakening local sexual mores. One battleground 
issue was sex education in public schools, and an early fight took place in Anaheim, 
California, in 1968. Advocates of such education, including those associated with the Sex 
Information and Education Council of the U.S., argued that students needed scientifically 
accurate information. Opponents protested that such programs were too sexually explicit, 
that they could encourage sexual experimentation, and that their amoral content did not 
condemn behaviors like premarital sex, homosexuality and bestiality. Various groups 
against sex education formed across the country; some of them, along with existing 
organizations like the John Birch Society and Hargis’s Christian Crusade, linked sex 
education with the familiar bogeyman of Communism. A popular film among the anti-
sex education groups was Pavlov’s Children, which alleged that the Soviet Union was 
using UNESCO (the United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organization) 
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to weaken American resolve against totalitarianism. As Daniel Williams notes, the sex 
education battles helped forge a link between anticommunists and social conservatives.
81
  
 A similar battle took place in the early 1970s in Kanawha County, West Virginia. 
There, the battle was not over sex education, but it did concern what children were being 
taught in the public schools. The dispute was born when the school board sought to adopt 
a number of books for use in its curriculum; the books were intended to be used as 
resources for K-12 teachers developing their own individualized instruction. Opponents 
of the textbooks objected to the sexual themes in some of the books, as well as material 
that in their view disparaged America, criticized a free enterprise economic system, used 
non-standard English, relegated the Bible to one among many of the world’s 
mythological systems, and taught that values were relative rather than absolute. 
Proponents of the books pointed to the books’ inclusion of multicultural perspectives—
they included a number of selections from minority writers—and to their “realism” in 
describing a variety of lifestyles and perspective. The dispute quickly grew far beyond 
the confines of the school-board meeting room, as many county residents chose up sides. 
It also turned violent: several schools were dynamited or firebombed, two people were 
wounded by gunfire, and school buses were fired upon; both sides were apparently 
involved in the violence. The battle gained the attention of national media, and a variety 
of outside groups became involved, including the John Birch Society and the newly 
founded Heritage Foundation, a conservative think tank.
82
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 Most of the books were eventually adopted, although with several 
accommodations for parents who objected to their use in the teaching of their children, 
and the dispute died down. It did, however, highlight the growing concern among some 
evangelical and fundamentalist parents regarding public schools. The growth of private, 
Christian schools was fueled in part by the desire to maintain segregated schools, as 
discussed further in chapter 6. But for many other parents, race had nothing do with their 
desire to form such schools. In their view, public schools were becoming captive to an 
anti-God, anti-American, anti-Bible ideology, and the solution was to form schools of 
their own. 
 A third sign in the 1970s that indicated a growing willingness to politically 
mobilize were protests against the push for homosexual rights, an effort that was growing 
in visibility. A number of cities passed gay-rights ordinances, and social conservatives 
began to organize opposition in the forms of petitions and resolutions. The Southern 
Baptist Convention, for example, passed its first resolution opposing homosexuality in 
1976. One of the highest profile campaigns was in Dade County, Florida, where Anita 
Bryant, a Christian singer and former pageant queen, rallied social conservatives in 1977 
against an ordinance that prohibited Miami schools from discriminating against 
homosexuals in hiring. Bryant created the group Save Our Children, arguing that 
homosexual teachers would seek to recruit youths to their “perverted, unnatural, and 
ungodly lifestyle.” Her campaign was successful in Miami, where residents passed an 
anti-gay-rights referendum; Jerry Falwell, by then a well-known figure in fundamentalist 
circles with his television program, Old Time Gospel Hour, traveled to Florida during the 
campaign to stage a rally in support of the referendum. Meanwhile, Save Our Children 
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had moved beyond Florida to agitate against similar gay-rights ordinances in other states, 
and the organization—later renamed Protect America’s Children—had broadened its 
agenda to include anti-pornography efforts and the promotion of school prayer. By 1980, 
Bryant herself was disillusioned with the culture wars; her own marriage had ended in 
divorce. But her campaigns had given notice that social conservatives were becoming 
more willing to fight against what they saw as attacks on “family values.”83 
 One of the questions raised by these instances is why issues related to sex and 
gender—abortion, the ERA, homosexuality, and sexual education—were becoming so 
central to evangelicals and fundamentalists’ social concern. Why were these fast 
becoming some, though not all, of the “hot button” issues that caused them such 
consternation? Some observers have argued that they represented an effort by white men 
to maintain their place in a gendered hierarchy as a racial hierarchy became less 
acceptable in the post-civil rights era. Others have suggested that economic concerns 
underlay these issues, and that women especially sought to defend the “traditional” 
family as a way of protecting their own status in a time of economic turmoil.
84
 Still others 
have posited that these concerns can be attributed to the designs of conservative political 
operatives who sought allies wherever they could find them, and who learned that 
theological conservatives would run to the anti-abortion banner even if those who waved 
it held economic beliefs that would not help them.
85
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 There may be some truth in these theses, and they may be helpful in explaining 
some aspects of the nascent Christian Right as it became allied with the broader New 
Right in the 1970s. But they fail to locate these issues against the backdrop of 
theologically conservative theology, and thus ignore the obvious explanation: 
evangelicals and fundamentalists were concerned about these issues because they 
believed that the Bible spoke clearly to them. The Bible condemned fornication (sex 
before marriage), adultery (sex outside of marriage), and, they believed, all homosexual 
activity.
86
 Jesus had commanded his followers to avoid sexual lust, equating it with 
adultery on the moral scale.
87
 Additionally, theological conservatives had long believed 
that the Bible taught that the husband was the head of the home, and that the wife’s duty 
was to submit to his leadership;
88
 how that relationship was to be practiced might be a 
matter of some debate, but the principle of hierarchy, they believed, was clear. Certainty 
about the Bible’s teaching on abortion was slower in coming, as noted above, but during 
the 1970s there was a growing belief that Scripture was decidedly opposed to the 
practice.  
 Furthermore, the nature of the fundamentalist and evangelical social ethic as it 
had developed by the mid-twentieth century helps explain the salience of these issues in 
the 1970s. In response to the old fundamentalist-modernist controversy, fundamentalists 
had developed a fairly privatized ethic, in which “personal holiness” and separatedness 
from “worldliness” were paramount. As we have seen, for example, many theologically 
conservative Protestants were suspicious of the civil rights movement as a manifestation 
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of the old Social Gospel. While evangelicals had attempted to expand their ethical 
concern to other areas—Carl Henry was an early proponent of this—avoiding sexual sin 
was still an important marker of both fundamentalist and evangelical identity. God’s 
word, they believed, clearly prohibited certain activities, and protecting what they saw as 
proper gender roles was important in maintaining the home as a redoubt against a 
growing cultural secularism. 
 Clearly, the cultural terrain on these issues was shifting in the 1960s and 1970s, 
and it was obvious that many in the broader culture no longer accepted what theological 
conservatives believed the Bible plainly taught. Divorce, acceptance of premarital sex 
and homosexuality, and pornography were on the rise, the Pill and abortion seemed to 
encourage promiscuity, and the ERA represented a challenge to what they saw as the 
basic unit of society: the family. To many of them, these were not just external issues, but 
were threats to their ability to raise their children as they saw fit.
89
 
 Given this theological backdrop, then, it is hardly surprising that evangelicals and 
fundamentalists were concerned about the sexual revolution and other changes in 
American society. What was new—at least when compared with their relatively apolitical 
stance of the mid-twentieth century—was their willingness to publicly protest such 
changes. By the end the 1970s, theologically conservative Protestants were increasingly 
turning toward political action as their preferred method of attempting social change. 
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CHAPTER 4 
 
THE DIAGNOSIS OF “SECULAR HUMANISM” 
 
 
 Beginning about eighty years ago we began to move from a Judeo-Christian 
 consensus in this country to a humanist consensus, and it has come to a special 
 climax in the last forty years. 
 
                —Francis Schaeffer, Speech, Mayflower Hotel, Washington, D.C., 1982 
 
 
 The Christian Right came into being during the 1970s. Its roots went deep in 
American history, as we have seen. Theologically conservative Protestants had long 
believed that they were the moral custodians of American culture,
1
 inheritors of the 
religious heritage that they increasingly believed the nation was now forsaking. Their 
theology had long been blended with American patriotism, and they had for some time 
held out hope that the nation would turn “back to God.” Yet the decades of the 1930s 
through the 1960s had been ones in which evangelicals and fundamentalists had largely 
been content to seek social change through revival, as individuals placed their trust in 
Jesus Christ as their Savior and were “born again.”  
 However, during the 1970s the reformist strand of their heritage began to gain 
more prominence in their thinking. As they had during the nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries, they began to use politics as a way of carrying out their mission to be 
“ambassadors” for Christ.2 For most of them, the political ideology they believed 
Scripture sanctioned was conservatism.  
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 Few evangelical leaders exemplified the commitment to revival and personal trust 
in Jesus Christ more than Bill Bright. Founder of Campus Crusade for Christ, Bright had 
dedicated his life to spreading the “gospel” message that eternal salvation was found only 
through Christ. Yet Bright also was a leader in the early 1970s of the political 
engagement that became increasingly common among evangelicals and fundamentalists 
during the decade. Bright’s efforts would not have the same staying power that Falwell’s 
would a few years later, but his belief that political engagement was a non-negotiable for 
faithful Christians was accepted by more and more of his fellow evangelicals.  
 Bright was only one of the writers and thinkers who helped meld an evangelical, 
politically conservative ideology. Perhaps surprisingly, the man who provided 
evangelicals with much of the ideological ammunition for that mobilization was Francis 
Schaeffer, a goateed American fundamentalist who dressed like a Swiss farmer and 
talked about Albert Camus. It would be Schaeffer’s articulation of “secular humanism” 
that would enable Falwell and other conservative Protestants to view many of the cultural 
changes of the era as part of the same anti-God conspiracy. Others helped forge a version 
of American history that justified their political engagement. Still others helped 
popularize premillennial dispensationalism, which gave them a sense of a urgency and 
impeding doom: the clock was ticking away, and the time to act was now. In these 
remaining four chapters, then, I describe the contributions of a number of writers who 
aided the consolidation of an ideology that viewed the federal government with suspicion 
while at the same time retaining great faith in the power of politics to change that 
government.  
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Bill Bright and Third Century Publishers 
 Bill Bright was born in 1921 in Coweta, Oklahoma, a small town near Tulsa, the 
son of a cattle rancher. In 1944, he moved to Los Angeles, where he took over and 
expanded a fancy foods business. He also began attending First Presbyterian Church of 
Hollywood, where he had a conversion experience in large part due to the teaching 
ministry of Henrietta Mears, the church’s director of Christian education.3  
 Bright believed that God was calling him into full-time ministry, and entered first 
Princeton Seminary and then Fuller Theological Seminary. His passion for practical 
evangelism and his belief that Christ’s return could happen soon, however, made these 
academic stints brief and half-hearted. In 1951, Bright left academic life for good and 
founded Campus Crusade for Christ. The new organization was designed to lead college 
students into a born-again conversion experience, and Bright’s initial efforts on the 
campus of the University of California at Los Angeles met with success. By the early 
1960s, the organization had chapters on more than one hundred campuses, with nearly 
three hundred staff members; eventually, Campus Crusade would be an international 
movement with a presence in about 150 countries.
4
  
 Bright’s primary concern was always evangelism, which for him and other 
evangelicals meant something personal and individual; the goal was to lead individuals to 
make a personal commitment to Jesus Christ. Bright’s background in business and 
marketing showed in his distillation of the gospel into “Four Spiritual Laws,” which were 
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packaged into small tracts. The laws, supported by relevant Scripture passages, presented 
the “plan of salvation”: 1) “God loves you and offers a wonderful plan for your life,” 2) 
“Man is sinful and separated from God. Therefore, he cannot know and experience God’s 
love and plan for his life.” 3) “Jesus Christ is God’s only provision for man’s sin. 
Through Him you can know and experience God’s love and plan for your life.” 4) “We 
must individually receive Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord; then we can know and 
experience God’s love and plan for our lives.”5  
 Yet for Bright, seeking to bring about revival on college campuses was never 
entirely an apolitical effort. For Bright, as with many other postwar evangelicals and 
fundamentalists including Billy Graham, bringing young people to faith in Christ was in 
part a defense against Communism. Communism was growing rapidly, he warned in the 
mid-1950s, and its leaders were ready to take advantage of the spiritual vacuum on 
college campuses by targeting college students, since they would be the leaders of the 
nation. “Either students will serve the true God,” Bright predicted in 1955, “or they will 
follow materialism and communism.”6 
 
Revival Through Politics 
 In the mid-1970s, Bright’s political efforts became much more explicit, as he 
became even more concerned about what he saw as increasing secularism in American 
society. While Campus Crusade continued to find success in its personal evangelism 
efforts, Bright worried that it was not enough to keep the nation from descending into 
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moral and spiritual “bankruptcy.” Bright’s efforts took several forms. In keeping with the 
evangelical focus on revival and conversion, Bright created “Here’s Life, America!,” a 
campaign with the goal of saturating the nation with the gospel message through five 
million trained church volunteers and extensive advertising campaign. The Christian 
Embassy was intended as an evangelistic outreach and spiritual resource for people 
working in national government, and furnished a building on Capitol Hill for that 
purpose.  
 Much more political in nature were two additional organizations. Intercessors for 
America was a lobbying group that encouraged conservative Protestants to contact their 
congressional representatives; one of its activities in 1976 was to encourage pastors to 
buy and distribute Bright’s pamphlet, Your Five Duties As a Christian Citizen, which 
encouraged Christians to get involved in politics. The second organization was Third 
Century Publishers, begun in 1974. Third Century was the creation of Bright and John 
Conlan, a Republican congressman from Arizona, and its mission was to produce 
materials that blended conservative politics and biblical principles to educate evangelicals 
at the grass-roots level so that they would elect suitable candidates. Funded primarily by 
wealthy evangelical businessmen, Third Century created home-study kits—similar to the 
Bible studies already familiar to evangelicals—that showed them how to run a local 
political campaign. These kits also included the “Third Century Index,” a scorecard for 
congressional representatives showing how they voted compared to conservative 
principles.
7
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 As Robert Liebman notes, these organizations were the first major effort to rally 
evangelicals to political conservatism. While not as successful as efforts later in the 
decade like Moral Majority—in large part because Bright did not have access to a large 
television audience like Falwell—they do indicate that some evangelicals at least were 
willing to link evangelism with political activism. Not all evangelicals were comfortable 
with that link; Graham criticized Bright for his politicization, and when Sojourners 
magazine, produced by left-wing evangelicals, described Bright’s partisan activities, he 
ended his explicitly political activities.
8
  
 The publications of these organizations, however, give insight into 
evangelicalism’s developing political ideology in the 1970s.9 First published in 1976, 
Bright’s short pamphlet—twenty-four pages—was not explicitly partisan; rather, in Your 
Five Duties he encouraged Christians to shoulder their responsibilities to pray, register to 
vote, become informed, help elect “godly people,” and vote. What was meant by “godly” 
Bright did not specify, but he argued strongly that electing “ungodly” people would lead 
to America’s ruin, which would threaten world evangelism. The blame lay with 
politically passive Christians. “We have ceased to be the ‘salt of the earth’ and the ‘light 
of the world,” he wrote. “As a result, the moral fiber of America is rotting away—and our 
priceless freedom is in grave jeopardy.” If only a portion of the “half of the people of the 
United States” who “profess faith in Jesus Christ” would fulfill their God-given duty, 
God might “set this nation on a new course of righteousness for His glory.” Relying 
heavily on Old Testament passages that describe God’s commands for the governance of 
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biblical Israel, Bright argued that the “God warns against ungodly leaders. The rule of the 
wicked is a direct violation of His will…Instead, God’s plan is for us to have leaders who 
know Him and will rule according to His Word…Godly people must vote for godly 
rulers.”10  
 Your Five Duties contained a fair bit of alarmist rhetoric, a sign that Bright felt 
deeply about the changes that the nation had undergone in the mid-twentieth century. 
“We are in danger of losing our nation by default,” he wrote, “and with it our individual 
freedoms and possibly our very lives.” His booklet indicated just how far removed he 
was by 1976 from any sort of fundamentalist separatism, in which being “salt and light” 
meant only a focus on individual holiness and personal evangelism. For Bright, 
evangelism was insufficient to combat the moral crisis he believed America was facing. 
Godly people would have to act politically if America was going to be preserved. 
“America is one of the last strongholds of freedom on earth—and citizens who are 
dedicated to God are the only resource for the preservation of our freedoms, including the 
freedom to serve Him,” he wrote. Only Christians, Bright appeared to be saying, could be 
trusted to maintain the American republic; non-Christians—in some malevolent way he 
did not specify—would apparently vote to end freedom. 
 
Rus Walton and One Nation Under God 
 While Bright argued that Christians should vote for “godly leaders” regardless of 
party, the primary publication of Third Century Publishers contained no doubt about what 
end of the political spectrum Christians should favor. This publication was One Nation 
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Under God, written by Rus Walton. Walton had a long history of involvement in 
Republican politics in California, first as campaign manager for Joe Shell, who 
unsuccessfully sought the Republican nomination for governor in 1962, and then as a 
campaign operative for Barry Goldwater during the 1964 presidential campaign. During 
that campaign, Walton produced brochures and a film—later disavowed by the 
candidate—that played on the fears of white conservatives by using a blizzard of images 
of black rioters, criminals being arrested, topless dancers and advertisements for sex 
shops, all in an effort to link supposed increasing immorality and social disorder with 
Lyndon Johnson.
11
  
 His book for Bright’s organization, published in 1975, was somewhat more 
measured, but its message was clear: individual freedom was a gift from God, and its 
existence was being threatened by government expansion, taxation, inflation and 
immorality. Walton freely blended providential history, biblical verses, frightening 
economic statistics, and paeans to the free market. In essence, Walton’s book promoted a 
version of Christian libertarianism: the best government was that which governed least, 
since small government forced people to develop virtue and trust in God.  
 In his view, individual freedom was paramount in God’s design for humanity. 
God had created people with the inalienable right to the pursuit of life, liberty, property 
and happiness, and Christ had died and risen to make individuals free not only from the 
“wages and the death of sin,” but from the “savagery of demagogues and kings.”12 
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According to Walton, the federal Constitution was not a secular document, but was 
designed to perpetuate Christian governance with individual freedom at its heart. “The 
rock, the power, and the beauty and the light that was the Spirit of the American Republic 
and its Constitution had been on earth since the beginning of time,” he wrote. “Since The 
Creation. It was there when Christ, with God, created the heavens and the earth—and 
man.”13  
 But that freedom was now being attacked by a host of enemies, including the 
expansion of the federal government. This Walton blamed primarily on President 
Franklin Roosevelt and the New Deal: “It was then, more than ever before, that socialism 
sank its roots deep into the nation’s heart. It was then the republic took its hardest 
lumps.”14 Walton rejected entirely the liberal belief that government could empower 
individuals and create equal opportunities for them; rather, for him, any expansion of 
government meant a loss of liberty, for it took control away from the people. Even worse, 
government could become an idol, as people began to trust in the “State” rather than in 
God.
15
 For Walton, then, the most virtuous government was the smallest one possible.  
 Walton attacked other aspects of American society as entailing a threat to 
individual freedom. Progressive taxation, inflation, and any attempt to redistribute wealth 
were “legalized plunder,” for they took wealth away from individuals without their 
consent. Busing children to schools outside their local neighborhoods—which some 
districts had adopted in an effort to desegregate their schools—was coercive. So were 
minimum wage laws, for in Walton’s logic they took jobs away from young people 
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because they forced employers to reduce their work force. Laws designed to prevent 
discrimination in hiring violated the individual liberty of employers to hire and fire whom 
they wished. Medicaid-financed abortions violated the liberty of taxpayers who were 
opposed to abortions, the ERA—if enacted—would take away more power from the 
states, and compulsory education in public schools that taught evolutionary theory and 
“situational ethics” took away the freedom of parents to have their children educated as 
they saw fit.
16
 Walton’s prose could be over-the-top; for instance, in discussing public 
education he suggested that supporters of it adhered to a new mantra that parodied Jesus’ 
words: “Suffer, little children. Come unto the State; it will be your new religion.”17 
 Walton’s book shows that the idea that evangelicals and fundamentalists only 
cared about “social” issues—like abortion, pornography, or the ERA—is false. Walton 
did sharply critique these things, but his agenda was far broader than that, and much of 
his book dealt with economic issues. This concern was shared by other Christian Right 
activists, as we will see. Furthermore, Under God and the Bright-inspired effort it 
represents highlights the growing affection some evangelicals and fundamentalists had 
for conservative politics in the early 1970s. As a case in point, evangelicals voted for 
Richard Nixon by a more than 4-to-1 margin in 1972.
18
 While a majority of them would 
not identify as Republicans until the 1980s, their presidential voting habits began to favor 
Republican candidates beginning in 1952. The exception was 1964, when only 38 percent 
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of them voted for Goldwater, as illustrated in figure 2.
19
 This Republican shift, which 
would continue into the twenty-first century, meant that white evangelicals began 
consistently voting Republican at rates at or greater than the national average. There were 
regional differences in this overall pattern; the South lagged in this evangelical rightward  
turn. Until 1972, a majority of southern evangelicals voted Democratic, a continuation of  
the “Solid South” born out of Civil War-era antipathy for the party of Lincoln.20 But by  
the end of the 1970s, both northern and southern evangelicals were solidly Republican.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
 19. The data in fig. 2 comes from Kellstedt et al., “Faith Transformed,” 272-273. 
 
 20. Ibid. The exceptions to the Democratic “Solid South” were 1948, when Strom Thurmond’s 
States’ Rights Democratic party won four Southern states; 1964, when the Republican Barry Goldwater 
won five Southern states plus his native state of Arizona, and 1968, when George Wallace’s American 
Independent Party also won five Southern states.  
Figure 2. Republican percentage of evangelical and mainline vote for U.S. president, 1936-2004. 
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Rushdoony and Reconstructionism 
 Throughout his book, Walton frequently quoted from Rousas John Rushdoony, 
and Under God illustrates the influence on the Christian Right exercised by Rushdoony 
and the movement he founded, Christian Reconstructionism. Reconstructionism
21
 is the 
belief that the Old Testament law that governed biblical Israel is still God’s will for 
nations today; the name refers to the idea that society should be “reconstructed” to reflect 
that biblical blueprint—including the death penalty for such things as adultery, 
homosexual acts, adult children who repeatedly disobey their parents, witchcraft, 
bestiality and Sabbath-breaking. It is also known as “dominion theology,” for the belief 
that God’s people are to take dominion over all aspects of society,22 or “theonomy”—a 
combination of the Greek words “theos” (God) and “nomos” (law)—to point to the 
movement’s focus on God’s law. 
 Reconstructionism has its roots in Reformed theology, and its leaders have found 
inspiration in John Calvin’s sixteenth-century theocratic government in Geneva and in 
Puritan New England. But its founder was Rousas John Rushdoony (1916-2001), a pastor 
and missionary associated with the Orthodox Presbyterian Church, the Presbyterian 
offshoot founded in part by J. Gresham Machen. Beginning in the 1950s, Rushdoony 
began to publish prolifically; his seminal book, The Institutes of Biblical Law (a nod to 
John Calvin’s Institutes of Christian Religion) came out in 1973. In 1965, Rushdoony 
created the Chalcedon Foundation in California, dedicated to propagating 
reconstructionist ideas.  
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 Rushdoony and other reconstructionist writers who followed him, like Greg 
Bahnsen and Gary North, argued that the Bible provided a complete guide for the proper 
ordering of society. The movement has five basic tenets. First, its understanding of 
salvation is Calvinistic. Regeneration—the new spiritual life Christ makes possible—is 
only by God’s grace. Second, reconstructionism is postmillennial, holding to the belief 
that Christ will return only after the millennium, the thousand-year earthly reign of the 
saints. Third, reconstructionists follow the presuppositionalism of Cornelius Van Til 
(1895-1987), a professor at Westminster Theological Society, although Van Til himself 
had nothing to do with reconstructionism. Van Til taught that epistemologically, there is 
no neutral ground. All thought is based on presuppositions—foundational assumptions—
and genuine discourse is impossible among those who hold different presuppositions. 
While this has definite apologetic implications—it ruled out all evidentialist attempts to 
reason an unbeliever into faith, for instance—what it means politically is that 
reconstructionists accept no system that is not based entirely on God’s revelation, which 
they believe is contained in the Bible. Any system based on natural law is illegitimate 
because it is an outgrowth of alien presuppositions. Fourth, the reconstructionist political 
system is deeply anti-statist, with a decentralized vision of society in which civil 
government is only one among many authorities. In this, Rushdoony was influenced by 
postwar libertarian writers like Friedrich Hayek, whose 1944 book The Road to Serfdom 
protested what he saw as the loss of individual liberty caused by government expansion, 
and writers in the Austrian school of economics like Ludwig von Mises. Finally, 
reconstructionists hold to the validity of the “whole law of God,” believing in the 
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desirability of enacting the entire Old Testament law code into modern civil statutes.
23
 As 
noted above, this would include making into capital crimes a variety of acts no longer 
even considered criminal offences by the vast majority of Americans. This latter vision 
has been reconstructionism’s best-known and most controversial aspect, and some 
observers have seen reconstructionism as a prominent strand within the Christian Right 
and as an ominous portent of that movement’s true goals of establishing a theocracy in 
which those determined to be “sinners” are publically executed.24 Reconstructionists 
themselves have always been careful to dissociate their movement from any sort of plan 
for violent takeover. Rather, Rushdoony’s postmillennial eschatology meant that he 
envisioned a slow transformation of society as individuals become regenerate.
25
 
 Rushdoony never saw himself as a political activist; indeed, he viewed the 
attempt by Christian conservatives to influence government as misguided. For him, the 
longed-for reconstruction of society was a grassroots approach, whereas Christian Right 
activism was top-down.
26
 Thus, the relationship between Rushdoony and the nascent 
Christian Right in the 1970s was always one of partial mutual suspicion. Rushdoony’s 
postmillennialism was anathema to most American evangelicals and fundamentalists, and 
they explicitly disavowed his advocacy of a biblical theocracy, no matter how it was to be 
implemented. But his writings still had a certain appeal for writers like Walton. For one 
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thing, Rushdoony helped fill a lacuna in their thinking: whereas they had done little 
thinking in the area of political theology, Rushdoony presented a complete vision. They 
might disagree with the details, but they could appreciate Rushdoony’s effort to provide a 
rigorously biblical political vision. Second, and perhaps of far greater influence, 
Rushdoony was convinced that America had been founded as a Christian nation, an 
emphasis that was ubiquitous in Christian Right rhetoric.
27
 Walton, for instance, quoted 
Rushdoony favorably: “To read the Constitution as the charter for a secular state is to 
misread history, and to misread it radically. The Constitution was designed to perpetuate 
a Christian order.” The First Amendment, according to Rushdoony and seconded by 
Walton, was designed not to remove religion from government, but to protect the state 
establishments of religion from federal interference.
28
  
 
Francis Schaeffer and “Secular Humanism” 
 Walton’s impact on the Christian Right of the 1970s was fairly limited. Bright 
severely restricted his own explicitly political activities after 1976, and Walton moved on 
to join the conservative Plymouth Rock Foundation.
29
 But Rushdoony’s 
reconstructionism movement would be influential on one of the key thinkers who helped 
lay the groundwork for Falwell’s Moral Majority: Francis Schaeffer. Schaeffer, like most 
other conservative Protestants, would never fully embrace reconstructionist thinking. But 
in important ways, reconstructionism helped shape his thinking.  
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 Schaeffer was born in 1912 in Philadelphia, the child of working-class 
Presbyterian parents. His parents were not deeply devout, and in his teens Schaeffer 
decided that he was an agnostic. In 1930, however, he became a Christian at a tent-
meeting revival led by evangelist Anthony Zeoli. He graduated from Hampden-Sydney 
College, a liberal arts school in Virginia, in 1935, and married Edith Seville, the daughter 
of American missionaries to China, the same year. The Schaeffers then moved to Francis’ 
hometown of Philadelphia, where he began training for the Presbyterian ministry at 
Westminster Seminary, the school that had been founded six years earlier by Machen and 
others who believed Princeton Seminary had become too liberal. Westminster itself 
underwent a split in 1937 during Schaeffer’s second year there, and he left with a group 
of faculty and students led by Carl McIntire as part of the first class at the new Faith 
Seminary in Wilmington, Delaware. The split—indicative of fundamentalism’s tendency 
to fragment over doctrinal issues—seems to have been over the proper understanding of 
Calvinism, temperance, and premillennialism. The Faith Seminary group adopted 
positions of moderate Calvinism, total abstinence from alcohol, and an emphasis on 
premillennial eschatology. After graduating from Faith Seminary in 1938, Schaeffer 
spent the next decade as a Bible Presbyterian pastor at churches in Pennsylvania and 
Missouri. In 1948, the Schaeffers moved to Switzerland under the auspices of McIntire’s 
organization, American Council of Christian Churches; their goal was help establish in 
postwar Europe the kind of resistance to modernism that characterized American 
fundamentalism, including a commitment to biblical inerrancy. Eventually, the 
Schaeffers established L’Abri (“The Shelter”) in a Swiss chalet; by the 1960s L’Abri had 
became a center for philosophical discussion for those interested in the intersection of 
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Christian faith and contemporary thought, and a destination for American and European 
young people seeking spiritual answers.
30
 
 
The Loss of the “Christian Base” 
 Barry Hankins, a recent Schaeffer biographer, suggests that Schaeffer’s career can 
be divided into three parts: his years as a pastor in the United States, his initial years at 
L’Abri, and his later years as a culture warrior especially consumed by his antagonism to 
abortion. The first and the third eras were ones in which Schaeffer exhibited the militancy 
characteristic of fundamentalism. The middle era, as he and Edith welcomed and sought 
to respond to spiritually adrift young adults at L’Abri, saw Schaeffer adopt a less 
combative and more creative approach.
31
 It was during his years at L’Abri that Schaeffer 
began to gain fame, first as a lecturer and then as an author; he eventually published 
twenty-four books, as well as two film series—based on his books—that were produced 
with the help of his son, Franky.  
 Schaeffer’s scope in his books was sweeping, attempting no less than a 
description of what he saw as the cultural and moral decay of Western—that is, American 
and European—civilization. This he rooted in the loss of a belief in absolute truth and an 
adoption of what he termed “secular humanism.” For Schaeffer, ideas were of paramount 
importance, for the ideas accepted by a culture amounted to its “worldview,” its basic 
way of viewing truth and the universe. He believed that its worldview shaped everything 
else, including its governance and the moral choices of its members. Thus, like Van Til, 
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Schaeffer stressed the importance of presuppositions, the assumptions one makes before 
building a rational system of thought. Unlike Van Til, however, Schaeffer believed that 
Christians could reason with non-Christians on the basis of their shared rationality and 
engage intellectually, as he was doing with the young people who were increasingly 
flocking to L’Abri.  
 Schaeffer’s primary message was that Western civilization had moved away from 
what he described as its “Christian base,” by which he meant not that all members of that 
culture were Christians, but that they held in common a basic understanding of truth. In a 
trilogy of books published between 1968 and 1972—The God Who Is There, Escape 
From Reason, and He is There and He is Not Silent—Schaeffer sketched this worldview 
and the consequences of its abandonment, themes that he developed in subsequent 
writings, including the book How Should We Then Live? and its associated film (1976). 
Until the early twentieth century,
32
 Schaeffer argued, people generally agreed that God 
existed and that there were such things as moral absolutes. While people might disagree 
on what they were, “nevertheless they could reason together on the classical basis of 
antithesis. So if anything was true, the opposite was false.”33 In essence, Schaeffer was 
describing a “correspondence theory” of truth—although he did not use the term—in 
which statements were believed to be true in accordance with whether or not they 
adhered to reality. But now, Schaeffer wrote, many people had left that way of thinking 
behind.  
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 One of Schaeffer’s key terms—and one that would appear in the rhetoric of 
Christian Right activists in the 1970s and beyond—was “humanism.” By this, Schaeffer 
meant a worldview that excluded God, “a value system rooted in the belief that man is his 
own measure, that man is autonomous, totally independent.”34 Schaeffer sometimes 
equated humanism with naturalism, or materialism—the belief that matter is all there is 
and that the supernatural does not exist. In this worldview, humans were simply the result 
of chance plus time.
35
 Schaeffer believed that such a worldview posed insoluble 
epistemological and moral problems for modern people. Epistemologically, humanism 
leads to meaninglessness, he asserted. If matter is all there is, and a man believes that 
there is no outside intelligence that has created the material world, then there is no reason 
for him to believe that his own senses are trustworthy. “Starting with himself, a person 
cannot establish an adequate explanation for the amazing possibility that he can observe 
the world around him and be assured that his observations match up with reality.”36 
Regarding the moral problem, Schaeffer asserted that humanism gave no basis for values. 
“Those who begin with the material universe can describe but they can never define.”37 
The problem, Schaeffer believed, was that humans had to have a source of values outside 
themselves, or they would simply create value systems of relative morality—which was 
exactly what he believed was happening. “Given time, even the ‘certainties’ of our 
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ethical systems can be undone—the bills of rights, the charters of freedom, and principles 
of justice, everything.”38  
 The result of the adoption of the humanistic worldview, Schaeffer argued, was 
that moderns had cut themselves off from God, who alone could give meaning and 
purpose to their lives, and were now living below what he called “the line of despair.” 
Believing as they did that matters of “purpose, significance, [and] the validity of love” 
were impossible to know with certainty, they were left with “only particulars, no purpose, 
no meaning. Man is a machine.”39 According to Schaeffer, this loss of meaning explained 
much of the drug culture, the hedonistic pursuit of sexual pleasure, non-representational 
modern art, the chance-based music of John Cage, and the pessimism of certain art films 
of the 1960  and 1970s. Ever the evangelist, Schaeffer saw this as a profound tragedy, for 
it meant not only that many modern people were living lives of despair—if they followed 
their presuppositions to their logical conclusions—but it also meant that they were 
eternally lost, because they were missing the salvation found only in Jesus Christ. His 
duty, he believed, was to help those under the line of despair see that their worldview was 
unable to account for major components of human experience; only Christianity was able 
to provide a consistent and tenable worldview.
40
  
 Schaeffer attempted not only to describe the characteristics and results of this shift 
from a “Christian base” to humanism, but its development. In several of his books—and 
in a somewhat idiosyncratic and superficial treatment of the intellectual history of 
Europe—Schaeffer sketched the growth of humanism through thinkers as diverse as 
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Thomas Aquinas, Dante Alighieri, Francis Bacon, Immanuel Kant, Jean-Jacques 
Rousseau, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel and Søren Kierkegaard. He also sought to 
show how humanism was illustrated in the works of a diverse host of artists, musicians 
and filmmakers. In How Should We Then Live?, for instance, Schaeffer could range from 
Marcel Duchamp to Jackson Pollock to Gustav Mahler and Arnold Schoenberg in the 
span of three pages, and he was sometimes criticized by Christian scholars for 
oversimplification or outright errors.
41
 Yet for many conservative Protestants—especially 
college students—his engagement with the Western intellectual tradition and with 
popular culture was exhilarating. At a time when many Christian colleges forbade their 
students from attending movies of any sort and rock music was off-limits, Schaeffer was 
discussing the films of Federico Fellini and the music of the Beatles and Led Zeppelin. 
For many evangelicals, Schaeffer helped them believe that their faith not only was 
intellectually viable, but that it was the solution for the ills of the modern age.  
 
Schaeffer’s Contribution to Christian Right Ideology 
 Schaeffer was crucial for the development of the ideology of the Christian Right 
for several different reasons. First, he drew attention to the issue of abortion. As noted in 
chapter 3, many evangelicals in the mid-1970s took fairly equivocating stands on the 
practice; for many evangelicals and fundamentalists, abortion was still largely a “Catholic 
issue” in the mid-1970s. Schaeffer would do much to change that perception. 
 Soon after the publication of How Should We Then Live?, Schaeffer began work 
on a new book and film that focused on what would become known as “sanctity of life” 
issues—abortion and euthanasia. The new productions were a cooperative effort with C. 
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Everett Koop, a surgeon at Philadelphia Children’s Hospital. Decades earlier, Koop had 
performed surgery on one of the Schaeffers’ daughters, and he and Schaeffer met again in 
1977 on a Canadian university campus where both were lecturing. After a further meeting 
in Switzerland, Francis and Franky Schaeffer and Koop determined, according to Koop, 
“to awaken the evangelical world—and anyone else who would listen—to the Christian 
imperative to do something to reverse the perilous realignment of American values on 
these life-and-death issues.”42 Both the book and film versions of Whatever Happened to 
the Human Race? were released in 1979.  
 The problem with abortion, according to Schaeffer and Koop, was not just that it 
was morally reprehensible. They believed that it was that, and the book contained graphic 
descriptions of abortion techniques, as well as instances in which infants had been born 
alive and allowed to die.
43
 But the deeper issue was that the acceptance of abortion 
revealed that Western society had jettisoned the Christian worldview and replaced it with 
a humanist one that did not sufficiently value human life. This was a theme that Schaeffer 
had begun to explore in How Should We Then Live?; in that work, Schaeffer castigated 
the Roe v. Wade decision, describing it as medically and legally arbitrary, in that it 
ignored both the lack of medical consensus regarding when life began and the 
constitutional guarantees of the equal treatment of persons. Furthermore, he wrote that 
“this arbitrary decision is at complete variance with the past Christian consensus.” He 
also employed a slippery-slope argument, suggesting that if the Supreme Court could end 
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the lives of unborn children, then it could do the same with the elderly and those in 
vegetative states.
44
  
 These arguments were developed further in Whatever Happened to the Human 
Race? “[W]e feel strongly that we stand today on the edge of a great abyss,” Koop and 
Schaeffer wrote.
45
 In one of the more striking scenes in the film, Koop describes abortion 
techniques while the camera pans across hundreds of dolls lying on what could be ice or 
snow. The substance is then revealed to be salt on the shoreline of the Dead Sea, and 
Koop asserts that he is standing at the site of the ancient city of Sodom. “Sodom comes 
readily to mind when one contemplates the evils of abortion and the death of moral law,” 
Koop intones. “The secular forces of humanism have scoffed at Christian morality and 
ethics and the Christian idea that man was created in the image of God. These theories of 
so-called liberation from biblical absolutes are bearing their bitter fruit.”46 The loss of 
those absolutes meant that there was no belief in the inherent worth of humans, and in 
such a society, the young and the old were the most vulnerable. Schaeffer and Koop 
warned that such a worldview had led both to the Nazi regime, with its genocide and 
grotesque medical experimentation, and to Communism’s inhumane system.47 The same 
fate could await other societies, and the authors quoted from a variety of ethicists and 
medical professionals who had raised the possibility of eliminating children with birth 
defects and the euthanasia of the elderly and terminally ill. “[I]f a human being is not 
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made in the image of God, why shouldn’t the malformed young and the elderly be put out 
of the way for the good of society—once society and the courts separate life and 
personhood?”48  
 Perhaps surprisingly, Whatever Happened to the Human Race? was not a battle-
cry for political action, although its final chapter did include a brief appeal to “use every 
constitutional practice to offset the rise of authoritarian governments and the loss of 
humanness in our society.” Christians should be willing to use all available means, the 
authors suggested, including legislation and “social action.”49 But the primary response 
they called for was a personal commitment to treat all human beings, including the 
unborn, with the dignity Koop and Schaeffer believed they deserved. It is clear why this 
was so. Having framed the abortion issue as one rooted in a humanistic worldview, Koop 
and Schaeffer could hardly make political activism their focus, for political change would 
not go to the root of the problem. What was needed was for Christians to live out a God-
centered worldview that valued human life, and to present it in an attractive way, as the 
Schaeffers had been seeking to do at L’Abri. Thus, they urged Christians to value all 
humans, submitting to the lordship of Jesus Christ in all things. “He is Lord not just in 
religious things and not just in cultural things such as art and music, but in our 
intellectual lives and in business and our attitude toward the devaluation of people’s 
humanness in our culture.”50 Schaeffer had for years argued that the adoption of a 
humanistic worldview meant that the dominant cultural values were those of “personal 
peace and affluence”: most people simply wanted to be left alone, untroubled by the 
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needs of others, free to pursue material prosperity.
51
 Now, in Whatever Happened to the 
Human Race?, he and Koop argued that opposition to abortion should entail a willingness 
to sacrifice those values. Churches and individual Christians must be willing to extend 
practical and financial help to both married and unmarried pregnant women considering 
abortion, suggesting that this might mean providing a place to stay for unmarried women 
or providing child care for mothers whose need to work might prompt them to seek an 
abortion. “Merely to say…‘You must not have an abortion’—without being ready to 
involve ourselves in the problem—is another way of being inhuman.”52   
 Nevertheless, Schaeffer was not opposed to political activism in principle, and his 
opposition to abortion would increasingly lead him in that direction. His articulation of 
reasons for political action would be a second contribution to the ideology of the 
Christian Right. Until the mid-1970s, Schaeffer’s career had been almost entirely 
apolitical. His writings primarily dealt with the intellectual validity of Christianity and its 
cultural implications; an exception was a booklet published in 1970 that outlined a 
Christian ecological ethic.
53
  But by the late 1970s, Schaeffer had begun to move to the 
right politically, and he would, in Hankins’ view, become the movement’s “intellectual 
guru.”54  
 The seeds of this politicization were already present in How Should We Then 
Live?, although it was hardly a clarion call to political action. But in that book, Schaeffer 
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spoke in ominous tones about the possible results of the abandonment of a transcendent 
moral law. Only such a law could guarantee the worth of individuals, regardless of their 
lack of utilitarian value; without such a law, there was nothing to restrain humans from 
doing whatever they wanted. “If there are no absolutes by which to judge society, then 
society is absolute,” he wrote. The alternatives were stark: either society would descend 
into anarchic hedonism, or an unprincipled majority would rule, or an elite—perhaps a 
dictator—would take over while promising to maintain the “personal peace and 
affluence” of the masses. The adoption of humanism meant that law was arbitrary, and if 
it was arbitrary then there was nothing to stop the destruction of freedom, as had already 
happened in the Communist world.
55
  
 Schaeffer’s political views were shaped in part by reconstructionist theology. By 
the 1960s, Schaeffer was aware of Rushdoony’s work and had read his writings; people 
who visited L’Abri during this decade recalled him speaking favorably about Rushdoony. 
Like many conservative Protestants, as a premillennialist Schaeffer was uncomfortable 
with Rushdoony’s postmillennial eschatology, and also distanced himself from the idea 
that the specifics of the Old Testament law, rather than its principles, were applicable to 
modern societies. Nevertheless, Rushdoony’s attempt to set out a Christian political ethic 
was intriguing to Schaeffer, and it seems that the latter’s belief that America had been 
founded on a “Christian base” may have come in part from Rushdoony.56  
 Schaeffer also helped lay the groundwork for the rise of the Christian Right by 
contributing the idea of “co-belligerency.” As noted above, conservative Protestants, 
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especially fundamentalists, were reluctant to collaborate with non-fundamentalists in any 
way; their separatist instincts usually led to denominational fragmentation rather than 
cooperation. Schaeffer, however, began to teach them that their theological commitments 
should not prevent them from working together with non-fundamentalists—even non-
Christians—on some social issues. Falwell would eventually attribute his own move 
away from fundamentalist separatism to Schaeffer, writing in his autobiography that it 
was Schaeffer who taught him that “there is no Biblical mandate against evangelical 
Christians joining hands for political and social causes as long as there was no 
compromise of theological integrity.”57  
 Schaeffer’s greatest contribution to the Christian Right, however, was the idea of 
“worldview.” Schaeffer’s constant message in his books was that Christians must learn to 
think about the culture as a whole and not in parts; that is, they should see the cultural 
changes they were witnessing not as separate moral issues, but as ones rooted in the shift 
from a Christian worldview to a “secular humanistic” one. This had two profound effects 
on the thinking of Christian Right activists like Falwell. First, it awakened them to the 
fact that they were not the only ones with a belief system to defend. Living as they did in 
a culture whose elites largely dismissed their beliefs as irrational, they were accustomed 
to a defensive posture intellectually. Schaeffer pointed out, however, that everyone had a 
worldview that depended on first-order, faith-based presuppositions. The naturalistic 
materialism of the “secular humanists” was an unproven assumption that they were 
obliged to defend just as Christians needed to defend their belief in a creator God.  Thus, 
no one stood on some sort of intellectual neutral ground, a realization that some 
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conservative Protestants found empowering. Although this was in some ways similar to 
later postmodernist assertions, for Schaeffer this observation did not lead into radical 
subjectivity. Rather, he believed that the Christian worldview was the only one that could 
adequately account for the fullness of human experience.  
 The second effect of worldview thinking was that “secular humanism” linked a 
great variety of issues, and it broadened the front on which Schaeffer’s followers believed 
they needed to fight. The concept, in William Martin’s description, was highly 
“elastic;”58 for some activists, secular humanism became a sort of catch-all term for 
everything that they opposed in American society. “To understand humanism,” according 
to one Christian magazine in 1980, “is to understand women’s liberation, the ERA, gay 
rights, children’s rights, abortion, sex education, the ‘new’ morality, evolution, values 
clarification, situational ethics, the separation of church and state, the loss of patriotism, 
and many of the other problems that are tearing America apart today.”59 In other words, 
the concept of secular humanism allowed any number of issues to be treated as “moral” 
ones. It also raised the stakes of political debate, because these activists believed that 
there were spiritual—even eternal—consequences if secular humanism was allowed to 
extend its reach into the culture. Thus, issues that might have been otherwise viewed as 
merely “political” became part of the Manichean contest of worldviews. Nowhere was 
the expansive nature of the secular humanism concept clearer clearer than in Tim 
LaHaye’s 1980 book The Battle for the Mind, discussed in chapter 7.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 
LOOKING BACK, LOOKING AHEAD 
 
 
 In the virgin wilderness of America, God was making His most significant 
 attempt since ancient Israel to create a “New Israel” of people living in obedience 
 to biblical principles, through faith in Jesus Christ. 
 
             —Peter Marshall and David Manuel, The Light and the Glory, 1977 
 
 With the Jewish nation reborn in the land of Palestine, ancient Jerusalem once 
 again under total Jewish control for the first time in 2600 years, and talk of 
 rebuilding the great Temple, the most important prophetic sign of Jesus Christ’s 
 soon coming is before us…It is like the key piece of a jigsaw puzzle being found 
 and then having the many adjacent pieces rapidly fall into place.  
 
       —Hal Lindsey, The Late Great Planet Earth, 1970 
 
 
 During the same years that Francis Schaeffer was diagnosing the present as 
tainted by secular humanism, other writers were looking to America’s past and creating a 
version of American history that helped justify evangelical political activism. According 
to these Christian nationalist writers, America had a special relationship with God, and 
had previously been a more moral, godly and blessed land. This version of America’s 
past was not new; as described in the first and second chapters, evangelicals had often 
blended patriotism with their religion. But the 1960s and 1970s saw an updating of the 
Christian nationalist myth, resulting in a new effort to put it into political service. Other 
writers—and film producers—were seeing a pattern emerge in world events that they 
believed matched Bible prophetic passages, indicating that the end times were perilously 
near. This view of future events would also help shape the agenda of the Christian Right.  
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Looking to the Past 
 Christian nationalist literature was widespread in these decades. Walton’s book, 
One Nation Under God, has already been noted in the previous chapter. Other examples 
included The Christian History of the Constitution of the United States of America 
(1960). Its author, Verna Hall, had worked in the Works Progress Administration (WPA) 
in the 1930s, but had become convinced that America was falling victim to “ever-
increasing socialism.” The reason, she wrote, was that Americans had forgotten the 
Christian nature of the founding of their nation. For a time, she worked for the National 
Association of Manufacturers, a group that had also employed Walton as a publicist 
before his stint with the Goldwater campaign.
1
 In 1960, she published the first volume of 
Christian History of the Constitution of the United States of America. This book was an 
anthology of primary documents, primarily from the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, 
that Hall believed showed the Christian roots of America.
2
 God in American History, 
published in 1966, was a work in a similar vein. Produced by Benjamin Weiss, it was a 
collection of American political documents with religious sentiments. The aim, Weiss 
wrote, was to show that the United States “is truly a nation ‘under God.’ We, the citizens, 
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are charged with a serious and unique responsibility to perpetuate this trusting faith in 
God to oncoming generations.”3  
 The nation’s bicentennial spurred additional interest in the role of Christianity in 
America’s past, and evangelical publishers capitalized on the interest. America in History 
and Bible Prophecy was a collection of essays that originated at the Bicentennial 
Congress on Prophecy in Philadelphia in 1976; the conference organizers sought to 
“stress the spiritual heritage of the Christian faith in our much blessed nation” and to 
describe America’s role in dispensationalist theology.4 America: God Shed His Grace on 
Thee was written by Robert Flood, a staff member with Moody Monthly, a popular 
fundamentalist magazine associated with Moody Bible Institute. Clearly intended for a 
popular audience, the oversize book contained many photos and drawings, with text that 
sketched America’s religious heritage and emphasized its connection with the nation’s 
prosperity and power.
5
  
 The blockbuster of the Christian nationalist historiography, however, was The 
Light and the Glory; this book, written by Peter Marshall and David Manuel, has sold 
close to one million copies since its publication in 1977
6
 and is still in print. Marshall, a 
pastor when the book was published, was the son of a U.S. Senate chaplain of the same 
name; Manuel was an editor at a New York publishing house and had recently become an 
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evangelical Christian. Their book, they wrote, was “not intended to be a history textbook, 
but rather a search for the hand of God in the different periods of our nation’s 
beginnings.”7 Despite that caveat, the authors nevertheless presented their book as a 
history, albeit a highly idiosyncratic one—they left out slavery entirely, for instance. As 
was the case with the other books noted here, Marshall and Manuel interacted little with 
academic historians; their primary point was that God had called the United States into 
being as a “New Israel,” and that America’s continued prosperity and safety depended on 
its continued obedience to God. The Light and the Glory began with Columbus and ended 
with the Revolutionary War; Marshall and Manuel would go on to write From Sea to 
Shining Sea (1986) and Sounding Forth the Trumpet (1999), which would carry the story 
to the Civil War, and which were equally providentialist in nature.  
 
A Blessed Foundation 
 These books had different emphases, but they held several themes in common. 
One of these was that America had in some sense a godly beginning. This took different 
forms. Some, like W. A. Criswell, pastor of the large First Baptist Church in Dallas, 
Texas, spoke broadly of America’s spiritual foundations: “It is a nation built around the 
church and founded upon the Christian faith.” The Pilgrims came to America “seeking 
the will of God,” he wrote by way of explanation, and churches had been an important 
part of its history.
8
 Weiss, too, argued that “the source of our nation’s strength from its 
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beginning has been faith in God.”9 For Weiss, the references to God in such documents 
as colonial charters, the Mayflower Compact, the Declaration of Independence, and 
references to God in presidential inaugural addresses were evidence of a national trust in 
God. Flood echoed similar themes in his book, writing that the country’s “general 
prosperity and its position as a great world power” was due to its “spiritual foundations 
and her evangelical thrust over two centuries.”10  
 Others were more specific. John F. Walvoord, president of Dallas Theological 
Seminary, wrote in the mid-1970s that while America was hardly a paragon of morality, 
its continued prosperity was due to the fact that its Christian population had been 
evangelistic, from the time of colonial missions to native Americans to the present. 
“From a divine standpoint, the prosperity of America stems from its share in fulfilling the 
program of God in the present age…the missionary effort coming from our shores is one 
of the major reasons why God has blessed us to this hour and withheld so many divine 
judgments that we undoubtedly deserve as a nation.”11 Hall identified a different reason 
for God’s blessing. Her book was an extensive anthology designed to support her belief 
that the nation had been founded on a “Christian principle” of individual liberty. Her 
book opened with a quote from II Corinthians 3:17: “Where the Spirit of the Lord is, 
there is liberty.” To Hall, this verse apparently was a reference to political liberty rather 
than spiritual liberty; the goal of her book, she wrote, was to help each American 
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“remember his Christian heritage and live so as to raise the standard of his Pilgrim and 
Puritan fathers into its larger and fuller expression of individual liberty.”12  
 According to Hall, the Puritans had brought this idea to America, but they were 
not its originators. On a map in her book titled “Origin and Backgrounds of the 
Constitution of the United States,” a chain stretched from Mt. Sinai—where the Bible 
says Moses received the Ten Commandments—to Greece, then Rome, then Europe and 
England and across the Atlantic to Jamestown and Plymouth. Along the way were labels 
with the names of such luminaries as the Protestant reformers John Calvin and Martin 
Luther, English Bible translator John Wycliffe, and the philosopher John Locke.
13
 The 
map illustrated Hall’s belief that the idea of self-government was rooted in the Bible. Her 
anthology included, for example, lengthy excerpts from Leonard Bacon, a nineteenth-
century Congregational pastor, who described the self-governing character of first-
century churches.
14
 According to Bacon, this principle was lost in the Middle Ages but 
recovered in the Protestant Reformation, and exemplified most purely by Puritan 
separatists who brought it to New England.
15
 At the beginning of a section titled “Local 
Self-Government,” Hall quoted from Mark 4:26-28, verses in which Jesus compares the 
kingdom of God to seed that a man casts upon the ground; the seed then grows and 
produces mature grain. On the same page were other quotes regarding the liberty of early 
churches, the political ideals of the Mayflower Compact, and James Madison’s 
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celebration of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. Apparently, Hall saw the United States 
either as a fulfillment of Jesus’ reference to the kingdom of God or as an illustration of 
Jesus’ metaphor of growth, in that the seed of liberty had now blossomed in  
America.
16
  
 Several of these writers also argued that God had providentially arranged history 
to bring about the founding of America. Hall included in her anthology a nineteenth-
century author, Arnold Guyot, who wrote that even America’s geography was 
providential: Asia and Europe, he wrote, were geographically suited for fostering a 
diversity of races and distinct nationalities. America’s geographic “unity and simplicity,” 
on the other hand, provides for “mutual intercourse, a common life, and the blending of 
the entire population into one. Evidently this continent was not designed to give birth and 
development to a new civilization; but to receive one ready-made, and to furnish to the 
cultivated race of the Old World the scene most worthy of their activity.” Guyot, in an 
ethnocentric oversight typical of his period, makes no mention of the native peoples 
already in North America. “America, therefore, with her cultured and progressive people, 
and her social organization, founded upon the principle of the equality and brotherhood 
of all mankind, seems destined to furnish the most complete expression of the Christian 
civilization; and to become the fountain of a new and higher life for all the races of 
men.”17 Flood, while disavowing that God had singled out America for special favor,18 
nevertheless wrote that America was an “entirely new kind of nation,” one that God had 
reserved until the “fullness of time” (a reference to Galatians 4:4, which refers to Christ) 
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“when the gospel of the Savior could have free course in her formative years and when 
that same gospel would help lay the cornerstone of our government and our freedoms.”19 
The hand of God in the history that brought forth America was unmistakable, he wrote. 
France had been able to stop the spread of Islam at the Battle of Tours (732), thus 
preserving Christian Europe so that it could later settle America, and Columbus had 
landed in the Caribbean instead the eastern seaboard, which remained “almost 
untouched” until the Reformation “had taken firm root.” For Flood, Spanish settlement 
would have been undesirable because of its Roman Catholic faith.
20
 Weiss, too, saw the 
hand of providence in American history, and thanked God “for guiding our forefathers to 
establish this wonderful nation.” 21 Weiss was clearly a believer in American 
exceptionalism; America was “advanced,” he wrote, and the “outstanding validation of 
the soundness of Western Christian culture  and civilization,” a status that he attributed to 
the faith its founders and citizens had displayed in its early history.
22
 
 Marshall and Manuel took the providential view of American history—that God 
had guided the nation’s founding—to a new level. Writing in the first person, with a great 
deal of description of their own historical search through libraries and archives, they note 
their thrill as it dawned on them that God had a specific plan for America. He wanted it to 
be a “new Jerusalem, a model of the Kingdom of Christ upon earth—we Americans were 
intended to be living proof to the rest of the world that it was possible to live a life 
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together which reflected the Two Great Commandments and put God and others ahead of 
self.”23  
 Marshall and Manuel arrived at this conclusion for two reasons. First, they took 
the self-descriptions of historical figures as evidence of “God’s perspective on American 
history.” Thus, for example, they quoted Christopher Columbus’s Book of Prophecies, in 
which Columbus asserted that God had chosen him as discoverer of a western route to the 
Indies, and take this assertion to be true.
24
 In the same way, they wrote that “the first 
settlers [referring, apparently, to English Puritans] consciously thought of themselves as a 
people called into a continuation of the covenant relationship with God and one another 
which Israel had entered into.” This, they wrote, was proof  that “God had a definite and 
extremely demanding plan for America.”25 It is one thing to see Columbus’s writings as a 
useful insight into his own understanding of his voyages, or to recognize that someone 
like John Winthrop did indeed see the Puritan migration to New England as a 
continuation of the Old Testament covenant with Israel. Such insights are necessary to 
accurately conceive the self-understanding of historical actors. But to assume that those 
sorts of self-descriptions actually reveal the mind of God is to go far beyond the usual 
bounds of historical practice and to engage in theological speculation. It is also strange, 
given evangelicalism’s usual suspicion of non-Scriptural revelation, that Marshall and 
Manuel would draw this conclusion.  
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 A second reason that Marshall and Manuel concluded that God intended America 
to be a “new Israel” was what they saw as evidence that God had orchestrated history to 
bring about America’s founding. This sort of reasoning abounded in the book. They 
asserted—to cite just a few examples—that God guided the Jamestown settlers to 
Chesapeake Bay because the native Americans there would allow them to settle. The 
Speedwell had to turn back rather than continuing the Atlantic voyage with the 
Mayflower because God was continuing “to separate the wheat from the chaff.” 
Squanto’s time of captivity with the English, before he met the Plymouth settlers, was 
evidence that God was preparing him for his future role. The difficulties Washington’s 
army faced at Valley Forge in the winter of 1777-1778 was the “crucible of freedom” in 
which “God was forging the iron of the Continental Army into steel.”26 Furthermore, 
Marshall and Manuel readily identified successes and setbacks to the colonial enterprise 
as signs that God was, respectively, blessing or punishing the colonies. Thus, King 
Philip’s War (1675-1678), in which Metacom’s forces attacked English towns in New 
England, was seen by Marshall and Manuel as evidence that God was demanding “a 
complete amendment of life. This would necessitate a rooting out of sin and a dealing 
with it to a degree which had not been seen on the eastern coast of America for nearly 
fifty years.”27 While most Christians throughout history have held the belief that God is 
sovereign over human events, few have been willing to identify his hand with such 
specificity. Yet the popularity of The Light and the Glory and its sequels is evidence that 
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many readers appreciated Marshall and Manuel’s willingness to assert that God had a 
special plan for America.  
 
A Fallen Nation 
 These samples of Christian nationalist historiography also shared another theme: 
the belief that America had strayed from its lofty calling. For these writers, America’s 
early history provided a backdrop that threw into sharp relief modern America’s spiritual 
failings. “Godliness, loyalty, and patriotism are no longer evaluated as sterling values,” 
according to Weiss.
28
 These writers were not entirely unified in their diagnoses. Hall 
published her book in 1960 as noted above, and saw the problem as beginning in the 
1930s with the New Deal. It was then, she wrote, that “Americans began to alter the 
original form of their Federal and State governments from those established upon 
individual and local self-government, to governments paving the way for ever-increasing 
socialism.” In her work with the WPA, she “saw the thoroughness of socialistic 
organization descend like a pall upon every facet of our economy and culture, altering 
almost everything.” This she linked with a decline in virtue and trust in God: “In 
proportion as Americans let go of faith in the absolute power of God, they have accepted 
the belief in an all powerful State.”29 Hall made no specific policy recommendations or 
calls to political action in Christian History of the Constitution, but by inclusion of 
certain excerpts and her comments on them, it was clear that she saw any expansion of 
the federal government as encroaching on liberty and virtue.  
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 Marshall and Manuel, on the other hand, dated the beginning of America’s 
decline to the 1960s. Until that period, they wrote, the word “America” evoked feelings 
of warmth and optimism. Then, “with a suddenness that is still bewildering, everything 
went out of balance.” Its military ventures began to fail, a president was assassinated, 
young people began to revolt, the economy began to struggle, students’ test scores 
plummeted, sexual promiscuity increased, abortion was legalized, and moral decay—
represented by things like pervasive pornography, business scandals, and Watergate—set 
in. Only as the nation returned to its calling as a nation under God would these examples 
of divine retribution be reversed into blessing.
30
  
 Part of the reason that consumers of this type of literature—whether they were 
conservative Protestants or simply conservative—may have found it appealing was that 
in a time of national uncertainty and shifting social mores it offered the comfort of 
nostalgia. Readers baffled by economic “stagflation,” concerned with the national scandal 
of Watergate, worried about rising divorce rates and the increasing acceptance of 
premarital sex, could vicariously—through these somewhat mythologized histories—
return to a time when America seemed to stand firmly on its godly foundations. These 
books clearly met a need for some readers at a time when academic historians had long 
moved away from valorized versions of America’s past. The mid-twentieth century, note 
three recent observers, was a time when social history—somewhat simplistically, the 
study of groups rather than individuals—and a stress on the contributions of non-white, 
non-male Americans held sway in the historical field. “[S]ocial historians,” they write, 
“put their research on a collision course with the conventional accounts of the American 
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past, which had relied in turn upon the inevitability of progress.”31 In one sense, the 
Christian nationalist writers discussed above questioned  the “inevitability of progress,” 
too: they believed the recent American story was one of moral declension. But they 
differed from academic historians in that they saw progress up to the point of America’s 
founding: indeed, they saw the United States as the culmination of world history and as a 
key part of God’s plan. 
 These Christian histories also offered a solution to America’s perceived ills. In 
that, they functioned as the Puritan jeremiads of the colonial period. Descriptions of 
America’s “godly past” and divine blessings were also calls to “return to God.” The 
works of these writers were not particularly political. But by the end of the 1970s and 
early 1980s, this type of history would soon be pressed into political service, as activists 
like Jerry Falwell would use this sort of jeremiad as a call for political action.  
 
Looking to the Future 
 In addition to turning their attention to the past, many conservative Protestants in 
the 1970s looked to the future. In one sense, Christianity as a whole is a future-oriented 
religion, and orthodox Christians have always maintained that Christ will return and that 
believers will spend a glorious eternity with him. But Christians have often differed on 
how precisely that will happen, and many—though not all—evangelicals and 
fundamentalists have had a special vision of the future shaped by their adherence to 
premillennial dispensationalism. Dispensationalism is not only concerned with prophecy; 
as noted in chapter 2, it is a broad method of interpreting the Bible that divides history, 
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past and future, into different eras, or “dispensations,” of God’s dealings with his “chosen 
people,” the Jews. But it does have a definite and detailed vision of the future, rooted in a 
literalist approach to prophetic passages.  
 
Dispensationalism and the Future 
 Dispensationalism is premillennial—its adherents believe that Christ will return 
before the millennium. Other Christian traditions have also been premillennial, but John 
Nelson Darby’s sharp distinction between Israel and the Church—all true believers in 
Jesus Christ—and his understanding of a “pretribulational rapture” made his system 
unique.
32
 In Darby’s view, Christians will leave the earth in the rapture before the “Great 
Tribulation,” a time of horrific and unprecedented war, famine and disease in which 
much of the world’s remaining population will die.  
 Dispensationalism, like most theological systems of belief, was not static, and 
during the twentieth century underwent several revisions.
33
 As can be expected with any 
theological movement, dispensationalists differ among themselves on some of the details. 
The vast majority of dispensationalists, however, have believed that the rapture is the 
next event on the prophetic calendar. In the rapture, they believe, Christians will be 
“caught up” (the Latin word rapio has that meaning) in the air to be with Christ, along 
with resurrected believers who have previously died. For support, dispensationalists point 
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to passages like I Corinthians 15:51-54 (“…for the trumpet will sound, and the dead will 
be raised imperishable, and we will be changed”) and I Thessalonians 4:16-17 (“For the 
Lord Himself will descend from heaven with a shout, with the voice of the archangel and 
with the trumpet of God, and the dead in Christ will rise first”).34  
 After the Church is raptured, the world will experience the “tribulation” period: 
seven years of war, famine and destruction, a time dispensationalists believe is described 
in Revelation and whose length is specified in Daniel 9, which speaks of “seventy 
weeks.” These weeks are understood as years; dispensationalists believe that sixty-nine of 
them have already taken place. A common dispensationalist interpretation is that the 
sixty-nine “weeks” of years (thus, 483 years) ran from the time of the Persian decree to 
rebuild the Temple following the Jewish exile to the time of Jesus’ triumphal entry into 
Jerusalem.
35
 Because most Jews rejected Jesus’ claim to be the Messiah, God put his plan 
for Israel on hold—thus postponing the seventieth “week”—and established the Church. 
But with the Church out of the way following the rapture, God’s program for Israel will 
restart with the final “week,” seven years in which the Great Tribulation will take place. 
During that time, the Antichrist—Satan’s representative—will rise to global power. He 
will initially make a peace treaty with Israel, but then will break that treaty and unleash a 
period of terrible destruction. At the conclusion of those seven years, Jesus will return to 
earth—this event, not the rapture, is the “second coming” of Christ in dispensationalist 
theology—and lead his forces in the gigantic battle of Armageddon, centered in the 
valley of Megiddo southwest of the Sea of Galilee, against the armies of the Antichrist.  
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 When the Antichrist is defeated, Jesus will establish his kingdom on earth and 
usher in the millennium, the thousand-year period in which Satan will be bound in “the 
abyss” (Revelation 20:2-3) and the earth will be filled with peace and harmony. At the 
end of that thousand years, dispensationalists believe, Satan will be released for a short 
time, deceive the nations, and lead them in one final rebellion. He will be defeated, cast 
into the lake of fire, all of humanity will be judged, the wicked will be cast into hell, and 
Christians will enter eternity in the “new heavens and new earth” (Revelation 21:2).36  
 
Dispensationalist Popularizers in the 1970s 
 As described earlier, dispensationalists typically see things getting worse—much 
worse—before the rapture. Thus, the conventional wisdom has usually been that 
dispensationalism tends to push its adherents toward political quietism: why bother with 
social reform and political activism when such efforts are doomed?
37
 In the middle 
decades of the twentieth century, this conventional wisdom generally held true. 
Dispensationalists did, for the most part, focus on “saving souls” and on charity work that 
was designed to ameliorate rather than reform social conditions. But the rise of the 
Christian Right in the late 1970s proved that dispensationalism was not inherently 
apolitical. Indeed, in surprising ways the prophetic aspects of premillennial 
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dispensationalism were politically salient, and prophecy writers helped lay the 
groundwork for the Christian Right.  
 Dispensationalist pastors and professional theologians continued to produce 
prophetic literature throughout the post-Second World War period. The founding of the 
modern state of Israel and the Cold War with its nuclear threat were two factors that 
prompted prophetic reflection. Since prophetic passages in the Bible seemed to assume 
that Jews would be in their “Promised Land” when the end times commenced,38 the 
existence of Israel and increased migration of Jews there was tremendously exciting for 
dispensationalists, for it meant that God’s timetable was progressing. Atomic weapons 
seemed to fill out the biblical picture of Armageddon; a writer in Moody Monthly, for 
instance, was only one of many to suggest that an atomic blast was an “exact picture” of 
the intense heat and global conflagration depicted in II Peter 3:10. In 1953, Wilbur Smith, 
a fundamentalist Presbyterian pastor and prophecy writer, commented that “[b]ooks on 
prophetic subjects are pouring from the presses…more frequently than ever before.”39 
  The 1970s, however, saw an intensification of interest in biblical prophecy, 
according to historian Paul Boyer.
40
 In part, at least, this was due to events in the Middle 
East, in particular the 1967 “Six-Day War” in which Israel was victorious over a coalition 
of Arab states. The war greatly expanded Israeli territory, but most importantly for 
dispensationalists, Israel gained control of the West Bank, including East Jerusalem and 
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Temple Mount. Given that a future “Third Temple”41 was an important part of 
dispensationalist thinking, Jewish control of the site of the biblical temple for the first 
time since the year 70 was fuel to the fires of prophetic speculation.
42
 As Gershom 
Gorenberg writes in his analysis of apocalyptic thinking centered on Temple Mount, the 
creation of Israel in 1948 and its acquisition of all of Jerusalem in 1967 are not “ordinary 
history: For those inclined to hear them, they’re divine proclamations that the hour is 
near.”43  
 Many dispensationalists were hesitant to link current events with Scripture in a 
precise way, for they viewed their system as a “futurist” one: none of the prophecies 
regarding the last days would be fulfilled before the rapture. Biblical prophecy remained 
something that pertained to the future, and these dispensationalists sought to distinguish 
their eschatology from “historicist” views that attempted to find prophetic fulfillment in 
the present age, an endeavor that many dispensationalists found both dangerously 
speculative and biblically unjustified.
44
 However, in the 1970s, a number of writers 
blurred the line between these futurist and historicist perspectives by seeing events of the 
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mid-twentieth century as, if not fulfillments of prophecy, then at least as developments 
that set the stage for the prophetic drama.
45
  
 One of these was The Late Great Planet Earth, the most popular prophecy book 
of the 1970s. Indeed, it was probably the best-selling non-fiction book of any sort during 
the decade. In this book, published in 1970, Hal Lindsey displayed little caution when it 
came to connecting biblical prophecy with current events.
46
 Lindsey was a Texan who 
attended Dallas Theological Seminary, a dispensationalist graduate school, and then 
worked with Campus Crusade for Christ at UCLA, where he began giving well-attended 
talks on his version of biblical prophecy.
47
  
 There was little in the timeline of The Late Great Planet Earth that 
dispensationalist readers were not already familiar with; some of his former seminary 
classmates complained that he had done little more than repackage his class notes. But 
Lindsey’s willingness to show how the international news of his day fit the “the prophetic 
puzzle” set him apart from more judicious writers. His goal, he wrote, was to “present the 
prophecies which are related to the specific pattern of world events which are precisely 
predicted as coming together shortly before the coming of the Messiah the second 
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time.”48 And he presented his material in a way that, according to historian Barry 
Hankins, “made the book read like pulp fiction or a romance novel.” His book contained 
breezy chapter titles like “Russia Is a Gog,” “Sheik to Sheik” and “The Ultimate Trip,” 
and its popularity quickly spread beyond the usual audience of fundamentalist church-
goers, especially after Bantam Books acquired the book and began marketing it widely.
49
   
 The world would soon see the rise of the Antichrist, which would lead to the 
rapture, the tribulation and Armageddon, Lindsey wrote. “Shortly after” the restoration of 
Jews in Israel, their nation would be attacked by an alliance led by a powerful nation 
from the “uttermost north.” This northern nation, according to Lindsey, was Russia, a 
link that numerous other dispensationalist writers also made.
50
 It was clear to him that the 
biblical book of Ezekiel foretold it. Ezekiel 38:2 has God commanding Ezekiel to 
prophesy against “Gog of the land of Magog, the prince of Rosh, Meshech and Tubal.” 
“Rosh,” according to Lindsey and the eighteenth and nineteenth scholars he cited, was a 
reference to Russia, and “Meschech” was Moscow. The Soviet Union, he wrote, “a 
country founded upon atheism,” would soon make an alliance with Iran and various 
African countries to invade Israel. In like fashion, the formation of the European 
Common Market “may well be the beginning of the ten-nation confederacy predicted by 
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Daniel and the Book of Revelation.”51 Communist China, too, was foretold in Bible, 
according to Lindsey, since Revelation 16:12 spoke of the “kings of the east.” Dismissive 
of any talk of a Sino-Soviet split, Lindsey asserted that the Soviet Union and China had 
world conquest as their shared goal, and “China is helping to shape the Orient into its 
pattern of prophecy.”52  
 He also came extremely close to predicting a date for the end of the world, a 
practice that dispensationalists usually took great pains to disavow.
53
 Matthew 24 reports 
Jesus as giving his hearers a number of signs that would anticipate his return: wars, 
famines, earthquakes, persecution, and false prophets, among others. Then Jesus tells a 
short parable of the fig tree; his hearers were to recognize that just as new leaves were an 
indication of summer, so they should recognize that his coming was near. “Truly I say to 
you, this generation will not pass away until all these things take place.”54 According to 
Lindsey, the fig tree was a symbol of national Israel; the creation of Israel in 1948 was 
when the “fig tree” had put forth its leaves; clearly, the prophetic clock was ticking. “If 
this is a correct deduction, then within forty years or so of 1948, all these things could 
take place. Many scholars who have studied Bible prophecy all their lives believe that 
this is so.”55 What was needed was for the temple to be rebuilt, since Matthew 24 seemed 
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to presuppose temple-worship. The existence of the Muslim shrine of the Dome of the 
Rock on the apparent former site of the Jewish temple was an obstacle. But, Lindsey 
wrote, “[o]bstacle or no obstacle, it is certain the Temple will be rebuilt. Prophecy 
demands it.”56  
 Walvoord, president of Lindsey’s alma mater, was slightly more circumspect than 
his former student when it came to making connections between current events and 
biblical prophecy. In his 1974 book Armageddon, Oil and the Middle East Crisis, 
Walvoord wrote that pre-rapture events were not fulfillments, but “preliminary moves,” 
which were “falling into place in rapid succession. As these moves are completed, a more 
specific timetable of events can begin.”57 Yet Walvoord—writing with his son, John E. 
Walvoord—was, like Lindsey, quick to describe how the power alignments among 
nations were taking prophetic shape. The Walvoords’ book showed that the line between 
futurist and historicist understandings of prophecy could be a fine line indeed. The world 
had already begun the “countdown leading to Armageddon,” the Walvoords wrote, and 
the rapture may be expected “momentarily.”58 They, too, saw the 1948 establishment of 
the state of Israel and the 1967 war as of crucial importance; Israel had shown that it 
would not be removed from the land, citing Amos 9:15.
59
 The Bible predicted a 
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“Mediterranean Confederacy” that would rise near the end of the present age, and the 
1973 oil embargo—the “Arab Oil Blackmail,” according to the book—revealed the new 
power held by the region. The “atheism, materialism, and military power” of Soviet 
Communism was, they wrote, preparing the way for the anti-God world religion that the 
Antichrist would introduce.
60
 The continued influence of “Russia”—the Soviet Union—
in the Middle East showed that it would be ready to invade Israel, probably during the 
tribulation.
61
 Additionally, world organizations like the United Nations, the European 
Common Market and the World Bank revealed the tendency to world government, which 
the Antichrist would introduce.
62
 All in all, the end was near: “Never before in history 
have all the factors been present for the fulfillment of prophecy relating to end-time 
religious trends and events.”63  
 Another work that did much to popularize the dispensationalist timeline in the 
early 1970s was a film, A Thief in the Night, released in 1972. Fundamentalists had long 
used charts and other visual aids to depict their understanding of biblical prophecy,
64
 and 
World Wide Pictures, a film production company associated with the Billy Graham 
Evangelistic Association, had been producing evangelistic Christian films since the 
1950s. A Thief in the Night—the title was a reference I Thessalonians 5:2, which warns 
that the “day of the Lord” will come unexpectedly, like a thief—was in a sense an 
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updating of these efforts. It, too, was clearly aimed at bringing people to faith, but it 
attempted to do so through eschatology, by depicting a young woman who missed the 
rapture and had to endure the horrors of the early tribulation period.  
 The film was produced by Russell S. Doughten, Jr., who had earlier worked on 
the 1958 cult classic, The Blob, starring Steve McQueen.
65
 Thief centers on a young 
woman named Patty, who considers herself a Christian because she engages in religious 
activities; from the perspective of the filmmakers, she clearly is not truly “saved.” She 
awakens to find that her husband and the rest of the world’s population of genuine 
Christians have disappeared in what she realizes was the rapture; those who have been 
left behind are now beginning to experience the tribulation. Soon, Patty is trying to stay 
out of the clutches of a one-world totalitarian government: UNITE, which stands for 
United Nations Imperium for Total Emergency (an indication of how the 
dispensationalist belief that the Antichrist would create a global government could feed a 
conservative suspicion of the United Nations).
66
 UNITE agents seek to put a binary 
number equaling 666—the “mark of the beast,” a reference to Revelation 13:16-18—on 
all citizens’ hands or foreheads. Those who do not comply are executed by guillotine. 
Patty flees, is trapped on a bridge and falls, apparently to her death—then awakens to 
realize it was all a dream. However, her relief is short-lived: her husband is missing in the 
rapture, this time for real. The film’s soundtrack included a song by Larry Norman, one 
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of the pioneers of the nascent Christian rock genre, titled “I Wish We’d All Been Ready,” 
to remind viewers that they too needed to be prepared for the rapture. Doughten and his 
colleagues would go onto make sequel films A Distant Thunder (1978), Image of the 
Beast (1981) and Prodigal Planet (1983), which sought to depict similar eschatological 
themes.
67
 
 These works above were just a few examples of an interest in prophecy during the 
1970s. Many of the preachers on television’s “electronic church” taught 
premillennialism, including Oral Roberts, Jimmy Swaggart, Kenneth Copeland, Rex 
Humbard, Jim Bakker and Falwell.
68
 Other writers contributed to the proliferation of 
prophecy writing during the 1970s. Some of them speculated about how the Trilateral 
Commission might be bringing about the one-world government of the Antichrist; how 
popular interest in the occult and changes in sexual morality—including greater 
acceptance of homosexuality—might be signs of the end; how the Soviet Union’s 
invasion of Afghanistan in late 1979 was the beginning of a fulfillment of Ezekiel 38; and 
whether credit cards and computers were preparing the way for satanic control of the 
world.
69
 “If we could learn to read life rightly, almost everything is a sign,” according to 
pastor Ray Stedman.
70
 For many fundamentalists and evangelicals, attuned as they were 
to Cold War fears and cultural changes, these speculations had a great deal of plausibility, 
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even when writers who shared a basic dispensationalist chronology regarding the future 
differed on various details.  
 
The Political Implications of Dispensationalist Belief 
 Clearly, for many dispensationalists, the primary implications of their beliefs 
about the future were not particularly political. Historian Timothy P. Weber has 
suggested that “American premillennialism was and is primarily a religious movement. 
Although it has had some social and political consequences, premillennialism’s 
paramount appeal is to personal and religious sentiments.”71 For many dispensationalists, 
one of those sentiments was comfort. Confident in their belief that they would spend 
eternity with Christ, they could look forward to his return for them in a pretribulational 
rapture. The troubles of this world not only were temporary, but were signs that the 
rapture was drawing ever nearer.  
 In the meantime, they were to live faithfully to God’s revealed word, which 
included engaging in evangelization. This theme was obvious in the works mentioned 
above. Lindsey ended his book by encouraging his readers to personally place their faith 
in Jesus Christ, if they had not done so already; those who had were encouraged to place 
themselves fully in God’s service, and rejoice in the “knowledge that Christ may return at 
any moment for us.”72 The Walvoords ended their book with a four-step outline 
explaining how to become a Christian. Another 1974 book, titled The Coming Russian 
Invasion of Israel, which detailed that expected event, had an additional purpose. It 
contained a call for Christians to live faithfully to Christ in the present and to evangelize, 
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and it concluded with a familiar call for unbelievers to trust in Christ. Its last chapter, 
however, was “a strategy for unbelievers,” with instructions for what to do during the 
tribulation if they found themselves left behind at the rapture. There would still be hope, 
the authors wrote; those who became Christians during the tribulation would be 
guaranteed eternity with Christ, but they might face severe hardship during these seven 
years. Above all, they should not worship the Antichrist, and resist having the mark of the 
beast stamped on them when the Antichrist had everyone “computerized.”73 But a 
predominant theme of prophecy writing was that of being prepared, through faith in 
Christ, for the rapture. Were they ready, or would they—like Patty in A Thief in the 
Night—be “left behind” to face the terror of the tribulation?74  
 Nevertheless, there were, as Weber notes, “social and political consequences” of 
dispensationalism, and some of them became more explicit in the late 1970s and 1980s. 
Dispensationalism may not have been a cause of the Christian Right, but it did shape 
evangelical political activism in important ways. This is not to suggest that 
dispensationalist theology automatically pushed its adherents into political conservatism. 
Senator Mark Hatfield, a moderate Republican who would never have been mistaken as a 
member of the Christian Right, was a premillennialist, as were a number of the signers of 
the 1973 Chicago Declaration of Evangelical Social Concern—a document that resonated 
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more with political liberals than with conservatives.
75
 But there were connections 
between dispensationalism and the agenda of the Christian Right.  
 One of the most obvious of these was with regard to Israel. Many evangelicals 
were advocates of “Christian Zionism,” which Stephen Spector defines as a biblically 
motivated support for the modern state of Israel as the Jewish homeland.
76
 Christian 
Zionism is a broad movement, and one that includes far more than just fundamentalists 
and evangelicals; its adherents had a variety of reasons for their pro-Israel stance, ones 
which may have had little to do with prophetic beliefs. American Christians in the 1970s 
could support Israel because they believed America needed an ally in the Middle East, or 
because Israel shared democratic principles with America, or because they believed the 
Holocaust necessitated a Jewish homeland. The “foreign policy” of many Christians vis-
à-vis Israel needed no support beyond Genesis 12:3, in which God promises to bless 
Abraham and to “bless those who bless you, and the one who curses you I will curse.” 
The Scofield Reference Bible of 1909, which propagated the dispensationalist system, 
also made this connection; Scofield commented on this verse that it “has invariably fared 
ill with the people who have persecuted the Jew—well with those who have protected 
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him.” While the support for Israel by American evangelicals could be heartfelt and 
genuine, then, it also had a self-serving element: they stood with Israel in its wars and in 
its disputes with the Palestinians in part because they wanted God’s blessing on their 
nation.  
 But the prophetic aspects of dispensationalism also contributed to evangelical 
Zionism. The belief that Jews would be in possession of the land of Israel when end-time 
events commenced meant that some dispensationalists saw their support for Israel as a 
way of  placing themselves on the right side of history. What difference they believed 
their support would make is an open question, given their beliefs about God’s control of 
the future: if Jewish possession of the land of Israel was divinely foreordained, then 
technically their support would make no difference one way or another. But for many 
dispensationalists this was not an important question; what mattered was that, in their 
view, God had promised the land to Israel and he was now fulfilling his promise. Nor was 
the Palestinian issue a particularly thorny one for many them: God had given the land to 
the Jews, and Palestinians who also lived in the land were often seen as little more than 
obstacles. 
 The Jerusalem Conference on Biblical Prophecy in 1971 was a sign of this 
growing relationship between dispensationalists and Israelis. The conference—whose 
organizer promoted it as a “ringside seat at the second coming”—was attended by some 
fourteen hundred people, and speakers stressed Israel’s role in God’s plan for the world. 
The Israeli government provided a venue free of charge, and former prime minister David 
Ben-Gurion spoke to the attendees about Israel as the land of the Bible.
77
 The state of 
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Israel also began to actively cultivate relationships with dispensationalist evangelicals 
and fundamentalists, including Falwell, by bringing them to Israel at government 
expense. Many of these leaders began to bring tour groups to the “Holy Land” with a 
special focus on Israel’s role in prophetic fulfillment.78 Evangelicals may have been pro-
Israel even if dispensationalism was not part of the thinking of many of them; for many, 
Genesis 12:3 was sufficient incentive. But belief about Israel’s future prophetic role was 
a fillip to a pro-Israel stance.  
 Another political implication of dispensationalism was that it added a supernatural 
dimension to Cold War fears of the Soviet Union. Of course, the Cold War era was one in 
which Americans across the religious and political spectrum believed the worst about 
“the Commies”; the fact that the Soviet Union had an alien economic system and was a 
nuclear-armed totalitarian regime in global competition with the United States was 
enough to engender paranoia. Many evangelicals and fundamentalists, though, had 
another reason: as we have already seen, many dispensationalists believed that the Soviet 
Union would be the leader of a prophesied northern confederacy that would invade Israel.  
 The effect of this prophetic belief was not always explicit. In Falwell’s 1980 
political manifesto Listen, America!, for instance, his chapter titled “The Threat of 
Communism” contains no reference to this prophetic belief about Russia, although 
Falwell, too, believed that Russia was the “Gog” of Ezekiel 38.79 Falwell instead 
discussed the Soviet Union’s plan for “world domination,” its repression of religion and 
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its bloody record of purges;
80
 perhaps this was because Listen, America! was intended for 
a wider readership than just dispensationalists who shared his prophetic views. But this 
belief about the Soviet Union’s prophesied malevolent role made dispensationalists more 
open to hawkish military rhetoric. Boyer suggests that “the connection between 
grassroots prophecy belief and nuclear-weapons policy, while real, was subterranean and 
indirect.” It was not that prophecy believers sought to hasten Armageddon in some sort of 
misguided attempt to ensure the fulfillment of prophecy. But their beliefs did lead them 
toward at least “passive acquiescence in the nuclear-arms race and Cold War 
confrontation.”81 Because they believed that war was inevitable—and with the advent of 
nuclear weapons, many began to include them in their end-time scenarios—they saw 
little point in seeking lasting peace with the Soviets. Some dispensationalists went 
beyond “passive acquiescence” and were fervent cold warriors. In a book published in 
1985, for example, Harold Lindsell (evangelical scholar and former editor of Christianity 
Today) was critical of peace activists and wrote that the campaign for a nuclear freeze 
was inspired by the KGB.
82
 As we will see in chapter 6, Falwell linked a strong defense, 
including nuclear build-up, with his program to restore “morality.”  
 Just as they viewed the Cold War through prophecy-tinted glasses, so did some 
dispensationalists see economic and political developments in the same way. For these 
believers, a globalizing economy, internationalist and ecumenical movements, computer-
based technology and the growth of mass media all lent an ominous cast to the present. In 
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this worldview, these developments were preparing the world for the global government 
that would be introduced by the Antichrist. 
 The biblical roots of this belief were in the books of Daniel and Revelation. In 
Daniel 7, Daniel is given a vision—and its interpretation—of a series of four beasts that 
represent kingdoms. The first three are recognizable as a lion, bear and leopard. The 
fourth beast, however, is “dreadful and terrifying and extremely strong,” with iron teeth 
and ten horns.
83
 Three of the horns are then torn out by a “little horn” with eyes and a 
mouth “uttering great boasts.” This fourth beast, Daniel is told, represents a kingdom that 
will “devour the whole earth”; the ten horns are kings, and the little horn will conquer 
three of them, wage war “against the saints” and speak against God. Revelation 13 uses 
similar imagery: a beast with ten horns and seven heads—one of which had had a fatal 
wound that had been healed—comes out of the sea and rules the entire earth. This beast 
also blasphemes against God and is worshipped by the world. The term “Antichrist” is 
not used in either passage; that term is used in the Bible only in I and II John (Greek 
antichristos), where the emphasis is not on a single individual but on a general spirit of 
deception that opposes the worship of Jesus.
84
 II Thessalonians 2:3-4, another passage 
that prophecy writers saw as referring to the Antichrist, speaks of “the man of 
lawlessness…the son of destruction” who will claim to be God, demand to be worshipped 
and be seated in the temple.  
 Interpretation of these cryptic passages has been widely varied in Christianity’s 
history. Some interpreters have seen these descriptions as referring to individuals or 
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kingdoms that were persecuting the religious communities of the books’ authors at the 
time of their creation. Others have seen them as generalized, symbolic descriptions of 
evil applicable during any period. Futurist interpreters like dispensationalists have held 
that these visions describe an individual yet to come—the Antichrist—who will set 
himself up in opposition to God and establish a worldwide rule.
85
 For pretribulational 
dispensationalists, this will happen during the tribulation and after the rapture of the 
church. That bit of chronological detail, however, did not stop many of them from 
speculating about the Antichrist’s identity, believing that perhaps his presence on earth 
could be discerned even before his final rise to power. Thus, the “Antichrist” label has 
been suggested for a remarkable number of candidates in Christian history. Among 
Protestants, the Roman Catholic papacy was for centuries the most probable candidate. 
The 1646 Westminster Confession of Faith, for instance, made that identification, as did 
Martin Luther and John Calvin.
86
 (For their part, Roman Catholics after the Reformation 
returned the favor, identifying those opposing Rome as Antichrist.
87
) Other possibilities 
in subsequent centuries included Napoleon Bonaparte, Adolph Hitler, Benito Mussolini, 
Israeli military leader Moshe Dayan, President John F. Kennedy, and Henry Kissinger, to 
name only a few.
88
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 Not all dispensationalists engaged in this kind of speculation about the 
Antichrist’s identity, but even many who refrained from doing so were more than willing 
to identify present trends that were setting the stage for his rule. This included seeing 
nearly any expansion of government or cooperative efforts among nations—like the 
League of Nations and United Nations—as possible preparatory moves. As early as the 
1930s, some fundamentalists saw in the New Deal sinister portents of the demonic rule to 
come. President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s use of executive power, his charismatic 
personality, and his contribution to the modern liberal state were viewed with alarm by 
some fundamentalists, and not just because they disagreed with Keynesian economic 
theory.
89
 Programs like Social Security were steps toward “socialism,” in their view, and 
thus the United States was aligning itself with the Communist, godless rule that would 
soon sweep over the earth. Lewis Sperry Chafer, dispensationalist theologian and first 
president of Dallas Theological Seminary, wrote in the 1940s that “a vast world system” 
was coming that would dominate “all parts of human life and activity.”90 Other writers in 
later decades found the beginnings of this “world system” in a variety of technological 
and social developments. The growth of the television and media industry, the ability of 
computers to catalogue massive amounts of data, the personality cults of celebrities and 
liberal Protestant cooperation in the World Council of Churches were but a few of the 
signs these observers found of the coming world order.
91
 This mindset also colored their 
view of international events. Lindsey was one of many prophecy writers to keep a close 
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watch on the European Common Market, and its addition of Greece in 1981 as the tenth 
nation caused great excitement; they believed that the ten beastly horns in Daniel 7 and 
Revelation 13 indicated that the Antichrist’s initial kingdom would consist of ten 
nations.
92
 All this was foreshadowing of the future culmination of world history. “The 
increasing availability of nuclear weapons, the propaganda power of the world media, 
and the blackmail power of international economic agreements now make it possible for 
a world dictator to seize control of the world in a way that that would have been 
impossible in any previous generation,” wrote Walvoord in 1974. “In an amazing way, 
the necessary ingredients for a world government are present for the first time in the 
history of civilization.”93  
 This apocalyptic thinking contributed to an anti-statist strand in the political 
ideology of evangelicals and fundamentalists throughout the twentieth century, and it 
helps explain why political conservatism resonated so deeply with them. There were a 
number of other factors, too, as I have already suggested. But, as Matthew Avery Sutton 
has recently observed, these beliefs shed light on why many conservative Protestants 
“fought the expansion of the state into such seemingly religious-neutral areas as health 
care, the economy, social welfare, and civil rights.”94  
 Thus, by the end of the 1970s, a number of evangelical and fundamentalist writers 
had contributed to a certain view of America’s future and its past. In their view, their 
nation had a righteous past and an ominous future. Founded on godly principles, the 
nation had fallen away from its high calling, largely due to the corruption of secular 
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humanism. And the storm clouds  of Armageddon were gathering, giving their thinking a 
renewed urgency.  
 This thinking coalesced into an ideology in which political activism, not just 
evangelism, was seen as the way forward. By the late 1970s and early 1980s, several 
writers were suggesting that while the Great Tribulation was inevitable, perhaps America 
could escape—and even mitigate—the effects of the “pretribulation tribulation” that 
secular humanism was sure to create. The chronology of the end times, in their view, was 
certain, even if the date of the beginning of the end was unknown. But in the meantime, 
before the rapture, American Christians could act to restore the nation to its purported 
godly heritage, allowing it to once again be “a city on a hill.”  
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CHAPTER 6 
 
THE FORMATION OF THE EVANGELICAL RIGHT 
 
 
 Now I know this a nonpartisan gathering and so I know you can’t endorse me, 
 but…I  want you to know that I endorse you and what you are doing. 
            
         —Ronald Reagan, August 1980, to 15,000 Christian leaders in Dallas, Texas 
 
 
 In 1971, a group of researchers published their findings on the social and political 
views of California clergy. Such clergy, they found, were largely silent on political 
issues, and the researchers explained that silence by noting that the clergy believed their 
most important mission was to prepare souls for eternity rather than change this world. 
Without individual salvation, any such social change was pointless anyway. 
 The researchers—three academic sociologists and a political scientist—further 
suggested that these beliefs were inherent in conservative Christianity. “[T]he thrust of 
evangelical Protestantism,” they wrote, “is toward a miraculous view of social reform: 
that if all men are brought to Christ, social evils will disappear through the miraculous 
regeneration of the individual by the Holy Spirit.” Evangelicals, they noted, primarily 
concentrate on conversion, and “largely ignore social and political efforts for reform.”1  
 Such a confident generalization was soon to be proven false; it was clear by the 
late 1970s that many evangelicals believed that their theology was perfectly compatible 
with political activism. It was also somewhat historically shortsighted. The researchers’ 
generalization did, for the most part, describe the political attitudes of evangelicals and 
fundamentalists during the middle decades of the twentieth century. But these groups 
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were, as we have seen, heirs of a long tradition of political engagement, rooted in the 
belief that America had a special relationship with God. That relationship was now in 
jeopardy, some of their leaders began to argue. By the end of the 1970s, a political 
theology had come into being that equated theological conservatism with political 
conservatism. In 1980, for the first time in the modern party system, a majority of 
evangelicals identified themselves as Republicans, a link that would become increasingly 
strong in the last two decades of the twentieth century. This was partly because the 
Republican Party had moved toward them. Both the 1976 and 1980 party platforms, for 
example, included support for a “constitutional amendment to restore protection of the 
right to life for unborn children,” speaking to an issue that was becoming increasingly 
important to evangelicals and fundamentalists.
2
 But the evangelical-Republican alliance 
was not just a matter of Republican courtship. Conservative Protestants themselves 
moved to the political right, increasingly antagonistic toward a federal government they 
believed was under the influence of “secular humanism.” Since the threat was coming 
from government, they believed they would have to engage politically to combat it.  
 
Signs of Strength 
 1976 was the “year of the evangelical,” according to a Newsweek magazine cover 
story in the fall of that year. There were two primary reasons for this designation. First, in 
August, a Gallup poll revealed that 35 percent of all Americans—perhaps as many as 
fifty million—said that they had been “born again,” a typical evangelical description of 
the moment when one repented of one’s sin and trusted in Jesus Christ for salvation. This 
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poll seems to have caught even evangelical leaders by surprise; it also alerted the 
mainstream press to their presence. Not just Newsweek but Time, U.S. News and World 
Report and the Saturday Evening Post featured evangelicals.
3
 The second reason was the 
presidential candidacy and election of Jimmy Carter. Carter, a Democratic governor of 
Georgia before becoming president, was open about being a born-again Christian during 
the 1976 campaign. A Southern Baptist, he was a regular church attender, taught a 
Sunday school class, and read his Bible daily. His faith gave notice that some 
evangelicals, at least, were willing to seek political power, and their sheer numbers made 
them a force to be reckoned with.
4
  
 Other candidates in the 1976 presidential race—Gerald Ford, Ronald Reagan and 
George Wallace—also professed faith in Jesus Christ, although Carter’s usage of the 
“born-again” term received the most attention.5 His faith was proof that evangelicals had 
“arrived;” their belief system was shared by a man competing for the highest office in the 
land. Many theologically conservative Protestants flocked to his campaign, 
enthusiastically supportive of a candidate they viewed as one of their own. The United 
States needed a “born-again man in the White House,” said a prominent speaker at the 
Southern Baptist Convention in June, 1976. “And his initials are the same as our 
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Lord’s!”6 Carter appealed to Americans of a variety of religious affiliations, of course; in 
the aftermath of the Watergate presidential scandal, it was clear to many Americans that 
“morality” was not only a private matter, and they believed Carter to be a man of decency 
and integrity.
7
 But Carter’s candidacy and election were particularly meaningful to many 
evangelicals, and their support of him showed that they were increasingly willing to 
engage politically. While that support would dwindle during his presidency, his election 
proved that being born-again did not preclude political involvement.  
 Evangelicals in the 1970s were a growing cultural force. Their churches grew 
during this decade, as they had in the 1960s, while mainline denominations—“liberal” 
churches, in evangelical parlance—shrank. The Southern Baptist Convention grew 15 
percent during the 1970s, and other conservative churches grew by as much as 50 
percent. The Episcopal, Presbyterian, Methodist and Congregational denominations, by 
contrast, each lost about 15 percent of their members between 1970 and 1985.
8
 Some 
individual evangelical churches grew prodigiously to become “megachurches,” defined in 
one study as churches with 2,000 or more members; by 1980 there were some fifty such 
churches in the nation, a figure that continued to climb in subsequent decades.
9
 Religious 
content on television and radio—the “electric church”—was dominated by conservative 
programming like Rex Humbard’s Cathedral of Tomorrow, Pat Robertson’s 700 Club, 
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Jim Bakker’s PTL Club and Jerry Falwell’s Old-Time Gospel Hour. Accurate estimates 
of the size of the audiences for these programs were difficult to come by, but by 1979 
there were at least sixty syndicated religious television programs and five such 
networks.
10
 Mainstream media outlets carried the stories of the conversions of public 
figures like Charles Colson, who converted to evangelical Christianity after his arrest for 
his role in the Watergate scandal, and Eldridge Cleaver, former Black Panther. 
Celebrities like football quarterback Roger Staubach spoke of their evangelical faith. 
Colson told his own story in the first of his many books, Born Again. Other books from 
evangelical authors were best-sellers, including Hal Lindsey’s The Late Great Planet 
Earth (discussed in chapter 5) and Marabel Morgan’s The Total Woman, which 
celebrated and encouraged marital sex.
11
 Evangelicals also in the 1970s made gains in 
wealth and education, narrowing the gap with mainline Protestants that had existed for 
most of the twentieth century.
12
 
 The enthusiasm that some conservative Protestants had for Carter was not the 
only sign that they were moving toward political engagement, for their attitudes toward 
politics also changed over the course of the decade. Surveys done in the early 1970s 
among evangelicals and fundamentalists consistently revealed a tendency toward political 
disengagement. For example, a 1972 study in North Carolina found that those who 
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affirmed belief in an afterlife, in God, and in the truth of the Bible were less likely to 
have voted and to have been involved in political discussions than were nonbelievers. A 
national study, also in 1972, found that fundamentalists were less likely than members of 
mainline congregations to be involved in political groups, to have paid much attention to 
the 1972 election and to value political participation. Attitudes among the clergy mirrored 
those of the laity. Within less than a decade, however, theologically conservative 
Christians were marching to a different drummer. A November, 1978, Gallup study, for 
example, revealed that 31 percent of evangelicals, compared to 17 percent of non-
evangelicals, said that it was very important “for religious organizations to make public 
statements about what they feel to be the will of God in political-economic matters.” A 
September 1980 study found that 74 percent of evangelicals, compared with 53 percent of 
nonevangelicals, agreed that “it is fitting and proper for religious groups to support 
candidates and to be active politically to restore morality to public life.”13 Other 
indicators also pointed to a rise in political awareness and activism among conservative 
Protestants. Christianity Today and other periodicals read by evangelicals began to give 
more attention to political issues in the late 1970s; they also encouraged political 
involvement, whereas before they had often discouraged it.
14
 
 
The Evangelical Right Gets Organized 
 One of the clearest signs of the changing attitudes of conservative Protestants was 
the formation of a number of political action groups in the latter years of the 1970s. One 
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of these groups was Christian Voice, formed in 1979 by California ministers Robert 
Grant and Richard Zone through the merger of several groups opposing homosexuality 
and pornography; Hal Lindsey, among others, served on its policy board, as did actor and 
singer Pat Boone. Within a year, Christian Voice claimed a mailing list of over 180,000 
members from a variety of Protestant denominations, as well as Roman Catholics and 
Mormons. The group’s publicity efforts were aided by Pat Robertson, who featured it on 
his 700 Club television show,
15
 and one of its early activities was to issue “moral report 
cards” to assist voters in making decisions by classifying issues and candidates as 
“Christian” and “un-Christian.”16  
 Two more organizations with roots in California were those founded by Tim and 
Beverly LaHaye. By the late 1970s, the LaHayes were no strangers to starting new faith-
based ventures. Tim LaHaye was a graduate of Bob Jones University and had pastored 
churches in South Carolina and Minneapolis. But it was in San Diego that his ministry 
would gain national prominence; there, his Baptist church eventually grew to encompass 
three congregations, he would found a Christian college and various Christian schools, 
and help create the Institute for Creation Research to encourage the teaching of “creation 
science.” He was involved in the conservative movement in southern California, was a 
supporter of Barry Goldwater in 1964 and a frequent speaker at meetings of the John 
Birch Society.
17
 He also authored a number of books, some with his wife. During the 
1960s and 1970s, despite his own conservative politics, the LaHayes’ books focused on 
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non-political topics like family relationships, marriage, and living a Holy Spirit-
controlled life, with titles like Transforming Your Temperament (1971), How to Study the 
Bible for Yourself (1976), and The Act of Marriage: The Beauty of Sexual Love (1976). 
Together, the LaHayes led Family Life seminars to teach principles of Christian 
marriage.  
 Their efforts to rally conservative Californians in support of two ballot initiatives 
were exceptions to their focus on personal and marital issues. The first of these initiatives 
was Proposition 16, a 1966 measure that would have made it easier for local communities 
to define and regulate obscenity. Tim LaHaye served on the advisory board of the 
California League for Enlisting Action Now (CLEAN), a pro-initiative group.
18
 The 
second was Proposition 6, more than a decade later. This referendum, often known as the 
Briggs Initiative, would have allowed California school districts to prohibit gays and 
lesbians from teaching.
19
 Neither of these initiatives gained enough support to become 
law, but they indicated the LaHayes’ political interest. In 1978, in the midst of the 
Proposition 6 battle, Tim LaHaye published The Unhappy Gays, in which he argued that 
homosexuality was a harmful societal influence and that gay and lesbian teachers would 
prepare students for recruitment into the “homosexual community.”20 He would also 
launch a political action group in 1979, called Californians for Biblical Morality, in the 
wake of the referendum fight. In petitions and rallies, members of the group posed the 
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question for Christians: “How can we be more vocal in urging elected officials to make 
laws and decisions based on traditional biblical morality?”21  
 Beverly LaHaye’s group, created for women, was also founded because of these 
perceived threats to “traditional morality.” In the 1970s, she became increasingly 
concerned about what she saw as the negative effects of the feminist movement on 
American society. The National Women’s Conference in 1977 would help propel her to 
action. This Houston conference, part of the International Women’s Year, had federal 
funding, was chaired by Bella Abzug, and featured well-known speakers including 
Rosalynn Carter, Betty Ford, and Betty Friedan. Many of its resolutions, such as those 
calling for extending Social Security to housewives and expanding educational 
opportunities for minority women, were widely supported by participants across the 
political spectrum. But proposed resolutions favoring the adoption of the ERA and the 
protection of lesbian and abortion rights were opposed by conservatives and provoked a 
counter-rally across town. In Beverly LaHaye’s words, “The lesbians flooded into that 
conference and attached themselves to the feminist movement, and never again were the 
feminists able to shake the lesbians from their agenda.”22 She soon organized Concerned 
Women for America, incorporated in January 1979, as a counter to the National 
Organization for Women and dedicated initially to stopping the ERA.  
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The Evangelical Right and the “New Right” 
 Other groups were formed through the efforts of Republican political activists 
who saw an opportunity to bring conservative Protestants into a coalition that, together 
with economic conservatives, could engender Republican success. These activists, 
members of the so-called “New Right,” sought to remake the Republican Party so that it 
could create, in historian Donald Critchlow’s words, an America in which “people upheld 
traditional values, mothers placed primary value on their homes and their children, and 
parents protected their children from social evils that came from a secular culture in 
disarray.” The vision of these New Right allies included “a strong social fabric; a culture 
that looked to past tradition as necessary to the preservation of its future; and a country 
protected by a powerful military willing to exert its strength when necessary.”23  
 Among this group were Paul Weyrich, Howard Phillips and Richard Viguerie. 
Weyrich was a former aide to a Republican senator from Colorado, and in the early 1970s 
had, with financial assistance from beer mogul Joseph Coors, founded both the Heritage 
Foundation and the Committee for the Survival of a Free Congress (CSFC). Heritage was 
a policy analysis group; one of its first activities was to assist those protesting the school 
books in the Kanawha County, West Virginia controversy, noted in chapter 3. CSFC 
sought to elect conservatives to Congress, and claimed as early victories the election of 
Orrin Hatch (R-Utah) and Malcolm Wallop (R-Wyoming) to the Senate.
24
 Phillips had 
created the Young Americans for Freedom (YAF) in 1960, along with William F. 
Buckley, Jr., and others. YAF was made up primarily of college students and was one of 
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the groups giving early support to the presidential candidacy of Goldwater in 1964. 
Phillips continued to be active in Republican politics in the 1960s and 1970s and held a 
position in the Nixon administration; in 1974 he founded the Conservative Caucus with 
the aim of recruiting conservative politicians.
25
 Viguerie also had been involved with 
YAF and had worked with the Christian anti-Communist crusader Billy James Hargis, 
but his primary contribution to the conservative cause was his direct-mail expertise. 
Viguerie was a pioneer in the use of computers to create direct mail for political 
campaigns and by the mid-1970s, he had created a leading fundraising operation and was 
credited with a number of political victories. He also helped George Wallace in the mid-
1970s raise enough money to retire a large campaign debt.
26
 In 1978, Viguerie organized 
a “Truth Squad” to “expose the lies” that had led to Carter’s withdrawal from the Panama 
Canal.
27
  
 Together, these long-time activists served as matchmakers between evangelical 
leaders and the Republican Party. In doing so, they both capitalized on the rising political 
awareness of evangelicals in the mid-1970s and did much to encourage it. One of the 
groups born out of this marriage was the Religious Roundtable, later known simply as 
“Roundtable.” The Conservative Caucus was instrumental in its formation; Ed McAteer 
was a leader in the Caucus and a Southern Baptist, and saw an opportunity to reach out to 
theologically conservative clergy. Roundtable set up political forums, workshops and 
discussion groups intended to show ministers how to mobilize their congregations for 
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conservative causes. The best-known of Roundtable’s events was the 1980 National 
Affairs Briefing in Dallas, Texas, in which thousands of pastors gathered to hear 
speeches from a number of political activists, prominent televangelists and presidential 
candidate Ronald Reagan. (Carter was also invited, but declined.) Reagan drew loud 
applause when he said: “I know you can’t endorse me, but I want you to know that I 
endorse you and what you are doing.”28 
 The second organization that these New Right activists helped bring into 
existence was the Moral Majority. Not only was it the largest, but it would become the 
best-known, with its name nearly synonymous with the Christian Right as a whole. By 
the late 1970s, Falwell had long left behind his 1965 disavowal of politics, when he had 
declared that pastors needed to preach the “gospel” and stay away from activism. He also 
had become a nationally known figure—in evangelical and fundamentalist circles, at 
least—through his television program, Old-Time Gospel Hour. By the early 1980s, the 
program was carried by 373 television stations and had a mailing list of about two and a 
half million.
29
 Thomas Road Baptist Church, Falwell’s church in Lynchburg, Virginia, 
had grown into one of the megachurches of the 1970s. By 1970, it had around three 
thousand members, and was the ninth-largest church in the nation. The church operated a 
youth camp, a residential program for alcoholics, and a “family center” that provided 
help for needy families. In the 1980s the church started a crisis pregnancy center that 
housed young women so they could carry their babies to term; the center also arranged 
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adoptions for those women who chose not to raise their children.
30
 Falwell’s religious 
empire also included Liberty Christian Academy, an elementary school that would grow 
to include a secondary school, started in 1967; and Liberty Baptist College—eventually 
Liberty University—in 1971.  
 He also broadened his audience beyond his congregation through his “I Love 
America” rallies, which he began in 1975. These rallies, held on the steps of state 
capitols, were a blend of preaching and patriotism. A choir of clean-cut Liberty students, 
attired in red, white and blue, would sing religious and patriotic songs, and Falwell would 
speak about his love for country and its need for national repentance, frequently quoting 
II Chronicles 7:14.
31
 Falwell’s public opposition to homosexuality also indicated his 
growing political interest. As noted in chapter three, he supported Anita Bryant’s efforts 
in Dade County, Florida, to overturn a city ordinance that prohibited all schools, 
including private ones, from discriminating against gays and lesbians in hiring. He 
travelled to California to support Proposition 6, writing in a letter to California pastors: 
“It is time that today’s Christian generation stand up and speak out against the sin that is 
eating away at the very foundations of our nation.”32  
 Thus, by 1979, Falwell was open to starting an explicitly political organization. In 
May of that year, Weyrich, Phillips, McAteer and Robert Billings—a leader in the 
Christian school movement—traveled to Lynchburg to meet with Falwell, who 
apparently needed little persuading. Weyrich later reported that he had contributed the 
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name of the organization by suggesting that there was a “moral majority” in America 
who would agree with the Ten Commandments but who had been separated by 
geographical and denominational differences. They only needed to be unified to make a 
real difference. The name had obvious resonances both with Nixon’s “silent majority” 
and with Bryant’s terminology; she had claimed after the Miami ordinance was defeated 
that the “normal majority” had been victorious. Nowhere near a majority of Americans 
would ever join the Moral Majority, and a 1982 national poll indicated that barely a 
majority—51 percent—of evangelicals had even heard of the organization.33 But the 
name did indicate the organizers’ belief that they were standing up for widely shared 
values. These values included being “pro-life” (that is, against abortion), “pro-traditional 
family,” “pro-moral,” and “pro-American;” sometimes “pro-Israel” was added to the 
list.
34
 By June, Moral Majority had an office in Washington, D.C., with Robert Billings 
as its director. Joining Falwell on the board were pastors Charles Stanley, D. James 
Kennedy, Greg Dixon and LaHaye.
35
  
 Christian Voice, Concerned Women for America, Religious Roundtable and 
Moral Majority were not the only groups seeking to link theological conservatism with 
political conservatism. Other organizations, often more narrowly focused, were also 
formed during this period. These included the Coalition for the First Amendment, which 
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sought to reinstate school prayer, and the American Family Association, which primarily 
sought to reduce the “excessive, gratuitous sex, violence, profanity [and] the negative 
stereotyping of Christians” on television. Other groups focused on school prayer and 
abortion.
36
  
 
Why the Late 1970s? 
 From a long historical perspective, as the earlier chapters describe, the 
mobilization in the late 1970s was a resurrection of beliefs about the relationship between 
religion and government that had deep roots in evangelical history. As we have seen, 
evangelicalism as a movement arose in a culture that more or less took for granted the 
idea that the state should be the moral guardian of the culture. Many American 
evangelicals had the additional belief that theirs was a nation with a special relationship 
with God and that it was obligated to express that relationship through its laws and in the 
public sphere. Many of them since the cultural losses of the 1920s had distanced 
themselves from these beliefs regarding political action, but now were ready for their re-
application. As George Marsden has suggested, even though evangelicals were largely 
premillennial by the twentieth century, there remained a sort of “residual 
postmillennialism” that encouraged political action, rooted in their Puritan-influenced 
heritage.
37
 By the 1970s they believed that they had the numerical strength and 
communication networks to make an impact.  
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 Noting these roots, however, does little to explain why these groups formed at this 
particular historical moment in the late 1970s. One of the attempts to explain this has 
relied on the concept of “status politics.” This theory—sometimes referred to as “status 
discontent theory”—suggested that social groups politically mobilize not just to protect 
their economic interests, but also to defend their status and social respectability. In this 
model, “moral crusades attract recruits who are dissatisfied with the valuation accorded 
them by society. The resentment stems from the perception by members of a group that 
social changes have undermined the prestige commanded by their lifestyle and elevated 
to supremacy contrasting models with divergent values and codes of behavior.”38 Applied 
to the development of the Christian Right, status politics theory—in the words of two of 
its proponents—suggested that “[r]eligious identity is…bound up with cultural tradition 
as part of a total way of life. When the security and status of that way of life appear 
threatened, its religious and moral content typically become rallying points of defense.”39 
Thus, the argument was that the moral agenda of these Christian Right groups 
represented an attempt by evangelicals to protect their privileged position.
40
  
 How useful status politics theory is for explaining the mobilization of the 
Christian Right depends in large part on how we understand the status of evangelicals and 
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fundamentalists in the late 1970s. Some observers have critiqued the model, pointing out 
that during the decades of the mid-twentieth century, these faith groups did not have 
much status to lose. Their own subculture—schools, publishing industry, churches and 
parachurch organizations—may have been thriving, but it was, after all, a subculture, and 
they were not mainstream cultural insiders and shapers. Thus, their marginality meant 
that their status was not essentially threatened by the cultural changes they protested.
41
 
Yet as we have seen, evangelicals and fundamentalists were, by some measures, gaining 
social status throughout the 1970s. Their churches and institutions were thriving, some of 
their preachers were highly visible, and mainstream awareness of their numbers and 
beliefs was increasing. Their subculture was becoming increasingly integrated into 
mainstream culture, and it could be argued that their mobilization was at least in part an 
effort to protect their new gains.  
 I would suggest, however, that the status politics model fails to account for much 
of the shift in political attitudes among conservative Protestants primarily because it does 
not adequately consider the theological-political ideology that I have been describing in 
these chapters. The status politics model assumes that political mobilization is primarily 
defensive and self-interested. Yet the anxiety expressed by leaders of the Christian Right 
was not so much anxiety about their own status as it was for the existence of the nation as 
a whole.
42
 This is not to assert that political active evangelicals were entirely altruistic; 
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their rhetoric reflected their sense that they and the values they held dear were under 
attack. But—if we take their writings and speeches seriously—they also believed that the 
entire nation was threatened by creeping “secular humanism.” This mixture of concern 
for both themselves and the nation was neatly summarized in a brochure from early in the 
life of the Moral Majority: “America is entering a Decade of Destiny in the 1980’s, a 
period in which we may lose our freedoms. As she faces the 1980’s, the very survival of 
the nation and everything we hold dear is at stake.”43  
 By the late 1970s, the key elements of this political theology were in place. In its 
most basic form, it held that America had been founded as a “Christian nation” and that 
evangelicals played a special role in guarding this heritage. It held that that heritage was 
being corrupted by humanism, which showed itself in a variety of symptoms, including 
changes in gender roles, changes in sexual mores, abortion, welfare spending, and a 
decline in patriotism. It included the belief that the eschatological clock was ticking, and 
that the time was short; a strand of this political theology maintained that these changes 
were not merely political changes, but were ominous signs of malevolent spiritual forces. 
And it held that the consequences of failing to “turn back to God” would be severe, but if 
only people of faith engaged in politics, those consequences could at least be forestalled.   
 
Trigger Issues 
 Many of the changes decried by the evangelical right had been around for years 
without prompting large-scale evangelical political mobilization. Evangelicals, for 
instance, had long been critical of any sexual practice other than heterosexual, marital 
                                                 
 43. Jerry Falwell, “Why the Moral Majority?” in Moral Majority Capitol Report (Washington, 
D.C.: Moral Majority, Inc., August, 1979), The General Materials of the Moral Majority, MOR 1-2, series 
2, folder 2, Liberty University Archive, Lynchburg, VA.  
216 
 
 
sex. Deviations from that norm were fodder for calls to revival and renewal, but as long 
as the federal and state governments were neutral or supportive of evangelical mores, no 
further action was necessary.  What happened in the 1970s was the increasing sense 
among some evangelicals that the halls of power themselves had been corrupted, and that 
those governments were under a nefarious influence. Several events helped trigger that 
belief.  
 One of these was the disappointment many evangelicals felt during the Carter 
presidency. He may have shown them that a born-again Christian could participate in 
politics, but on a number of issues he failed to meet their expectations. Carter supported 
the Equal Rights Amendment and women’s rights and was moderately supportive of gay 
rights, positions that were anathema to many conservative Protestants. He spoke against, 
for example, Proposition 6 in California. While personally against abortion, Carter 
nevertheless opposed seeking a constitutional amendment to overturn the Roe decision, 
which did little to endear him to increasingly anti-abortion evangelicals.
44
 They also 
disagreed with him on economic and foreign policy issues. His signing of a treaty to turn 
control of the Panama Canal over to the Panamanian government rankled many 
evangelicals, who, like other conservatives, saw the “giveaway” as an affront to 
American patriotism. He seemed unable to control the stagflation that crippled the 
national economy.
45
 To make matters worse, his interview with Playboy magazine during 
the 1976 campaign continued to tarnish his Christian credentials among evangelicals. In 
that interview, Carter had sought to assuage any fears non-believers might have had that 
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he was a judgmental moralizer. Referring to the Sermon on the Mount, he had told the 
interviewer that Jesus equated the act of adultery with lust in one’s heart, and said that he 
had “committed adultery in my heart many times…God forgives me for it.” A few 
decades later, in a more open and confessional age, his admission might have passed with 
little comment, but in the mid-1970s it was jarring to conservative Protestants—as was 
his use of the word “screw” to refer to promiscuous sex.46 And some expressed chagrin 
that he had even spoken with a magazine they viewed as pornographic in the first place.
47
  
 An attempt by Carter in 1980 to mend fences with evangelicals may have done 
him more harm than good. In late of that year, the president hosted a southern-style 
breakfast—complete with grits—at the White House for a small group of evangelical and 
fundamentalist leaders, including Jerry Falwell, Oral Roberts, Rex Humbard, Jim Bakker, 
D. James Kennedy, Charles Stanley and Tim LaHaye. The breakfast, like Carter’s 
address to the National Religious Broadcasters gathering the evening before, was an 
attempt by the White House to shore up waning support among conservative Protestants 
for the 1980 election. Some of those at the breakfast had become increasingly vocal about 
their dissatisfaction with the president’s policies, which they viewed as dangerously 
liberal.  
 The breakfast may have reminded some of the attendees of the faith connection 
they had with the president. Afterward, Bakker noted that while he had been critical of 
the president, “it is easier to take potshots at the image on the screen than when you’re in 
the same room with a warm, decent man confessing his faith in Jesus Christ.” 
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Nevertheless, Carter’s remarks at the breakfast, in response to questions about abortion, 
school prayer, homosexuality and the lack of evangelicals in his administration did 
nothing to allay the growing suspicion of many in the group that he was failing to stem 
the tide of “secular humanism” that they believed was sweeping the nation. LaHaye 
remembered later that as he left the breakfast, he was moved to pray: “God, we have got 
to get this man out of the White House and get someone in here who will be aggressive 
about bringing back traditional moral values.” There were others in the group, he 
believed, who had the same desire. “We all had made a commitment to God that day that, 
for the first time in our lives, we were going to get involved in the political process and 
do everything we could to wake up the Christians to be participating citizens instead of 
sitting back and letting other people decide who will be our government leaders.”48 By 
1980, the candidate that many evangelicals believed would bring back “traditional moral 
values” was Ronald Reagan.  
 Another precipitating cause of the formation of the Christian Right was the 
growing gay rights movement. The 1970s were years in which homosexuality was 
increasingly visible. The Briggs Initiative in California and the Miami fight over 
homosexual school teachers were two cases in which gays and lesbians and their allies 
pushed for greater legal protection; they won the battle in California and lost in Florida. 
A number of states by the mid-1970s had eliminated sodomy laws, effectively 
decriminalizing gay and lesbian sex.
49
 As noted in chapter 3, the U.S. civil service 
commission in 1975 had removed its ban on hiring homosexuals. A member of Carter’s 
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administration met with gays and lesbians in the White House, raising the ire of some 
conservatives, including Bryant.
50
 Harvey Milk became the first openly gay person to win 
public office in California, when he was elected in 1977 to the San Francisco Board of 
Supervisors. Gay rights parades, gay and lesbian newspapers, magazines, and community 
organizations raised the public profile of homosexuality and celebrated the slogan “Gay 
is Good.” The television show Soap debuted in 1977 and featured television’s first openly 
gay character, played by Billy Crystal.
51
 While gays and lesbians still faced plenty of 
prejudice, they also enjoyed a growing—if grudging—societal acceptance.  
 For many conservative Protestants, this apparent acceptance was one of the 
reasons that political action was necessary: governments at various levels seemed to be 
siding with homosexuality. Evangelicals and fundamentalists, by and large, did not see 
homosexuality as a “sexual orientation” that one was born with, but as a sinful choice that 
they believed was clearly forbidden in Scripture. Biblical passages like I Corinthians 6:9-
10, which condemned homosexuality—along with acts like fornication, adultery, 
coveting and theft—formed the basis of their belief. In addition to the biblical 
proscription, many conservative Protestants, as well as other Americans, simply found 
homosexual practice abnormal and a perversion of natural sexual activity. Furthermore, 
many of them increasingly saw it not just as a sin, but as a threat to families. Matthew 
Lassiter has noted that in the 1970s the “crisis of the American family” was a  
“mainstream feature of the decade”; evangelicals and fundamentalists were not the only 
ones who were fearful in the wake of the sexual revolution, rising divorce rates, and 
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increased cohabitation.
52
 Conservative Protestants believed that two-parent, heterosexual 
families were a key building block of society, and that arrangements outside that norm 
were not only sinful, but dangerous for the entire culture. “[H]ow can I be silent about the 
sins that are destroying the moral fiber of this nation?” wrote Falwell in August 1979 in a 
fund-raising letter for the new Moral Majority. “How can I be silent about abortion, 
homosexuality, pornography, and laws that seek to destroy the Christian family?”53  
 A third “trigger issue” for the formation of Christian Right groups in the late 
1970s was the Internal Revenue Service’s attention to the tax-exempt status of private 
Christian schools. Following the Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954 and the 
federal government’s subsequent stepped-up efforts to desegregate public schools, private 
religious schools had exploded in number, especially in the South. Nationally, enrollment 
in such schools tripled between the mid-1960s and the late 1970s; in Mississippi, for 
example, the number of non-Catholic private schools rose from seventeen in 1964 to 155 
by 1970.
54
 Some of these schools clearly had been formed as “segregation academies,” 
born out of the desire of white parents to have their children educated apart from African-
American children. Yet there was a mixture of other motives, as well. Many Christian 
parents also wanted religious instruction, including the sorts of prayers and Bible reading 
banned by the Supreme Court in public schools, to be part of their children’s education; 
to have “traditional” gender roles respected; to have their children taught a “biblical 
                                                 
 52. Matthew D. Lassiter, “Inventing Family Values,” in Rightward Bound, 14.  
 
 53. Falwell, Moral Majority mailing, August 22, 1979, The General Materials of the Moral 
Majority, MOR 1-2, series 3, folder 3, Liberty University Archive, Lynchburg, VA.  
 
 54. Kalman, Right Star Rising, 272; Joseph Crespino, “Civil Rights and the Religious Right,” in 
Rightward Bound, 93.  
221 
 
 
worldview,” which did not include evolution; and to have their schools inculcate a 
respect for authority and a patriotism some of them believed public schools were lacking.  
 Thus, these schools existed at the crossroads of race and religion, and the IRS had 
the unenviable task of attempting to sort out these motives. Private Christian schools 
were classified as charitable organizations, and donations to them—often enabling their 
existence—were tax-exempt. The question for the IRS was how to determine whether 
they were actually “church schools,” existing for religious reasons, or whether they were 
“white-flight schools” and thus undeserving of tax-exempt status. A lawsuit in 1969 by a 
group of African-American parents in Mississippi against the IRS (Green v. Kennedy) 
was part of the reason the federal agency began to act.
55
 There was also growing political 
pressure. While President Richard Nixon was not eager to alienate potential white 
Republican voters through aggressive efforts on the issue, he also wanted to appear as a 
racial moderate, and in 1970 instructed the IRS to deny tax exemptions to schools that 
were racially discriminatory. A 1971 district court decision in the Green case mandated 
the same thing, and the agency began to draw up policies based on the court’s 
prescriptions. It also revoked the tax-exempt status of Bob Jones University in 1975, 
which had denied admission to African-American students until 1971, and still banned 
interracial dating and marriage. In 1978 the IRS announced new benchmarks that schools 
had to meet to retain their tax status. If Christian schools had been formed at the same 
time that public schools in the community had been desegregated, those schools needed 
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to prove that they had “significant” numbers of minority enrollment and were actively 
seeking minority students.
56
  
 These regulations created a firestorm among supporters of Christian schools—
hundreds of thousands of letters were sent to the IRS and to members of Congress.  
Falwell joined the disapproving chorus. “The Infernal [sic] Revenue Service has been 
questioning the taxability, the exempt status of Christian schools,” he said in a sermon in 
February, 1979. “Why? To put the Christian schools out of business. Why? Because 
they’re motivated by the devil in this effort, that’s why.”57 For many conservative 
Protestants, the IRS action became yet another reason to dislike Carter, even though the 
regulations had been in the works since the Nixon presidency.  
 Weyrich and other Republican activists saw a chance to bring evangelicals and 
fundamentalists to the party, linking their religious concerns to the conservative theme of 
a meddling federal government. Senator Bob Dornan (R-California) called for the 
resignation of the IRS commissioner, asserting that the IRS had assumed Christian 
schools were “guilty until proven innocent…People all over this land are sick and tired of 
unelected bureaucrats engaging in social engineering at the expense of our cherished 
liberties.”58 Congress held hearings on the issue, and Senator Jesse Helms (R-North 
Carolina) helped pass legislation that blocked enforcement of the IRS guidelines.
59
 In 
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1982, the Reagan administration reinstated Bob Jones University’s tax-exempt status, 
creating a wave of protest that the White House was supporting racial discrimination; the 
university would eventually lose a Supreme Court decision that upheld the original 
position of the IRS.
60
  
 Both Viguerie and Weyrich would later claim that it was the IRS controversy, 
more than any other issue—including abortion—that created the Christian Right. The 
agency’s action “kicked the sleeping dog,” Viguerie claimed. “It galvanized the religious 
right. It was the spark that ignited the religious right’s involvement in real politics.”61 
Weyrich asserted something similar. “[The IRS action] enraged the Christian community 
and they looked upon it as interference from government,” he said in an interview years 
later. “[I]t suddenly dawned on them that they were not going to be able to be left alone 
to teach their children as they pleased. It was at that moment that conservatives made the 
linkage between their opposition to government interference and the interests of the 
evangelical movement.”62  
 The timing of the creation of the prominent Christian Right organizations 
indicates that the IRS controversy was certainly a factor in their creation. The Roe v. 
Wade decision in 1973 alone had not been enough to mobilize conservative Protestants to 
political action, nor had the passage of the ERA or such things as rising divorce rates and 
the increased availability of pornography. The IRS move did indeed “kick the sleeping 
dog.” But suggesting that it was essentially the only factor, as some have done, probably 
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goes too far.
63
 Abortion was of increasing concern to many evangelicals by the late 
1970s, largely because of Schaeffer’s efforts, and for many evangelicals and 
fundamentalists who were not in leadership roles or associated with Christian schools, the 
IRS’s moves probably had little political salience.  
 Even for the leaders of the Christian Right groups, the IRS controversy was only 
one reason for their growing suspicion of the government. In the early 1970s, Falwell’s 
ministry had issued bonds that allowed it to raise over $6 million. In 1973, the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged the ministry with “fraud and 
deceit.” At the least, the bond issue had been amateurish and poorly documented, and the 
investigation revealed that the finances of Falwell’s church were in trouble. But the 
SEC’s charges were dropped after an investigation, and there was no indication that 
Falwell and his associates had engaged in intentional wrongdoing; Falwell continued his 
fund-raising efforts that put the ministry on a sounder financial footing. For Falwell, 
however, the entire incident was an example of “government interference in the work of 
the church.”64 LaHaye’s church, in the mid-1970s, attempted to get a zoning variance 
passed by the city council, and was rejected. This experience convinced him that “men 
and women largely hostile to the church controlled our city.”65 These two men, at least, 
believed that they had additional reasons beyond the schools issue for their belief that 
government was too intrusive. James Robison, a Texas-based television preacher with a 
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national following, dating his politicization to a different type of episode. Robison’s 
program was pulled from a Dallas television station in February 1979 after he asserted 
that homosexuality was a sin and charged that gays sometimes recruit children for sexual 
acts. In response, Robison organized a rally at the Dallas Convention Center on the theme 
of “freedom of speech, the right to preach.” The rally was attended by ten thousand 
people, including Falwell, and the station put Robison back on air. The rally also linked 
him with New Right activists like Phillips and Weyrich; Robison would soon be the 
primary spokesman for the Religious Roundtable, formed later that year.
66
 Thus, the IRS 
controversy was not the only event that prompted the formation of the Christian Right 
organizations. 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
EVANGELICAL POLITICAL THEOLOGY IN  
THE AGE OF REAGAN 
 
 
 Let us unite our hearts and lives together for the cause of a new America…a 
 moral America in which righteousness will exalt this nation. Only as we do this 
 can we exempt ourselves from one day having to look our children in the eyes and 
 answer this searching question: “Mom and Dad, where were you the day freedom 
 died in America?”  
            
               —Jerry Falwell, Listen, America!, 1980 
 
 
 In 1980, Ronald Reagan was elected president of the United States with the help 
of theologically conservative white Protestants. When he took the oath of office on 
January 20, 1981, his left hand rested on a King James Bible opened to II Chronicles 
7:14, a verse long favored by politically engaged evangelicals as a sign that God 
promised to bless a nation that relied on him: “If my people, which are called by my 
name, shall humble themselves, and pray, and seek my face, and turn from their wicked 
ways; then will I hear from heaven, and will forgive their sin, and will heal their land.”1  
 Reagan’s election was a turning point in the political history of evangelicals. 
About 65 percent of them voted for him in the election, not as high a percentage as had 
voted for Nixon in 1972 (84 percent), but considerably more than had voted for the 
Republican candidate Gerald Ford in 1976. And—in a shift that would hold true for years 
to come—the 1980s were the first years that more evangelicals identified as Republicans 
than as Democrats. Evangelicals would also become an increasingly important part of the 
Republican coalition. Their percentage of the Republican Party presidential vote would 
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continue to rise throughout the remaining twentieth-century elections; in 2004, white 
evangelical Protestants accounted for about 40 percent of George W. Bush’s support.2  
 How much credit for Reagan’s election was due to evangelicals and 
fundamentalists and to new Christian Right organizations was a matter of some debate.
3
 
What was certain was the affection that many of them—especially the leaders of those 
political groups—felt for the new president. They celebrated the “beginning of a new era 
of conservatism in America,” in the words of one of the leaders of the Christian Voice.4 
Jerry Falwell spoke publically of “our beloved president,” especially praising Reagan’s 
anti-abortion stance. Reagan “has taken his stand for this country, and some things that 
he’s said lately have just made me feel that God was really talking to him. I hope you’re 
praying for your president. We want God to bless America.”5  
 The affinity between evangelicals and Reagan might at first glance have seemed 
odd. Reagan was divorced, hardly a faithful church attender, and a movie actor during the 
mid-twentieth century when most fundamentalists excoriated anything coming out of 
Hollywood. As California governor, he had signed a law expanding abortion rights, and 
later had opposed the Briggs Initiative in his state. Yet many evangelicals and 
fundamentalists loved his strong anti-Communist rhetoric, his support for prayer in 
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schools and his “endorsement” during the 1980 campaign of their efforts to apply what 
they viewed as biblical morality to politics. By the 1980 campaign, Reagan was firmly 
against abortion; his party’s platform included anti-abortion language, as it had in 1976. 
The platform also pledged to “halt the unconstitutional regulatory vendetta launched by 
Mr. Carter’s IRS Commissioner against independent schools.”6 Finally, many 
conservative Protestants deeply resonated with his affirmation of the supposed divine 
origins of America and his optimistic blend of patriotism and religious faith. As early as 
1952, Reagan—still a Democrat—told a graduating college class: “I, in my own mind, 
have thought of America as a place in the divine scheme of things that was set aside as a 
promised land.”7 He would retain this type of religious patriotism throughout his career, 
even as his other political beliefs evolved; perhaps the best-known of these references 
was his use of the biblical phrase “city on a hill” to describe America, hearkening back 
both to John Winthrop and to the Sermon on the Mount.
8
   
 
The Evangelical Right and America’s Past 
 In the late 1970s and 1980s, a number of writers made contributions to an 
ideology that made political activism not only plausible, but necessary. The sampling that 
follows in this chapter illustrates an ideology that helped cement the growing alliance 
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between theologically conservative Protestants and the Republican Party. These writings 
helped overcome any residual reluctance many of them had regarding political activism; 
for many evangelicals and fundamentalists in the remainder of the twentieth century and 
on into the twenty-first, political activism would be simply taken for granted as an 
expected part of their faith. Increasingly, that activism would be conservative.  
 One of the key elements of this ideology was the familiar belief that America had 
been founded with a special relationship with God. Various writers expressed this belief 
in different ways. For Francis Schaeffer, the key element was that the nation had been 
founded on a “Christian consensus,” broadly defined, rather than on a “humanistic base.” 
This meant for Schaeffer that the American founders believed that God rather than 
humans was the “final reality”; that is, that God existed as creator and governor of the 
universe and had bestowed value and rights on his human creation. Thus, the American 
legal system did not create rights for Americans; it merely recognized what God had 
already granted. “Think of this great flaming phrase: ‘certain inalienable rights,’” 
Schaeffer wrote. “Who gives the rights? The state? Then they are not inalienable because 
the state can change them and take them away.” Those rights, he argued, come from God, 
and the founders worked from “the concept that goes back into the Judeo-Christian 
thinking that there is Someone there who gave the inalienable rights.”9 Tim LaHaye, who 
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was heavily influenced by Schaeffer, echoed this idea, although he was a bit more 
specific. America was founded not on Christian principles as such, but on “biblical 
principles, all of which are found in the Old Testament and therefore should not exclude 
any but the most anti-God, antimoral humanist thinkers of our day.”10 The basis for 
America’s laws and Constitution, LaHaye asserted, was the “last six commandments of 
the Decalogue, dealing with man’s treatment of his fellowman, and the civil laws of the 
Old Testament.”11  
 By pointing to the Old Testament and the Ten Commandments as the source of 
the American legal system, LaHaye was attempting to make alliances not just with all 
Christians, but also with Jews. Other writers, however, asserted that the New Testament, 
too, was influential in America’s creation. The nation’s founders “almost to a man, 
believed in God,” wrote Pat Robertson in the mid-1980s. “They were students of the Old 
and New Testaments and were deeply influenced by the life and teachings of Jesus. They 
founded the nation on principles basic to our Judeo-Christian heritage.”12 America’s 
“godly” past was a constant theme in Falwell’s speeches, sermons and writings. “Any 
diligent student of American history finds that our great nation was founded by godly 
men upon godly principles to be a Christian nation,” Falwell wrote in Listen, America!, 
published in 1980 shortly after his Moral Majority organization was formed. “Our 
Founding Fathers were not all Christians, but they were guided by biblical principles. 
They developed a nation predicated on Holy Writ. The religious foundations of America 
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find their roots in the Bible.”13 For these activists, these beliefs about America’s past 
were not simply historical assertions, but were justification for political action. Their 
political activism, they could argue, was merely a defense of the nation’s historical 
worldview that they themselves still shared.
14
  
 At times, however, these assertions about America’s “Christian” past were 
detrimental to their agenda, for they sought to build as large a coalition as possible, and 
claiming that America was uniquely Christian could be off-putting to some potential 
allies. The leaders of the Moral Majority were particularly explicit regarding what they 
believed was their non-sectarian agenda, claiming support from Catholics, Jews, 
Protestants, and Mormons—anyone longing for a “return to moral sanity.”15 Falwell 
attempted at times, partly depending on his audience, to modulate his “Christian nation” 
rhetoric. “I don’t think America has ever been or can be a Christian republic,” he said in a 
television interview just a year after he had claimed the opposite in Listen, America!. “I 
believe that America…is a nation under God, built upon the Judeo-Christian ethic.”16 
Whether America had been a “Christian” nation or merely a “religious” one was a 
distinction that for political purposes Falwell often did not care to make.  
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 Another belief about America’s past that figured large in the ideology of the 
evangelical right was a certain understanding of the U.S. Constitution’s First 
Amendment. John Whitehead was one of proponents of the idea that the amendment did 
not mandate a “separation of church and state.” Whitehead had a law degree from the 
University of Arkansas and was converted to an evangelical faith after reading Lindsey’s 
The Late Great Planet Earth, which he had started reading because he thought it was 
science fiction. While living in California, Whitehead began attending a church pastored 
by the Christian Reconstructionist Rousas John Rushdoony, and through Rushdoony 
became fascinated by the relationship between the American founding and Christianity. 
In 1980, Whitehead defended in court a San Francisco church that had been sued by its 
former organist after the church dismissed him because of his homosexuality. Whitehead 
won the case, and came to the attention of Christian Right activists, including Francis and 
Franky Schaeffer. Soon, he was collaborating with them on two books: his own, which 
would be called The Second American Revolution (1982) and contributing research for 
one of Francis Schaeffer’s final books, A Christian Manifesto (1981).17  
 Much of Whitehead’s book would have been familiar to anyone who had read 
Schaeffer’s previous writings. Whitehead argued that America had been founded with a 
“biblical base”: the American founders believed in a God who governs his creation and 
who gives laws that are absolute.
18
 Thus, law is not something that can be invented, and 
Whitehead castigated what he referred to as “sociological law,” the idea that law evolves 
and is whatever those in authority say it is. This concept of sociological law, Whitehead 
                                                 
 17. Barry Hankins, Francis Schaeffer and the Shaping of Evangelical America (Grand Rapids: 
William B. Eerdmans, 2008), 193-194.  
 
 18. John W. Whitehead, The Second American Revolution (Elgin: David C. Cook, 1982), 32.  
 
233 
 
 
believed, was shaping American jurisprudence.
19
 Whitehead’s additional complaint was 
that the First Amendment, with its guarantee that “Congress shall make no law respecting 
an establishment of religion,” was being used in a way it was never intended: to prevent 
“Christians from exercising their beliefs and influencing the society in which they live.” 
The First Amendment, he argued, was intended to prevent the establishment of a national 
church and to protect—rather than end—the state-established churches in existence at the 
time the Constitution was ratified. The amendment was not intended, Whitehead asserted, 
to prevent individual Christians and churches from bringing their faith into the public 
sphere. Whitehead particularly criticized the Supreme Court’s decisions regarding school 
prayer and Bible reading, and suggested that Christians had the right to post the Ten 
Commandments in public spaces.
20
 In essence, Whitehead argued that the First 
Amendment was designed to protect churches from governmental interference and not 
the other way around, an argument that evangelical conservatives would assert again and 
again in subsequent decades.
21
 
 
“Humanizing America”  
 America may have had a divinely blessed beginning, according to these writers, 
but it was now being corrupted by immorality and the influence of secular humanism. 
                                                 
 19. Whitehead, The Second American Revolution, 49-50.  
 
 20. Ibid., 93-100.  
 
 21. See, for example, John Eidsmoe, God and Caesar: Christian Faith and Political Action 
(Westchester: Crossway Books, 1984), 19-24. Perhaps the best-known proponent of this view today is 
David Barton and his organization, Wallbuilders. Barton, named one of Time magazine’s twenty-five 
“most influential evangelicals” in 2005, is an author, lecturer and Republican Party activist whose constant 
theme is the purported Christian roots of America. Time, February 7, 2005, accessed March 20, 2014,  
http://content.time.com/time/ specials/packages/article/0,28804,1993235_1993243_1993261,00.html. For 
Barton’s beliefs about the First Amendment, see in particular his book Original Intent: The Courts, the 
Constitution, and Religion (Aledo: Wallbuilders Press, 1996).  
234 
 
 
Like Puritan preachers of the colonial period issuing jeremiads, these activists were, in 
Michael Lienesch’s phrase, “troubled patriots,” and lamented what they saw as the evils 
of modern American society.
22
 They found the culprit in an “anti-God worldview” that 
Schaeffer had been describing for nearly two decades. Secular humanism, Falwell said in 
1982, “is fast becoming the dominant religion of our society in America,” and the nation 
was forsaking the “Judeo-Christian values” of its founding. “As far as God’s dealing with 
society is concerned, I personally feel that America is in trouble. I think in serious 
trouble.”23  
 For these leaders, the secret to understanding a society was not by examining its 
institutions, culture or demographics. Rather, they followed Schaeffer in asserting that the 
key was in understanding its presuppositions—the basic beliefs that undergirded 
everything else. One of the best illustrations of how Schaeffer’s concept could be put into 
political service was LaHaye’s The Battle for the Mind, published in 1980.24 There were 
only two possibilities for human thought, LaHaye wrote: one either began with “man” or 
with God. Humanism, he wrote, is “a man-centered philosophy that attempts to solve the 
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problems of man and the world independently of God.”25 Freely admitting his debt to 
Schaeffer, LaHaye elaborated how humanism was infecting modern America, and 
asserted that “unless the 60 million people who George Gallup’s poll indicates are 
Christians wake up to who the enemy really is, the humanists will accomplish their goal 
of a complete world takeover by the year 2,000.” The members of the American 
Humanist Association and the few hundred signers of “Humanist Manifesto I” (1933) and 
“Humanist Manifesto II” (1973) were but the tip of the iceberg. The godless philosophy 
was widespread, LaHaye alleged, and its adherents were quickly “humanizing 
America.”26  
 The five basic tenets of humanism, LaHaye wrote, were atheism, evolution, 
amorality, autonomous man and a “socialist one-world view.” Humanists reject the idea 
of God and thus “must explain man’s existence independent of God.” For LaHaye, belief 
in the theory of evolution was rooted not in empirical observation but in this rejection of 
a divine creator. As noted in chapter 6, LaHaye was one of the founders of the Institute 
for Creation Research, a group dedicated to discrediting evolutionary theory and 
defending a creationist view. He asserted that there was no evidence for the kind of 
species-change demanded by evolution. Humanists continued to cling to the theory, he 
wrote, because if their theory was discredited, “their entire humanistic philosophy will 
collapse.” Evolution was related to “amorality,” the third tenet of humanism: “If you 
believe that man is an animal, you will naturally expect him to live like one.” The spread 
of sexual permissiveness, homosexuality, pornography, “easy divorce,” trial marriages, 
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“inflammatory sex education forcibly taught our school children from kindergarten 
through high school” and drug abuse were only some of the evidence of the moral fallout 
resulting from belief in evolution, according to LaHaye. The belief that “man” was 
autonomous—that is, independent from God—had additional dire consequences. It led to 
a pursuit of “self-actualization” to the exclusion of compassion, to an emphasis on 
pleasure rather than responsibility, and to selfishness and general social disharmony. 
Finally, LaHaye asserted that humanists “have a running romance with big government. 
They universally assume that government is good and that big government is better than 
little government…Anyone familiar with humanist writers is struck by their consistent 
hostility toward Americanism, capitalism, and free enterprise.”27  
 LaHaye’s argument here was essentially that because humanists had forsaken 
belief in God, they replaced it with a belief in government. Thus, LaHaye found sinister 
humanistic motives behind any expansion of government or international organization. 
The United Nations came in for special attack: “The humanists discovered early,” he 
wrote, “that the UN offered them a tremendous springboard to a humanist one-world 
government with a socialistic economic system.” LaHaye alleged that humanists were 
especially influential in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO), that they saw abortion as a means of population control, that 
they sought to subvert national sovereignty, and that the result might be Soviet or 
Chinese troops on U.S. soil. Humanists were not influential only at the U.N. He wrote 
that “over 50 percent of our legislators are either committed humanists or are severely 
influenced in their thinking by the false theories of humanism”; according to LaHaye, the 
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humanists were “why we were not permitted to win in Korea and Vietnam and why they 
voted to give away the Panama Canal.” In language reminiscent of earlier communist-
conspiracy theories propagated by the John Birch Society, LaHaye charged that the U.S. 
government—especially the State Department—was filled with humanists. This, he 
wrote, was why “America has faded from its position as the most powerful nation on 
earth to our present status of military inferiority to Russia.”28  
 Humanism seemed to be behind every political position LaHaye disliked. 
Abortion, the push for homosexual rights, government deficit spending, the elimination 
of capital punishment, “national disarmament” (apparently a reference to nuclear arms 
limitations talks with the Soviet Union), higher taxes, the Equal Rights Amendment and 
“unnecessary busing” (referring to efforts to create racially mixed schools) were all 
evidence of this humanist conspiracy. All these, LaHaye asserted without elaboration, 
were opposed by a majority of the American people, yet “we are being controlled by a 
small but very influential cadre of committed humanists, who are determined to turn 
traditionally moral-minded Americans into an amoral, humanist country.”29  
 The concept of “secular humanism” at least partially explains the sweeping nature 
of LaHaye’s list of alleged social ills. On some of these issues—such as abortion, 
homosexuality, and the ERA—he and other evangelicals believed that they had biblical 
grounds for their opposition. Scripture, they believed, taught that God created life in the 
womb, that homosexual activity was a perversion of his creation, and that the ERA 
subverted the divinely ordained order of “husband leadership” in marriage and the home. 
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But why did LaHaye—and other politically conservative evangelicals—assert that such 
things as tax increases, relinquishing control of the Panama Canal, nuclear arms reduction 
and busing were signs of an “atheistic, amoral” agenda?  
 Perhaps his opposition to busing, at least, was rooted in nothing more than his 
insensitivity as a white man—to put it mildly—to the racial disparity in America. He 
argued that the “church of Jesus Christ is the last obstacle for the humanists to conquer. 
The 1960s saw the battle for racial rights. In the 1970s, it was sexual rights. But the 
1980s have been designated for the battle against religious rights.” He also suggested that 
the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) was one of 
the “special interest groups” used by humanists to advance their agenda.30 These were no 
more than passing references, but LaHaye clearly branded the entire the civil rights 
movement as a humanist-inspired effort. At the least, LaHaye seemed unaware of how 
offensive this suggestion would have been to those marchers for civil rights whose 
activities were inspired by deep Christian faith. At the worst, he was revealing his own 
crude racism and appealing to that of his readers.  
 Whatever his own deeper motives with regard to race, the focus of his book was 
on uncovering the agenda and power of the secular humanist worldview. Understanding 
LaHaye’s use of this concept helps explain how he could see such disparate issues as 
“moral” ones. His thinking was strongly dualistic; according to The Battle for the Mind, 
all concepts—including political positions—were rooted either in a belief in God or in 
atheism. There was no middle ground, and it led him to categorize as “humanist” beliefs 
that might to others have seemed morally neutral. One of the beliefs rooted in atheism, he 
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alleged, was the humanist goal of a “one-world, socialistic government.” The humanist, 
he wrote, “yearns for an international oneness of all people and seems willing to sacrifice 
national benefits to international unity.” Goals such as ending world poverty or bringing 
about world peace were indeed desirable, LaHaye wrote. But attempting to engineer them 
through government action was both detrimental to society and dangerous. Trying to 
guarantee a minimum income through a welfare system, he asserted, “is the worst human 
demotivator ever conceived by government.” And seeking world peace through 
disarmament denied the innate sinfulness of human beings; human evil needed to be 
restrained through the threat of force. “If [humanists] would learn a lesson from history, 
they would find that such a utopian life-style has never existed and never will. Mankind 
must experience a change in nature before people can live together as brothers in a world 
of peace.”31  
 Thus, LaHaye branded as “humanistic” any governmental action that seemed like 
an attempt to create equality (like busing, or higher taxes to pay for welfare spending) or 
seemed to limit American sovereignty and power (like the Panama Canal issue or arms 
reduction). These were attempts, in his thinking, by humanists to engineer an egalitarian 
world and would end in disaster. Whether his own attempts to implement a conservative 
political agenda were also an attempt to engineer a “utopia” of his own creation—
regardless of whether people had a “change in nature”—was a question that he never 
addressed.  
 LaHaye was not the only evangelical leader in this period to allege the pernicious 
influence of humanism. Several of them wrote glowing back-cover blurbs for his book. 
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These included D. James Kennedy, pastor of the large Coral Ridge Presbyterian Church, 
in Fort Lauderdale, Florida; Falwell; and Adrian Rogers, president of the Southern 
Baptist Convention. In 1982, Kennedy told the delegates at a joint gathering of the 
National Religious Broadcasters and the National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) that 
“secular humanists have declared war on Christianity in this country and they are 
progressing very rapidly.”32 The National Association of Evangelicals (NAE) issued a 
resolution in 1981 that warned against secular humanism and its consequences of 
“unrestricted abortion, free love and homosexual practices, permissiveness in divorce, 
genetic engineering or cloning to help mankind evolve into brave new men.”33 The 
NAE’s resolution did not display the same sort of sweeping, conspiracy-minded paranoia 
as did LaHaye. But it illustrates how, by the early 1980s, the concept of secular 
humanism for many evangelicals explained much of the social change they feared.  
 
The Case for Political Action 
 The question was: how should conservative Protestants respond? The answer was 
clear to these leaders. They should mobilize politically, vote, put pressure on their 
legislative representatives and perhaps run for office themselves. Noting that Romans 
13:1-7 refers to rulers as God’s “ministers,” LaHaye wrote: “We are in a moral quagmire 
today because ministers have failed to recruit ‘ministers of God’ from our congregations, 
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to run for public office.”34 Both LaHaye and Falwell asserted that it was a “sin” that there 
were millions of non-voting American Christians; Falwell could usually get a laugh in 
speeches by asserting that it was a minister’s duty to get people “saved, baptized and 
registered to vote.”35 Schaeffer, by the early 1980s much more politicized than he had 
been just a decade earlier, echoed the importance of political action. A Christian 
Manifesto was published in 1981; in it Schaeffer asserted that there was “open window” 
for Christians to make a political difference, given the “conservative swing” of the 1980 
election.
36
 He also raised the possibility of protest and civil disobedience if the window 
closed. By this, Schaeffer primarily meant nonviolent resistance and the withholding of 
taxes. But he also suggested that force was appropriate when a government had 
“abrogated its authority,” noting the example of the American Revolution.37 
 There was no hint of such desperate measures in Listen, America!. But Falwell 
was equally forceful in his belief that America needed to return to its “moral” roots 
through political action. Listen, America! was a sort of manifesto for the Moral Majority, 
as Falwell sought to popularize and explain his organization, and much of the book was a 
discussion of the wide range of problems that Falwell believed were besetting America.  
 As was the case with LaHaye’s The Battle for the Mind, the list was long, and 
Falwell was willing to lump a variety of issues into his “moral” agenda. Large portions of 
it could have passed for a Republican politician’s stump speech. Falwell complained that 
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taxes were an “overwhelming burden,” that “government spending is out of control,” and 
that the nation’s “whole welfare system is built on a basic premise that is detrimental to 
our society.” While there were times welfare was necessary, he asserted, the present 
system was undermining the work ethic commanded in the Bible.
38
 Regarding 
international policy, Falwell, along with many other Americans of his era, believed in the 
“missile gap”—that the United States was far behind the Soviet Union in numbers of 
nuclear weapons. Listen, America! included a chapter devoted to America’s “faltering 
national defense.” His complaints about rampant government spending apparently did not 
apply to defense spending, for he wanted it to be dramatically increased. Romans 13, he 
noted, included the idea that rulers bear “the sword” to administer justice; therefore, 
American politicians who sought to reduce the nation’s nuclear stockpile were abdicating 
their responsibilities. Another international issue to which Falwell devoted a chapter was 
support for the nation of Israel. Here, he reflected fairly standard dispensationalist beliefs. 
Israel should be wholeheartedly supported, he argued, not only because of the historic 
suffering of the Jewish people, but because “God is not finished with the nation Israel.” 
Those nations that did not support Israel would incur God’s wrath, he wrote, citing 
Genesis 12:3.
39
 The middle section of the book listed social issues closer to home that 
Falwell decried. These included abortion, homosexuality, the feminist movement, 
obscenity in the media, drug and alcohol abuse, and “Satan worship and the occult” in 
rock songs, and a humanist-controlled public-education system in which students were 
taught situational ethics, evolution, and sex. 
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 The solution to all these issues, according to Falwell in the book’s final section, 
was “revival.” The revival that he called for was a curious blend of political action and 
spiritual renewal. The last chapters, for instance, included a standard evangelical 
presentation of the “plan of salvation,” complete with Scripture references. Humans are 
sinners, Falwell wrote, and thus unable to earn their way to heaven (Romans 2:23). But 
salvation is through the grace of God; it is a gift (Ephesians 2:8-9). Through faith in Jesus 
Christ, humans could receive “regeneration…the new birth.” Falwell called on his 
readers to “receive Christ as your personal Savior…Acknowledge your sin, accept His 
forgiveness and the gift of life that He offers.” In this same section, Falwell also 
discussed three areas of political action: registering to vote (and—presumably—voting); 
becoming informed about issues; and mobilizing, by which Falwell meant primarily 
contacting elected officials and lobbying them on the sorts of “moral” issues he had 
discussed.
40
 
 There were at least two tensions in this sort of rhetoric that Falwell never seemed 
to recognize, much less attempt to resolve. First, it was not clear how the sort of spiritual 
renewal he called for was to be brought about through politics. Even if his “moral 
majority” had been able to legislate its complete agenda, the question remained how that 
political victory was to bring about the spiritual humility, repentance and faith in Jesus 
Christ that Falwell’s own theology held was necessary for salvation. As he wrote, “good 
deeds alone will not save a nation, nor an individual.”41 Yet by seeking to implement a 
“moral” agenda, while at the same time arguing that that agenda did not depend on 
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“regeneration,” Falwell seems to have been seeking the sort of good-works-without-faith 
that he disparaged. As biographer Michael Winters has written, Falwell reduced “religion 
to ethics, thereby casting religion in a utilitarian role, as a prop for Americanism.” Thus 
divorced from its doctrinal core, morality became little more than “moralism, one 
ideology among many, something to be justified at the polls, not confirmed by the 
dictates of God.”42 Falwell, the evangelist, and Falwell, the political activist, thus seem to 
have been at cross-purposes with each other.  
 The second tension had to do with the two audiences to whom Falwell sought to 
appeal: evangelicals and fundamentalists like himself, and non-evangelicals who 
nevertheless believed America was on the wrong track. Falwell himself clearly rooted his 
political convictions in the Bible, and he saw—at least by the mid-1970s—conservative 
political involvement as a natural outgrowth of a Christian’s faith in Jesus Christ. When 
people were “saved” and began to study the Bible, he assumed, they should share his 
beliefs, and his sermons and speeches to fellow evangelicals and fundamentalists were 
laced with Scripture proof texts. Yet at the same time, he wanted to build a broad 
coalition of “moral” Americans who did not necessarily share his evangelical 
convictions. Thus, Falwell wanted it both ways: an agenda that his fellow evangelicals 
would support for biblical reasons and one that non-evangelicals would support because 
it appealed to broadly held convictions. Support from the latter group was never 
widespread. There were a few non-evangelicals who joined the Moral Majority, but 
                                                 
 42. Winters, God’s Right Hand, 9.  
 
245 
 
 
Falwell was never able to overcome the general perception that he was anything more 
than a spokesman for the type of conservative evangelical he pastored.
43
  
 
Will God Judge America? 
 There was another reason why these leaders believed that political action was 
necessary to fight the nation’s “corruption”: to avoid the wrath of God. Falwell spoke 
frequently of the possibility that America would face God’s judgment. “Many have 
exclaimed, ‘If God does not judge America soon, He will have to apologize to Sodom 
and Gomorrah,’” he wrote in Listen, America!. “In almost every aspect of our society, we 
have flaunted our sinful behavior in the very face of God Himself.”44 Falwell frequently 
linked the nation’s increasing “immorality” with the possibility of a loss of “liberty.”45 
His fear seems to have been two-fold. On the one hand, Falwell feared that if secularists 
gained governmental power, they could curtail the freedom of Christians to worship and 
live as they chose. But his deeper fear was linked to this idea of judgment: God might 
judge America by allowing it to slide into chaos—or even into Communist enslavement. 
Falwell was not alone in this speculation about a coming judgment of God. Lindsey and 
LaHaye, too, warned of the possibility of divine wrath.  
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 In strict dispensationalist terms, such a judgment was impossible: the only 
judgment that the Bible spoke of, according to dispensationalist theology, was the 
tribulation. But that would follow the rapture, when Christians would be taken out of the 
world; since that event had not happened, God’s wrath on the earth was yet forestalled. 
But, as anthropologist Susan Harding writes, in the 1980s these writers adjusted their 
eschatology to speculate about another possible judgment, one that was not found in the 
Bible. This, in turn, allowed them to call for “national revival” in an effort to avoid that 
judgment. Such a revival was one that few of their dispensationalist forebears had 
thought possible; the typical future scenario envisioned by premillennialists was one of 
ongoing moral decline until the establishment of Christ’s earthly kingdom during the 
millennium. Thus, as Harding writes, these writers “fashioned bold new narrative frames 
that not only cast Christians onto history’s center stage but momentarily reversed the 
course of human history, opening up a veritable ‘postmillennial window’ in the End 
Times.”46 They remained premillennialists. But they sounded like postmillennialists in 
their optimism about a national revival.  
 In The Battle for the Mind, for example, LaHaye wrote of a “pretribulation 
tribulation,” which would happen “if liberal humanists are permitted to take total control 
of our government.” Unlike the seven-year, global tribulation that he was absolutely 
certain would follow the rapture, this one was not inevitable. It could be postponed—or 
even avoided—if only Christians would politically mobilize and fight against the 
influence of humanism. Perhaps surprisingly for a book that described the humanist 
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threat to America in such dire terms, LaHaye ended his book on an optimistic note. There 
was evidence, he believed, of spiritual reawakening in America, and he was hopeful that 
American Christians would continue to be a force for global missions.
47
 Falwell, too, held 
out hope that “God has not finished with us as a nation,” in part because “America is the 
last logical base for world evangelization…If we lose our freedom and our liberty, no one 
else can spread the Word of God to all peoples across the earth.”48  
 Hal Lindsey’s book The 1980s: Countdown to Armageddon was perhaps the most 
dramatic example of how conservative politics could be joined to dispensationalism. 
After the publication of his blockbuster The Late Great Planet Earth in 1970, Lindsey 
had been in high demand as a speaker, even addressing U.S. military personnel at the 
American Air War College and the Pentagon on prophetic topics.
49
 The 1980s, published 
in 1981, was in one sense an updating of the prophetic picture in light of events in the 
1970s. The Soviet Union had continued to expand its power, most notably into 
Afghanistan in 1979; the Middle East continued to be a region of conflict, as the 1973 
Arab-Israeli War demonstrated; and the European Common Market had added its tenth 
member in 1979, which prepared it for a takeover by the Antichrist. This figure, Lindsey 
believed, was alive and perhaps already a member of the European parliament. While 
there were some surprises in the 1970s, Lindsey believed that his predictions in his earlier 
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book were still on track.
50
 What was new in The 1980s was his focus on America’s 
political scene.  
 Lindsey had given little attention to domestic politics in The Late Great Planet 
Earth. While electing “honest, intelligent men to positions of leadership” was important, 
he had suggested in that book that politicians were unable to provide the answers to the 
“basic and visceral questions of man.”51 In Lindsey’s view, biblical prophecy indicated 
that the United States would soon lose its status as a superpower and be replaced; it was 
being weakened by student rebellions, communist subversions, military cowardice, and 
loss of moral principle among its leaders. “The only chance of slowing up this decline in 
America is a widespread spiritual awakening,” he wrote.52  
 Ten years later, Lindsey foresaw the possibility of a different future for America. 
He still believed American decline was, in the end, inevitable. Since there was no biblical 
prophecy that could be construed as referring to the United States, the nation must pass 
from the international scene before those prophesied end-time events began. Lindsey 
speculated that the nation might be taken over by Communists, or destroyed in a nuclear 
attack, or become subordinate to the European confederacy. But, he suggested, there was 
also a more hopeful possibility: “If some critical and difficult choices are made by the 
American people right now, it is possible to see the U.S. remain a world power.”53 In 
other words, it was possible that the United States could retain its world supremacy right 
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up until the rapture; what happened after that would not be the concern of true Christians, 
for they would have been “caught up” out of the world to be with Christ. These “critical 
and difficult choices,” it was clear from The 1980s, meant the implementation of a right-
wing political agenda. This included a dramatic increase in military spending to increase 
its nuclear arsenal; like Falwell, Lindsey believed that the U.S. was woefully behind the 
Soviet Union in military power.
54
 For this, he largely blamed the Trilateral Commission 
and the Council on Foreign Relations. Furthermore, the “welfare state” that had begun 
with Franklin Roosevelt’s New Deal was threatening to “strangle the entire economy,” 
and a “‘free lunch’ mentality has begun working its way into the American mind,” which 
was leading to socialism. While the genuinely needy should receive assistance, he wrote, 
the Bible taught that no one should eat without working.
55
 Lindsey made no real attempt 
to link these political convictions directly with his premillennialism. Rather, he seemed to 
have arrived at them from other sources, and then adjusted his eschatology to allow for 
the possibility of their implementation.
56
  
 Lindsey, LaHaye and Falwell showed that dispensationalists were not inherently 
apolitical. That eschatology could—and did—push some evangelicals and 
fundamentalists out of the political arena. But, as Baptist theologian Russell Moore notes, 
if politically engaged dispensationalists are “inconsistent,” then the “late twentieth 
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century has seen several attempts at ‘inconsistent dispensationalism.’”57 Clearly, the 
writers sampled here along their faithful readers and many other ordinary conservative 
Protestants found that their beliefs about the future and their conservative political 
convictions were perfectly compatible. If anything, as sociologist Sara Diamond has 
suggested, their premillennialism gave an added urgency to their political efforts. The end 
of the world was probably coming sooner rather than later, and if the United States was to 
avoid an early “tribulation,” they would have to act to set it back on a course of “moral 
righteousness.”58   
 At times, these activists could sound as if they believed in a sort of national 
“prosperity gospel.” This type of thinking had a long history within American 
Christianity; its proponents taught that God would give financial and physical blessings 
to the faithful—especially to those who donated to certain ministries. Mainstream 
evangelicals usually ridiculed this theology as “health-and-wealth” when it was applied 
to individuals. Yet Falwell, for instance, seems to have assumed that God would bless the 
United States if it only became a more moral and politically conservative nation. “I think 
an unredeemed person could get all the principles of the Scriptures of the Judeo-Christian 
ethic and live by them and enjoy all the blessings from living by them,” Falwell told an 
Atlanta Baptist group in 1982. “Now he would go to hell a very disciplined person if he’d 
never accepted Christ, but he could enjoy the benefits of obedience to biblical principles 
on this earth if he lived by them because they’re automatic. They’re unalterable.” There 
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were seven such principles, he said: the “dignity of human life,” as opposed to abortion 
and euthanasia; monogamous, heterosexual marriage; “common decency,” as opposed to 
pornography; the work ethic; support for Jews and Israel; a God-centered education; and 
the institutions of the home, the state, and and the church. If only America would return 
to these principles, Falwell preached, God might not judge America but would continue 
to bless it with wealth, stability and international prominence.
59
  
 
The Hope of National “Healing” 
 To what extent did these activists speak for America’s evangelicals? Clearly, 
groups like Falwell’s Moral Majority did make an impact on the political scene. By the 
early 1980s, his organization claimed to have registered over four million voters; other 
outside observers suggested that those numbers were inflated, and that the Moral 
Majority, Christian Voice and Roundtable had together registered about two million. 
Membership statistics generated the same sort of debate. Moral Majority claimed a 
membership of over four million by 1981; outsiders alleged that the group was including 
anyone on its mailing list, and that the actual membership was perhaps 400,000.
60
  
 How many of America’s increasingly Republican evangelicals would have 
affirmed the entire ideology of these activists is not clear. Evangelicals may have voted 
for Reagan and joined the Republican Party for a variety of reasons, and not necessarily 
because they believed that secular humanism was corrupting America’s “Christian” 
heritage, or that the nation would face God’s wrath if it did not reform. In other words, 
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some of these Republican evangelicals may have registered and voted primarily as 
economic conservatives, or as military hawks, or on the basis of some other primary 
identity rather than as evangelicals, per se.  
 But when activists like Falwell were doing their best to marry evangelical 
theology with conservative politics, such distinctions were not easy to make. He and the 
other leaders discussed in this chapter helped forge an ideology that made evangelical 
support for conservative politics a familiar part of the American political landscape. For 
many evangelicals, it became increasingly obvious that they needed to be politically 
engaged, and that that mobilization would be for conservative causes. The apolitical 
focus on saving souls in anticipation of the rapture—common in the mid-twentieth 
century—did not entirely disappear. But it would become increasingly relegated to the 
sidelines of the evangelical subculture in the latter decades of the century. In its place was 
an older understanding of the relationship that Christians should have with the gears of 
government. Rather than merely seeking revival, they were called to be reformers. In the 
midst of turbulent times and with the nation afflicted with what they viewed as a variety 
of social ills, they believed they were called to lead America back to God in the hope that 
he would—in the words of II Chronicles 7:14—“heal their land.” 
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